

# **NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY**

## **MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEXT DECADE (2020-2030) – INDUCING CONSENT OR RELYING ON COMPLIANCE?**

Diploma thesis

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**ABSTRACT**

The most outstanding conceptual challenge of modern crisis management is the principle of consent. It is not a problem only at the operational level - it challenges the entire decision-making structures of crisis management operations. In post-cold war times and especially in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there has been a transition from peacekeeping with limited size and scope towards large and complex peace operations. This shift has presented peace operations with a dilemma. How to balance between maintaining consent for peace operations, whilst being able to use military force to coerce those attempting to wreck peace processes?

To address such a dilemma, this research aims to promote understanding, on what can be achieved by military crisis management operations (peace support operations) in the next decade. The research concentrates on the focal research question: Should military components induce consent or rely on the compliance of conflicting parties in crisis management operations of the next decade (2020 – 2030)? The focus is on military – political strategic level considerations, and especially on the time before political decisions to commit to a crisis management operation. This study does not focus on which actor or organisation should intervene.

The framework of this thesis derives from the so called ‘peacebuilding space’, the scope of peace operations and spoiler theory. Feasibility of both peace enforcement and peacekeeping in countering future risk conditions are analysed in this framework. This future-orientated qualitative research uses the Delphi-method with a panel of national and international experts. Citation analysis supports identification of relevant reference material, which consists of contemporary literature, the Delphi-questionnaires and interviews. The research process followed three main stages. In the first stage, plausible future scenarios and risk conditions were identified with the Delphi-panel. In the second stage, operating environments for peace support operations were described and consequent hypotheses formulated. In the third stage, these hypotheses were tested on the Delphi-panel. The Delphi-panel is sufficiently wide and diverse to produce plausible yet different insights. The research design utilised specifically military crisis management and peace operations theories. This produced various and relevant normative considerations. Therefore, one may argue that this research; which is based on accepted contemporary theory, hypotheses derived thereof and utilising an expert panel, contributes to the realm of peace support operations.

This research finds that some degree of peace enforcement will be feasible and necessary in at least the following risk conditions: failed governance; potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces; as well as in territorial and extra-territorial border disputes. In addition, some form of peace enforcement is probably necessary in risk conditions pertaining to: extremism of marginalised groups; potential disputes over previously uninhabited and

resource-rich territories; and interstate rivalry. Furthermore, this research finds that peacekeeping measures will be feasible and necessary in at least risk conditions pertaining to: potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; uncontrolled migration; consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes; territorial and extra-territorial border disputes; and potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories. These findings are all subject to both generic and case specific preconditions that must exist for a peace support operation.

Some deductions could be derived from the research findings. Although some risk conditions may appear illogical, understanding the underlying logic of a conflict is fundamental to understanding transition in crisis management. Practitioners of crisis management should possess cognizance of such transition. They must understand how transition should occur from threat to safety, from conflict to stability – and so forth. Understanding transition is imperative for managing the dynamic evolution of preconditions, which begins at the outset of a peace support operation. Furthermore, it is pertinent that spoilers are defined from a peace process point of view. If spoilers are defined otherwise, it changes the nature of an operation towards war, where the logic is breaking the will of an enemy - and surrender. In peace support operations, the logic is different: actions towards spoilers are intended to cause transition towards consent - not defeat. Notwithstanding future developments, history continues to provide strategic education. However, the distinction is that the risk conditions occur in novel futures. Hence, lessons learned from the past should be fitted to the case at hand.

This research shows compelling evidence that swaying between intervention optimism and pessimism is not substantiated. Both peace enforcement and peacekeeping are sine qua non for successful military crisis management in the next decade.

#### KEYWORDS

military crisis management, peace operations, peace support operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, spoilers, spoiler theory, Delphi method

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# **MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEXT DECADE (2020-2030) – INDUCING CONSENT OR RELYING ON COMPLIANCE?**

## **1 INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Challenges of Military Crisis Management**

“The operation has encapsulated virtually all the obstacles to effective peacekeeping. It is deployed in a vast space, lacks sufficient forces to handle that space, is overshadowed by international differences over its role, has no credible peace process to maintain – and does not enjoy the genuine consent of either the host state and many non-state actors. *The consequence is that the organisation has found itself in a strategic muddle, operating neither in an enforcement mode nor with a political basis for consent-based peacekeeping.* Even with weak consent from the state the mission was able to mitigate the humanitarian crisis – but the limitations on even that mode of operation have been highlighted by the fact that it has not stopped the host nation expelling many NGOs from the area.”<sup>1</sup> To avoid such strategic muddles in the future - the intent of this thesis is to provide insight on when to induce consent and when to rely on compliance.

The greatest single conceptual challenge for peacekeeping today, may be defining how the principle of consent applies to modern operations. Host-nation consent and exit strategies will continue to challenge peacekeeping in the future.<sup>2</sup> The problem is how far the United Nations or any organisation can operate contrary to the will of a host government. This is not merely an operational problem, but a political one that goes to the heart of peacekeeping. It highlights

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<sup>1</sup> Jones, Bruce et al.: *Building on Brahimi – Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty*, New York University, Center on International Cooperation, New York, 2009, p.10. Original quote edited by author of this thesis as not to reveal operation or organisation directly. Acronym NGO stands for *non-governmental organisation*.

divisions between states that emphasize the importance of sovereignty, and those that give humanitarian concerns and human rights precedence in some cases.<sup>3</sup>

Research of crisis management is both timely and relevant from a national interest as well as international relations point of view. Firstly, the Finnish Defence Forces' role pertaining to crisis management was clarified in recent legislation<sup>4</sup>. Secondly, developments within the overall international system have been significant. Transformation of military forces; evolving roles of UN, NATO and EU; as well as their experiences from both the Middle East and Africa, have all had an impact on military crisis management<sup>5</sup>. Military crisis management and related developments have remained high on the agenda of political, military and scientific discourse.

Contemporary military crisis management is rather new for military forces. In warfare, one is usually confronted by an identifiable enemy. In most cases of contemporary military crisis management, identifying an enemy is not plausible. Furthermore, waging war has been founded on a possibility to differentiate the battlefield and the existing societies from each other<sup>6</sup>. Existing reality is different – war occurs among the people<sup>7</sup>. Throughout history, wars have had a direct or indirect effect on societies. Responding to these challenges has been attempted by developing the ways and means by which crisis management is conducted. The UN has developed integrated mission approach<sup>8</sup>. The EU and member states are involved in developing comprehensive approaches to crisis management<sup>9</sup>. Crisis management continues to experience a significant evolution<sup>10</sup>. Peace enforcement and other various ways of using military capabilities have appeared alongside what was once called 'traditional peacekeeping'.

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<sup>2</sup> UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon: Remarks to General Assembly thematic debate: "UN Peacekeeping - Looking into the Future", 22 June 2010, [http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/speeches/statments\\_full.asp?statID=864](http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/speeches/statments_full.asp?statID=864), (18.1.2011).

<sup>3</sup> Jones et al. (2009), p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Act on the Defence Forces*, 11.5.2007/551, with effect from 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2008. *Act on Military Crisis Management*, 31.3.2006/221, with effect from 1<sup>st</sup> of April 2006.

<sup>5</sup> Raitasalo, Jyri and Sipilä, Joonas: *Sodan määrittelystä - Käsitykset sodasta sodankäynnin taustalla*, Edita Prima, Helsinki, 2004, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Raitasalo et al., p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> Nurmela, Teemu: *The Social Battlespace of Stabilization Operations – Action Amongst the People*, Edita Prima Oy, Helsinki, 2010, pp. 18–21, 126–128.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO): *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations --*, New York, 2008, [http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpps/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf), (6.2.2009).

<sup>9</sup> Rintakoski, Kristina and Autti, Mikko: *Comprehensive Approach --*, Edita Prima, Helsinki, 2008, s.11.

<sup>10</sup> Bellamy, Alex J.; Williams, Paul; Griffin, Stuart: *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 71, 93, 121. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin depict examples of peace operations as early as in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In post-cold war time, peacekeeping has experienced

Protection of global peace and security; managing the challenges posed by 'rogue' and 'failed' states on the periphery of the state system; and the protection of citizens from an expanding array of threats, are all examples of the fundamental challenges that the international community faces.<sup>11</sup> Crisis management has an important role in countering these challenges. Thus, conducting research on crisis management is pertinent from multitude points of view. Awareness of requirements imposed by future military crisis management has an impact on the development of military forces, as well as on considerations related to the employment of military capabilities. Awareness guides education and training of military forces, which develops essential knowledge to perform successfully in military crisis management<sup>12</sup>. This enhanced knowledge should especially reflect on advice provided by military experts for political decision-making<sup>13</sup>.

## 1.2 Why this Research: Dilemma of Consent Divide and Avoiding Intervention Pendulum

Humanitarian interventions have two general aims: provide emergency assistance and protect fundamental human rights. Such interventions can and often do take non-military forms of activity: emergency aid, diplomacy and sanctions – and so forth. However, forcible military interventions in humanitarian crises have proven to be necessary in ongoing conflicts. Such conflicts threaten aid and development operations, and at times encompass states that violate human rights. To these ends, humanitarian interventions are peace operations aimed at creating safe and secure environments by suppressing conflict. Such humanitarian interventions are post-cold war activity. There are several reasons for this. Cold war itself dominated international politics, and intervention in developing states was not plausible. Cold war politics prevented international collaboration in suppressing conflicts in developing states. This was mainly achieved by paralyzing the UN Security Council by vetoes. Furthermore,

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quantitative, normative and qualitative transformation. Furthermore, at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century there has been an increased demand for peace operations.

<sup>11</sup> Jackson, Robert et al.: *Introduction to International Politics: Theories and Approaches*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp.94.

<sup>12</sup> Krogars, Marco and Parikka, Eevastiina: *Sotilaana globalisoituvassa maailmassa*, Hakapaino, Helsinki, 1999, p. 52. Krogars and Parikka describe a definition hierarchy of data, information and knowledge.

<sup>13</sup> Välimäki, Pasi: *Tiedustelu rauhaatukevissa operaatioissa*, Hakapaino, Helsinki, 1999, p.1. Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, Commander UNPROFOR: " -- it is our job to make sure that propaganda does not provide the basis upon which policy is based. We have to ensure that the international community, in particular, understands the reality, not the rhetoric."



there was insufficient public pressure on great powers to ameliorate conflicts in developing states.<sup>14</sup>

Now two decades into post-cold war times, there is a well-known but relevant theoretical and practical shift pertaining to peace operations. Where humanitarian interventions were rare and considered illegitimate during the Cold War, large-scale complex peace operations have been and are being conducted in post-cold war times. There has been a transition from peacekeeping with limited size and scope towards large and complex peace operations. This shift has presented the whole context of peace operations with a *dilemma*. How to balance between maintaining consent for peace operations, whilst being able to use military force to coerce those attempting to wreck peace processes and oppose humanitarian mission? This dilemma pertains to the idea of '*consent divide*'. It is argued that should consent be withdrawn at the tactical level, where one or more hostile groups obstruct peacekeepers in the field; small amounts of force may be used to keep a mission on track. However, it is cautioned that excessive use of force could result in a collapse of consent for a mission as a whole – that is at the operational level. This implies that, a mission would have crossed the '*consent divide*', undermining its credibility as an impartial peacekeeping force and prejudicing mission legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents.<sup>15</sup>

Despite the above dilemma, during the past decades the number and scale of military interventions is at unprecedented levels compared to cold war times. This development is coined as new interventionism.<sup>16</sup> However, this *interventionism appears to sway as a pendulum between intervention optimism and intervention pessimism*. To elaborate, "--, intervention pessimism is the belief that little can be done about humanitarian disasters without the consent and cooperation of the major parties concerned; all is lost if the peacekeeping force crosses the consent divide. Intervention optimism is the belief that the international community can forcibly rebuild failed states and reform murderous ones; operational success depends on the ability to induce consent if required."<sup>17</sup> Two failures in

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<sup>14</sup> Baylis, John; Gray, Colin S.: *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 308-310. See Theo Farrell's elaboration on reasons for non-intervention.

<sup>15</sup> Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 311-313. See also Mason, David T. and Meernik, James D.: *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Societies*, Routledge, London, 2006, pp.1-11. As an example pertaining to this dilemma, the UN failed to stop Serb spoilers in Bosnia, which was eventually admitted by the Secretary-General. See United Nations Press Release: *Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Report of Secretary-General on Fall of Srebrenica*, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991215.ga9687.doc.html> (19.4.2011).

<sup>16</sup> Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 309-310.

<sup>17</sup> Baylis et al. (2010), p. 314. Bellamy et al, (2010), pp. 119-121, 151-152.

post-cold war peace operations: in Somalia from 1992 to 1995 and in Rwanda from 1993 to 1994, are examples of such optimism and pessimism.

Operations in Somalia are described as a ‘Vietnam’ of peacekeeping, and display intervention optimism. Despite huge financial effort (i.e. US\$ 1.6 billion), deploying material and personnel into Somalia, the UN failed to establish a sustainable safe and secure environment, and rebuild the state. After unsuccessful efforts of UNOSOM I mission, the UN Security Council authorized first UNITAF and then UNOSOM II<sup>18</sup>. The key idea was *induce consent if required*. Though UNITAF had modest achievements, apparent misunderstanding of military capabilities for the tasks on hand caused the overall failure of these operations. The UN failed by trying to do too much.<sup>19</sup> Matching ends to means had failed.

Operation UNAMIR had been deployed to Rwanda with a limited mandate to monitor a ceasefire and assist in relief operations<sup>20</sup>. The key idea was *do not cross the consent divide*. Unauthorized to prevent war crimes and under-resourced, UNAMIR was overwhelmed by the genocide that unfolded around it. Lack of political commitment resulted to UN failing in Rwanda by not doing nearly enough.<sup>21</sup> Intervention optimism and eventual failure in Somalia had led the intervention pendulum to sway towards intervention pessimism. Such pessimism failed the people of Rwanda.

Thereafter the intervention pendulum has continued swaying. NATO’s successful air campaign in Bosnia (1995) and in Kosovo (1999)<sup>22</sup> gave traction for intervention optimism. After such optimism, the contemporary post-conflict stabilization operations in Afghanistan have proven to be a struggle<sup>23</sup>. A pertinent question on future prospects is: will there be sufficient political will to utilise the hard learnt lessons of Afghanistan in peace support operations of the next decade?<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM); Unified Task Force (Somalia) (UNITAF).

<sup>19</sup> Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 314-317. Bellamy et al, (2010), pp. 106-107.

<sup>20</sup> United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).

<sup>21</sup> Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 314-317. Bellamy et al, (2010), pp. 108-110, 113-117. Bellamy et al. provide a useful summary of failings, which led to the UN peacekeepers stand aside in both Srebrenica and Rwanda.

<sup>22</sup> Baylis et al. (2010), pp. 324-325.

<sup>23</sup> i.e. Operation International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is a NATO led operation; and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which is a United States led operation. [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef\\_orbat.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef_orbat.htm) (22.6.2011) and <http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi> (22.6.2011).

<sup>24</sup> Here the author is grateful for useful discussion with diplomatic editor Kari Huhta, 12.8.2010.

Strategy is both a discipline and a way that has an interest to connect military capabilities to political objectives. In contemporary times of fiscal austerity within some developed states and transformations of military forces, it is evermore important to match ends to means in crisis management and peace support operations. This matching will be conducted in an international environment where there is a continuous evolution in balance of power<sup>25</sup>. In parallel, there is an evolution of crisis management and peace operations concepts, as well as uncertainties in resourcing peace support operations. Some research has attempted to match future operating environment requirements with the dilemma of consent divide<sup>26</sup>. Nonetheless, it is evident that continuous research on this issue is a prerequisite for sound future policies and practice<sup>27</sup>.

*“Consent is a requisite for legitimacy and long-run sustainability, yet coercion will be required to deal with factions resisting or defecting from a peace process”<sup>28</sup>.* The research interest is, if this statement is valid in the future. If so, under what specific circumstances is it applicable in the future? Answers to these questions may have numerous ramifications, including requirements set for military capabilities. As military engagement is about using or preparing to use military force, thus one focal question is the quantum of force required and expected<sup>29</sup>. As the examples of peace support operations from recent history show, misjudgement has led to either inefficient use of resources or unnecessary huge loss of life. Instead of accepting an ‘*intervention pendulum*’ approach, future peace operations call for comprehensive and honest appreciations of conflicts on hand. Simply, strategy must fit the case.

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<sup>25</sup> For example see: “China abroad - Welcome, bienvenue, willkommen - America needs to worry about the contrast between its attitude to China and Europe’s”, The Economist, 30.6.2011. See also Ministry of Defence (Finland): *Predictions Regarding International Actors up to the Year 2030*, Helsinki, 2007, [http://www.defmin.fi/files/1154/Abstracts\\_in\\_English.pdf](http://www.defmin.fi/files/1154/Abstracts_in_English.pdf) (22.6.2011).

<sup>26</sup> Regan, PM: *Choosing to intervene: Outside interventions in internal conflicts*, Journal of Politics, 60 (3): 754-779 AUG 1998. See also Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas: *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (2006), pp. 13-18.

<sup>27</sup> This need is underscored by the contradictions of contemporary research – see: Fortna, VP: *Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war*, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 48, no.2, pp. 269-292 June 2004. Fortna identified three contradictory arguments as a starting point for her study. See also Peceny, Mark and Pickering, Jeffrey: “Can liberal intervention build liberal democracy?” in Mason, TD and Mernik, JD (ed.): *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Studies*, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 130-132. Peceny and Pickering call for focus on strategic dilemmas between stabilization and democratization.

<sup>28</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 303-304.

<sup>29</sup> See appendix 1 for illustration on spectrum of military effort in peace operations and conflict.

### 1.3 The Structure of this Thesis

Theoretical framework and research process is described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 moves on to describe plausible future scenarios in which crisis management is likely to be conducted in the next decade. Probable risk conditions that merit crisis management efforts are also identified in chapter 3. Feasibility of inducing consent or relying on compliance in future peace support operations is evaluated and described in chapter 4. Deductions derived from research findings, recommendations on the subject matter for Finnish Defence Forces, evaluation of validity and reliability are depicted in chapter 5. In addition, propositions on areas for further research are included in the concluding chapter 5.

## 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 Key Definitions

This chapter describes how the United Nations and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization define key terms pertaining to this research. The chapter concludes by describing how peace operations, military crisis management and peace support operations are understood in this research.

NATO understands *crisis management* to include military and non-military responses to threats, be it in a national or an international situation<sup>30</sup>. NATO's role in crisis management goes beyond military operations to include issues such as the protection of populations against natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations. NATO states that its definition of crisis management entails wider tasks than peacekeeping. The NATO Strategic Concept 2010 *broadens* NATO thinking on crisis management, envisaging NATO's involvement at all stages of a crisis.<sup>31</sup> These views are similar to UN's views in the sense that crisis management (i.e. peace operations) involves military and non-military measures at a national

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<sup>30</sup> NATO, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?), (10.1.2011). It is worthwhile to note that the UN understands crisis management as a field level activity. See UN: A New Partnership Agenda (2009), p.5: "*Crisis management: When put to the test, peacekeeping missions must be prepared to respond. Timely, accurate and detailed security risk assessments can provide early warning of an emerging threat and help ensure the safety and security of missions and personnel. Scenario planning in the field is critical. In moments of crisis, reliable reserve capacities remain a vital and as of yet unfulfilled requirement for UN peacekeeping.*"

or international level. The UN approach is making, keeping and building peace. UN understands that *peace operations* are rarely limited to one type of activity, whether United Nations-led or conducted by non-United Nations actors<sup>32</sup>. The way of dealing with a crisis depends on its nature, scale and seriousness. In some cases, crises can be prevented through diplomacy or other measures while others require more robust measures such as military action. Depending on the nature of the crisis, different types of crisis management operations may be required.<sup>33</sup>

The NATO definition of crisis management includes collective defence crises and crisis response operations. Collective defence refers to what the alliance defines ‘article 5 operations’, and which are not within the scope of this research. *Crisis response operations* cover all military operations conducted by NATO in a non-Article 5 situation. They support the peace process in a conflict area and are also called peace support operations<sup>34</sup>. NATO also distinguishes natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations as a separate entity of crisis response operations.<sup>35</sup>

NATO understands *peace support operations* to be multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a United Nations mandate; or a mandate of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; or at the invitation of a sovereign government. Peace support operations involve military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to achieve long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. NATO has delineated several functions that peace support operations may encompass: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, preventive deployment, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> NATO, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?), (10.1.2011). NATO Strategic Concept 2010: “NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.”

<sup>32</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO): United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - Principles and Guidelines (2008), pp. 17-20.


<sup>33</sup> NATO, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?), (10.1.2011). For definitions of various peace operations, see also Bellamy et al. (2010) pp. 7-9; and Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas: *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (2006), pp. 10-11.

<sup>34</sup> NATO's involvement in the Balkans and Afghanistan and its efforts in countering piracy off the Horn of Africa are illustrations of this. (e.g. operations: IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Operation Ocean Shield).

<sup>35</sup> NATO, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?), (10.1.2011).

<sup>36</sup> NATO, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?), (10.1.2011). See also United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, JWP 3-50, 2nd Edition, Swindon, June 2004, pp. 15 (1-2). This manual endorses that these activities pertain to peace support operations same, but does not include preventive deployment.

The United Nations has portrayed *peace operations* to include similar activities: conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace building and preventing relapse into conflict.<sup>37</sup> These activities are discharged as an integral part of a political process. Picture 1 illustrates linkages between the activities.



Picture 1: The scope of peace operations.<sup>38</sup>

These *peace operations*, which intrude upon domestic sovereignty of states, are established in two alternative ways. In the first way, under the Chapter VI of the UN Charter, operations are achieved through negotiated consent of the parties to a conflict. Thereafter the legal terms for the presence of foreign forces are specified in the status of forces agreements. Alternatively, in the second way, operations are established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which permits overriding domestic jurisdiction without the consent of the local parties.<sup>39</sup>

NATO defines *peacekeeping operations* to be generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and they are conducted with the consent of all parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement.<sup>40</sup> For UN *peacekeeping* is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces

<sup>37</sup> UNDPKO (2008), pp. 18-19.

<sup>38</sup> UNDPKO (2008), pp. 17-20.

<sup>39</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), p. 320.

after interstate wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.<sup>41</sup> *It is important to note that the UN does not explicitly define consent of all parties as a necessity to conduct peacekeeping.* Furthermore, it is understood that peacekeeping has military and non-military dimensions.

NATO appreciates that *peace enforcement operations* are undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.<sup>42</sup> For UN *peace enforcement* involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.<sup>43</sup> *Pertaining to the coercive dimensions of peace operations both organizations, NATO and UN, recognize the authority of the UN Charter.*

The term *peace operation* is the overarching definition that entails the activities portrayed in picture 1. In this research, *military crisis management* is understood as a peace operation that has a military dimension – which means that military capabilities are planned for and utilised<sup>44</sup>. Furthermore, in this research *peace support operation* is understood as a part of military crisis management and encompasses both peace enforcement as well as peacekeeping. These are feasible definitions as military measures have a meaningful role alongside non-military measures in peace operations.

## 2.2 Identifying Reference Material

To identify relevant sources of information pertaining to the research interest several methods were utilised. Firstly, related material was identified using search engines. Subsequently, through citation and content analysis key authors of relevant research were determined.

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<sup>40</sup> NATO, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?), (10.1.2011).

<sup>41</sup> UNDPKO (2008).

<sup>42</sup> NATO, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm?), (10.1.2011).

<sup>43</sup> UNDPKO (2008).

<sup>44</sup> The definition 'military crisis management' (i.e sotilaallinen kriisihallinta) is consistent with national legislation of Finland. Therefore, it is utilised in this thesis.



Secondly, founded on initial discussions<sup>45</sup> people with expertise were identified as members for Delphi-panel. Utilising the Delphi-panel will be explained in chapter 3. Thirdly, based on content analysis academic researches and books were identified utilising the National Defence University and University of Helsinki search engines.

To identify key authors of relevant research searches were conducted using the Web of Science (ISI) search engine<sup>46</sup> in October 2010 and January 2011. Six keywords were used: (1) peacekeeping; (2) peace enforcement; (3) peace operations; (4) peace support operations; (5) humanitarian intervention; and (6) military intervention. Subject areas were set as international relations and political science. Document types searched were article or proceedings paper with time span from 1995 to 2011. Thereafter, the ten most cited articles pertaining to each keyword were analysed for substantial relevance for this thesis. Citation amounts of relevant articles were examined to determine how well they are represented in total and annual citations. These searches provided the following results (i.e authors of relevant articles and proceedings):

- Peacekeeping: *Doyle and Sambanis; and Fortna*<sup>47</sup>
- Peace enforcement: Doyle and Sambanis; *Werner and Yuen; Jakobsen; Chopra; and Dandeker*<sup>48</sup>
- Peace operations: Doyle and Sambanis; *Luttwak; Neack; and Jakobsen*<sup>49</sup>
- Peace support operations: Neack; Jakobsen; Chopra; Dandeker; *Bellamy and Williams*<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> The researcher is thankful for helpful discussions with colonel Norman Atkins, colonel Pekka Holopainen and diplomatic editor Kari Huhta, August and September 2010.

<sup>46</sup> The search was directed to the following databases: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-expanded), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Arts and Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI), Conference Proceedings Citation Index (CPCI-S, CPCI-SSH).

<sup>47</sup> Doyle, MW; Sambanis, N: *International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis*, American Political Science Review, 94 (4): 779-801 DEC 2000. Fortna, VP: *Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war*, International Studies Quarterly, 48 (2): 269-292 JUN 2004 (Fortna 2004a). Fortna, VP: *Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace*, International Organization, 57 (2): 337-372 SPR 2003

<sup>48</sup> Werner, S: *The precarious nature of peace: Resolving the issues, enforcing the settlement, and renegotiating the terms*, American Journal of Political Science, 43 (3): 912-934 JUL 1999. Werner, S; Yuen, A: *Making and keeping peace*, International Organization, 59 (2): 261-292 SPR 2005. Jakobsen, PV: *National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the cold war?*, Journal of Peace Research, 33 (2): 205-215 MAY 1996. Chopra, J: *The space of peace-maintenance*, Political Geography, 15 (3-4): 335-357 MAR-APR 1996. Dandeker, C; Gow, J: *The future of peace support operations: Strategic peacekeeping and success*, Armed Forces & Society, 23 (3): 327-& SPR 1997.

<sup>49</sup> Luttwak, EN: *Give war a chance*, Foreign Affairs, 78 (4), Jul. - Aug., 1999, pp. 36-44. Neack, L: *UN Peacekeeping – In the interest of community or self*, Journal of Peace Research, May 1995 vol. 32 no. 2 181-196.

<sup>50</sup> Bellamy, AJ; Williams, PD: *Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace operations*, International Security, 29 (4): 157-195 SPR 2005.



- Humanitarian intervention: *Thomas and Tow; Evans and Sahnoun; Regan; and Jakobsen*<sup>51</sup>
- Military intervention: *Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom; Regan; Hermann and Kegley*<sup>52</sup>

Doyle and Sambanis, Werner and Yuen, and Jakobsen have the largest percentage shares of total citations during 1995-2011. However, Doyle and Sambanis receive overwhelming shares of total citations, and consequently provide core reference material for this thesis<sup>53</sup>. Detailed results are in appendix 2. Furthermore, books and research papers produced by the identified authors were utilised as references. Evidently, these books and research papers provided further reference material. The reference material provided by the identified authors (i.e. above) is utilised throughout the thesis, but especially in the discussion of the findings in chapter 4.

Research on military crisis management in Finland (i.e. within the military community) has focused on the European Union's role in military crisis management, defining comprehensive approach as well as capabilities development. These researches were not used as reference material directly, but some of them were utilised as useful background information on research interests and research designs. For instance, Koljonen has a future oriented research design founded on scenario building method and Nurmela's research interest is the social battle space.<sup>54</sup> The existing research does not cover matching of contemporary approaches to future scenarios. Consequently, provided recommendations are derived mainly from past

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<sup>51</sup> Thomas, N; Tow, WT: *The utility of human security: Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention*, Security Dialogue, 33 (2): 177-192 JUN 2002. Evans, G; Sahnoun, M: *The responsibility to protect*, Foreign Affairs, 81 (6): 99- NOV-DEC 2002. Regan, PM: *Choosing to intervene: Outside interventions in internal conflicts*, Journal of Politics, 60 (3): 754-779 AUG 1998.

<sup>52</sup> Collier, P; Hoeffler, A; Soderbom, M: *On the duration of civil war*, Journal of Peace Research 41 (3): 253-273 MAY 2004. Hermann, MG; Kegley, CW: *Ballots, a barrier against the use of bullets and bombs - Democratization and military intervention*, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40 (3): 436-459 SEP 1996.

<sup>53</sup> Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas: *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (2006). This book draws upon the study (Doyle et al., 2000).

<sup>54</sup> Kempplä, Veli-Matti: *Kokonaisvaltaisen kriisinhallinnan käsite*, Senior Staff Officer Course (SSOC) thesis, National Defence University (NDU), Helsinki, 2010. Koljonen, Vesa: *Euroopan unionin sotilaallinen kriisinhallinta vuonna 2030*, Master of Military Science thesis, NDU, Helsinki, 2009. Laakkonen, Mikko: *Sodankäynnin periaatteiden vaikutus kriisinhallinnassa*, SSOC, NDU, 2009. Lehtonen, Janne: *Kokonaisvaltaisen kriisinhallinta ja sen koulutustarpeet*, SSOC, NDU, 2009. Myllymäki, Juha: *Euroopan unionin turvallisuusrakenteiden kehittyminen vuoteen 2010 mennessä kriisinhallinnan näkökulmasta*, SSOC, NDU, 2003. Mäkinen, Mikko: *Euroopan unionin ja Yhdysvaltojen suhteiden kehittyminen: erityistarkastelussa unionin kriisinhallinta ja NATO*, Master of Military Science thesis, NDU, Helsinki, 2006. Nurmela, Teemu: *The Social Battlespace of Stabilization Operations – Action Amongst the People*, General Staff Officer Course Diploma thesis, NDU, Edita Prima, Helsinki, 2010. Pirkkalainen Jarkko: *Ilmavoimien kansainvälisen valmiusyksikön tehtävät ja suorituskyvyt kriisinhallintaoperaatiossa vuonna 2020*, Restricted, SSOC, NDU, 2010. Seppänen, Marko: *Analyysi Euroopan unionin kriisinhallintakyvystä kriisiskenaarioiden valossa*, Master of Military Science thesis, NDU, Helsinki, 2003. Wikström, Kaarle: *Euroopan unionin merellisen toimintakyvyn kehittyminen ja sen näkymät*, General Staff Officer Course Diploma thesis, NDU, Helsinki, 2007.

experiences. Pertaining to strategic studies of crisis management, analysing the operating environment and related changes is at least recommended by Mika Kerttunen<sup>55</sup>. This thesis attempts to follow that recommendation. In this thesis, publications issued by NATO, The Millennium Project and United Kingdom Ministry of Defence were utilised to depict future scenarios, reasons for conflict and operating environments of military crisis management<sup>56</sup>. Subsequently, the Delphi-panel provided insights on the plausibility of the futures depicted.

Relevant research material was not constrained to the above only. A wider preunderstanding provided by existing literature is described in the next chapter, in which many of the above authors are represented.

## 2.3 Preunderstanding and Consequent Propositions

After indentifying relevant reference material, it was possible to start forming a preunderstanding on the subject. This chapter describes what contemporary literature provides for understanding conflict and peace operations, and consequent propositions. Literature and research related to peace operations, peace support operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, military or humanitarian intervention focus on five main themes. These are: reasons for conflict; reasons for sustainable peace; implementation of interventions; legitimacy of interventions; and organisational issues (e.g doctrines, development, burden sharing) of intervening organisations.

### 2.3.1 Reasons for Conflict

Levels of economic development and *integration*; *friction* related to power and influence; as well as the *asymmetry* of wealth and power, are the fundamental potential causes of conflict<sup>57</sup>. These underlying problems may materialize as regional disputes, interstate rivalry and extremism. Interstate rivalry may exacerbate as well as be influenced by intrastate conflicts<sup>58</sup>. A European perspective is the key threats that the EU may face. These threats include

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<sup>55</sup> Kerttunen, Mika: *Kuinka sota voitetaan. Sotilasstrategiasta ja sen tutkimisesta*, National Defence University, Edita Prima, Helsinki, 2010, p.10.

<sup>56</sup> NATO: *Multiple Futures Project – Navigating Towards 2030*, Final report, April 2009.

The Millennium Project: *2010 State of the Future*, Washington, 2009.

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UK MoD): *Future Character of Conflict*, 2010.

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: *Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2040*, Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 4th edition, 2010.

<sup>57</sup> NATO: *Multiple Futures Project – Navigating Towards 2030*, Final report, April 2009.

terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime<sup>59</sup>. Though they are not categorized as reasons for interstate conflict – they do have an impact on the international peace and security. Furthermore, by traversing across state boundaries these threats have an interstate dimension – although it is not explicitly stated. The reasons for disruptions in international peace and security are examined in more depth in chapter 3 of this research.

Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis focus on the *reasons for outbreak of civil war*<sup>60</sup>. By conducting a comparative case study of 30 civil wars over the period of 1960-1999, they analyze the impact of opportunity and grievance factors. They find that the *opportunity factors explain well the reasons for outbreak, whilst grievance factors have little explanatory power*. Unsurprisingly the availability of finance and the costs influence the opportunities for civil war. Reliance on primary commodity exports substantially increases conflict risk. Male secondary education enrolment, per capita income and economic growth rate are significant factors and reduce risk of conflict. Grievance factors such as inequality, political rights, ethnic polarization and religious fractionalization were insignificant. Of the grievance factors, only ethnic dominance had adverse effects. Collier and Sambanis suggest that diversity makes rebellion harder because it makes rebel cohesion more costly. Their study also shows that time since a previous conflict has substantial effects: time ‘heals’. However, large population diasporas slow the ‘healing’ effect.<sup>61</sup> Collier and Sambanis’ findings raise two propositions. Firstly, one may theorise that by acknowledging the causes of war, one is able to address those causes and eventually remove them. This would support a state of no war. Especially *addressing opportunity factors* appears to be prudent. Secondly, it is important to understand time as a factor. The longer a peace operation can help sustain even an uneasy peace, the lower the risk for reoccurrence should be. However, large diasporas should be prevented. *Patience appears to be a virtue* for peace operations.

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<sup>58</sup> UN: *A More Secure World – Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 2004, pp. 31 – 32.

<sup>59</sup> EU: *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003, pp. 3 – 5.

<sup>60</sup> Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas (ed.): *Understanding Civil War, volume 1: Africa and volume 2: Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions*, The World Bank, Washington, 2005.

<sup>61</sup> Collier et al. (2005), pp. 1 – 19, 303 – 329.

### 2.3.2 Reasons for Sustainable Peace

Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis have conducted a renowned quantitative and qualitative analysis of international peacebuilding.<sup>62</sup> Supported by statistical analysis of all the civil wars from 1945 until 1999 they provide the robust theoretical framework of a so called ‘peacebuilding triangle’. Their relevant and valid argument is that the levels of hostility, local capacity and international capacity are dimensions that interact; and consequently, these dimensions define the space for peacebuilding.<sup>63</sup>

Relevant to this thesis Doyle and Sambanis have identified several critical determinants of successful peacebuilding. Most importantly, they find that *strategically designed peacekeeping and peace enforcement do make a difference*. This applies to interstate conflict as well<sup>64</sup>. International capabilities can advance peace by substituting for limited local capacities and decrease factors that feed deep hostility. Such intervention improves the prospects for peace, but only if the peace operation is appropriately designed. Enforcement operations can end violence, but alone they cannot promote durable, democratic peace. Consent-based peacekeeping with civilian functions, which do not have a mandate to end the violence if parties do not cooperate, usually are not successful in ending violence. However, with a peace treaty and the cooperation of the parties, peace operations can assist with required institutional and political reform that helps secure long-term peace.<sup>65</sup>

*Democratic peacebuilding* (i.e higher order peacebuilding) is more successful after non-identity wars; after long and not very costly wars; in countries with relatively high development levels; and when UN peace operations and substantial financial assistance are available. *An end to the violence* (i.e. lower order peacebuilding) is more dependent on robust third-party intervention and on low hostility levels; rather than on the breadth of local capacities. Furthermore, peacemaking aimed at facilitating a peace treaty is potentially life

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<sup>62</sup> Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas: *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec 2000), pp. 779 – 801. At the time of writing, Michael Doyle was a professor at Princeton University. Currently he is a professor of international affairs at Columbia University. He has served as assistant secretary-general and special adviser to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 2001-2003. At the time of writing, Nicholas Sambanis was an economist at the World Bank. Currently he is a professor of political science at Yale University.

<sup>63</sup> Doyle et al. (2000), pp. 779 – 801. See also Regan, PM: *Choosing to Intervene - Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts*, Journal of Politics, vol. 60, issue 3, (Aug 1998), pp. 754 – 777. Regan makes the similar point of international considerations influencing decisions to intervene.

<sup>64</sup> Fortna, VP: *Interstate Peacekeeping - Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects*, World Politics, 56 (4), July 2004, (Fortna 2004b), pp. 511 – 519.

<sup>65</sup> Doyle et al. (2000), pp. 779 – 801. See also Werner et al. (2005) pp.261-263, 287-289.

saving, since treaties are highly correlated with an end to the violence.<sup>66</sup> Pertaining to applicability of peace enforcement and peacekeeping, these findings suggest two evident propositions. Firstly, if a cessation of hostilities is the main objective and hostility levels are relatively low - then peace enforcement should be feasible. Secondly, if a sustainable peace is desired and suitable preconditions exist, then peacekeeping and a more comprehensive approach is appropriate.

### 2.3.3 Implementation of Peace Operations

Page Fortna's survey of peacekeeping pertaining to interstate conflict suggests that peacekeepers are able to disrupt the processes that might otherwise lead back to war in several ways. To some degree, they may make deliberate aggression physically more difficult, and make surprise attack less likely. Peacekeepers have the potential to raise the international costs of aggression, bringing tangible losses in terms of military support, as well as, less tangible losses in reputation and political support. In the overall setting of an operating environment,<sup>67</sup> peacekeeping actions of mediation, monitoring and verification serve as credible signals of intentions among belligerents, who otherwise have difficulty making their aims known. On a smaller scale, peacekeepers can help prevent accidents and small skirmishes from leading back to war. This is to say that on-the-spot mediation can restore calm, while formal investigations would present belligerents with difficult choices. Either the belligerents do nothing and appear weak in the face of perceived provocations, or they respond and escalate the situations. Most importantly, *peacekeeping helps to disrupt spirals of misunderstanding and uncertainty*, which could lead to unwanted war. Alongside the initial will to stop the fighting, a determinant of long-term success will depend on the perception that resolve of the peacekeepers will last<sup>68</sup>. Peacekeeping fulfils this role by monitoring compliance and serving as an impartial referee for the inevitable charges of cease-fire violations.<sup>69</sup> An evident proposition is that measures related to peacekeeping (e.g. observing, monitoring, verifying etc.) are justified in military crisis management. Furthermore, Fortna's study suggests another proposition. Simply the presence of a peacekeeping force acts at least as a deterrent. However, such forces must display a will to persevere even in the long-term.

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<sup>66</sup> Doyle et al. (2000), pp. 779 – 801.

<sup>67</sup> For a definition of *operating environment*, as understood by the military see United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: *British Defence Doctrine*, Swindon, 2008, pp. 2-10 – 2-11. See also Nurmela (2009), pp. 54-73.

<sup>68</sup> Werner, S; Yuen, A: *Making and keeping peace*, International Organisation, 59 (2): pp. 273-276, Spring 2005.

<sup>69</sup> Fortna (2004b), pp. 481-519. Page Fortna is associate professor of political science at Columbia University.

Mats Berdal focuses on the lessons learned and not learned from the use of force in peace operations<sup>70</sup>. The specific focus is on the role and utility of military force. The obvious point he makes is that *there is firm link between the employment of military force and the long-term political objective*, which the use of force is intended to support. That is matching means to ends. Parallel to Doyle and Sambanis, the key point Berdal advocates is that peacekeeping is not appropriate in a number of cases. In contrast, hard decisions regarding the use of force will have to be made. Furthermore, Berdal sees that peace enforcement follows the logic of war and war fighting<sup>71</sup>. He does not see peace enforcement distinct from war fighting. However, in this thesis such logic is not fully accepted, which will be summarised in chapter 5. For the benefit of this research, Berdal argues that consent is not an absolute quality<sup>72</sup>. Based on Berdal's argumentation there are two consequent propositions. Firstly and evidently, in certain circumstances peace enforcement measures within crisis management are necessary. Secondly, consent is malleable, which supports the feasibility of peace enforcement in the first place. However, Berdal does differentiate between spoilers<sup>73</sup> of a peace process and an enemy encountered in war. One may consider the lack of this differentiation, as a shortcoming in Berdal's argumentation.

Pertaining to the discourse on whose interests are appreciated in peace operations, Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams claim that there is a lack of research between the *relationship between peace operations and international theory*. They explore the epistemological and ontological issues related to peace operations. Pertaining to epistemological issues, they present critical theory as a new approach to gaining knowledge on peace operations. They claim the dominant problem solving theories are limited in their perspective and as identifying and dealing with problems in a particular manner. Problem solving theories take the world as they find it. These theories define some actions relevant, identify particular lines of causality and render certain practices legitimate at the expense of others. In contrast, critical theories aim to reflect upon the characteristics of the prevailing world order querying how that order came to existence. On the ontological issue, they raise concern that the ontology of theories of

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<sup>70</sup> Adebajo, Adekeye and Sriram, Chandra Lekha (ed.): *Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century*, Frank Cass, London, 2001. Article by Berdal, Mats: *Lessons Not Learned: The Use of Force in 'Peace Operations' in the 1990s*, pp. 55-71.

<sup>71</sup> Adebajo et al. (2001), p. 71. Berdal quotes an anonymous highly experienced officer as saying: "... in war, however limited the objective or the resources allocated to achieve it, the need to break the will of the opponent and to bear the risk to those resources marks the difference from peace."

<sup>72</sup> Adebajo et al. (2001), pp. 61-63. Berdal uses the Australian forces in Somalia as an example, where the margin of existing consent was enlarged and built upon by an enterprising outside force.

<sup>73</sup> The spoiler theory is explained in chapter 4 of this study. See Stedman, Stephen John: *Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes*, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, Autumn 1997, pp. 5-7.

peace operations is rarely discussed. They raise three interrelated questions. What is the relationship between the intervening force and the recipient of intervention? What is the abstract and material context in which peace operations function? In addition, what counts as an issue in the study and practice of peace operations? For the benefit of this thesis, Bellamy and Williams explore the ever-important question of point of view in peace operations: Whose interests are served by the prevailing definitions of ‘common sense’ in peace operation matters? They claim that it is usually the interests, values and priorities of the intervening forces that shape contemporary peace operations.<sup>74</sup> For the benefit of this thesis and as relevant propositions, Bellamy and Williams’ argumentation suggest that *peace operations and peace processes they support should be inclusive and comprehensive*. This actually supports argumentation against forceful intervention, and *simultaneously advocates local ownership of peace processes*. The question related to point of view is relevant for this thesis – it has ramifications on defining both spoilers as well as posture of a peace operation (i.e. either peace enforcement or peacekeeping). Despite their criticism on problem solving theories, Bellamy and Williams do not provide robust alternatives<sup>75</sup>.

Bellamy and Williams have identified various types of peace operations in order to overcome the above problems. They base their distinction on what each type of operation is supposed to achieve. This implies that the primary *distinction lies in the intended ends they aim to achieve rather than the means that are employed* to achieve them. The seven types of peace operations they distinguish are: (1) preventive deployments, (2) traditional peacekeeping, (3) wider peacekeeping, (4) peace enforcement, (5) assisting transitions, (6) transitional administrations and (7) peace support operations. It is important to point out that these types of operations have not been developed in chronological order. Nor are they mutually exclusive, but rather that a single operation may move back and forth between various aims or may involve more than one of these roles simultaneously.<sup>76</sup>

### 2.3.4 Legitimacy of Interventions

The discourse on *humanitarian intervention* is supported by the writings edited by J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane. Their focus pertains to the conditions under which

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<sup>74</sup> Bellamy, Alex J. and William, Paul (ed.): *Peace Operations and Global Order*, Routledge, New York (2005), pp. 3, 6-9, 17. See also article by Michael Pugh, p. 39 – 55.

<sup>75</sup> Bellamy et al. (2005), pp. 103-183. The insights provided do not relate particularly well to applicability of military means in crisis management. However, Bellamy and Williams provide views on how to provide adequate resources for peace operations, pp. 183-213.

*unauthorized humanitarian intervention is justified ethically, legally and politically.* These viewpoints are integrated to form an interdisciplinary approach to the issue. They define humanitarian intervention as follows: “The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”<sup>77</sup> From the definition, one identifies the requirement for military force (i.e. means) with a specific aim of preventing or ending violations (i.e. ends) in a non-consensual context (i.e. ways: coercion). Thus, these writings have relevance for this research.

Deriving from just war theory and liberal political philosophy, Fernando Tesón argues that it is acceptable for interventions to cause deaths of innocent people - if by intervening greater harm is prevented, and the damage caused is unintended. He makes the claim that non-intervention is doctrine of the past. Allen Buchanan argues that moral authority justifies actions taken without necessarily obtaining state consent. In contrast, Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman strongly defend the principle of non-intervention, generally, in international law. They argue that to denigrate this principle would be to assume an unsound change in the international legal system. Jane Stromseth argues usefully that codification of principles of humanitarian intervention is a mistake. According to Stromseth, as it is not codified it provides “... fertile ground for the gradual emergence of normative consensus, over time, based on practice and case-by-case decision-making.”<sup>78</sup> From the viewpoint and the execution of strategy, this is a useful view.

Robert Keohane advocates for *differentiation of domestic and external sovereignty*. Domestic sovereignty should be sustained where and when possible. In contrast, the concept of external sovereignty (n.b. involving the exclusion of external *authority*) should be abandoned for many troubled societies where interventions are contemplated. Thus, Keohane’s standpoint makes an argument for peace enforcement. The idea of forceful liberalism is advocated in the book, but the important counterpoint made is that application should be incremental and developed from discourse and practice. The writings are from an immediate ‘post 9/11 – era’ and reflect

<sup>76</sup> Bellamy et al. (2010), pp. 7-9, 153-299. Bellamy et al. (2005), pp. 21-22. See also Berdal, Mats: *Building Peace after War*, IISS, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 11-17.

<sup>77</sup> Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): *Humanitarian Intervention – Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003. For definition, see p.18. See also Chopra, J: *The Space of Peace-maintenance*, Political Geography, vol 15, issue 3-4, (Mar/Apr 1996), pp. 335 – 357. Chopra provides points of view on different dimensions of authority. Thomas, N; Tow, WT: *The utility of human security: Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention*, Security Dialogue, 33 (2): 177-192 JUN 2002. The extension of security to include human security is advocated in this article.



an intellectual need to analyze humanitarian interventions in the international system. Though the ideas presented are relevant for this research, one must note that the viewpoint in Holzgrefe and Keohane's book is on *unauthorized intervention*. That is intervention not authorized by the UN Security Council under the Charter of the UN. NATO intervention in Kosovo is a prominent example<sup>79</sup>. Furthermore, Michael Doyle provides useful standards for preventive interventions as well as related case examples. These four standards are lethality of threat, likelihood of threat, legitimacy of responses and legality of actions. In addition, Doyle advocates an incremental approach to build up standards that promote rule of law on what constitutes a legitimate use of force. To achieve this, he argues that the UN Security Council should decide on legitimacy of all non-defensive or preventive uses of force.<sup>80</sup>

### 2.3.5 Organisational Issues

Rather obviously all relevant multilateral international organisations issue themselves, and are the focus of continuous research. Broadly speaking the organisations aim to define the respective organisation's strategic vision and objectives for the future; specific objectives for developing necessary capabilities; processes and structures to implement capabilities development; and guidelines on how to operate with these capabilities.

The EU focuses on an active, capable and coherent approach to managing security matters, whilst being focused on partnership through international cooperation.<sup>81</sup> UN peacekeeping calls for clear political direction and cohesive mission implementation. Furthermore, UN focuses on faster deployment of missions and their meaningful ability to respond to contingencies. With a capability-driven approach, the UN concentrates on projecting future needs for post-conflict crisis management (i.e. peacekeeping).<sup>82</sup> NATO focuses on reaffirming

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<sup>78</sup> Holzgrefe et al. (2003), pp. 93 – 129, 158 – 173, 184 – 203, 233.

<sup>79</sup> Holzgrefe et al. (2003), pp. 1, 245 – 272, 273 – 298. See also Voeten, Erik: *The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force*, International Organization, 59, Summer 2005, pp. 551-553. Voeten provides a critical view on the UNSC's ability to legitimize actions.

<sup>80</sup> Doyle, Michael W: *Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2008, pp. 46-96, 151-159. *Lethality* identifies the likely loss of life if the threat is not eliminated. *Likelihood* assesses the probability that the threat will occur. *Legitimacy* covers just war criteria of proportionality, necessity and deliberativeness of responses. *Legality* examines whether the threat itself is produced by legal or illegal actions, and whether the response is legal.

<sup>81</sup> For EU matters see the following. EU: *A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 2003. EU: *Guide to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)*, November 2008. EU discourse utilises definitions: *crisis-management*, *crisis-management operations*. EU: *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World*, Brussels, December 2008.

<sup>82</sup> For UN matters see the following. UN: *A More Secure World – Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Department of Public Information, New York, 2004. UN: *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - Principles and Guidelines*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), 2008. Jones, Bruce et al.: *Building on*

its collectiveness as an effective alliance, and is prepared to prevent, manage and stabilize conflicts<sup>83</sup>. All organisations focus on strategic partnerships and burden sharing with other organisations and individual states<sup>84</sup>. All organisations appreciate that future threats are diverse and intertwined creating a blur in any operating environment.

Furthermore, within the Multinational Experiment 5 (MNE5) contemporary challenges pertaining to organisational issues have been identified. As the ultimate aim of every operation is to promote and secure human security. A more 'human' aspect is required in all phases when developing comprehensive approach (CA). Human aspect calls for appropriate attitude, mindset and flexibility at national, international, inter-agency and individual levels. Implementing CA implies a need to create integrated mechanisms for early coordination - at the decision making phase. It is too late to begin coordination at execution phase. Three specific challenges are stressed. First, different understanding of mandates hinders co-operation amongst all actors. This challenge is exacerbated by information sharing policies and cultures, which are not supportive for CA. Alongside this, the same challenge reflects on understanding and verifying the impact of operations. Second, communication and cooperation with local counterparts is inadequate to create understanding and to manage expectations. Consequently, this hinders ability to plan actions according to the local absorption capacity. Third, stovepipes in national and international budgeting systems prevent pragmatic and flexible use of resources. This strains any planning processes, which are supply driven in the first place.<sup>85</sup>

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*Brahimi – Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty*, New York University, Center on International Cooperation (NYU CIC), New York, 2009. UN: *A New Partnership Agenda - Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (UNDPKO and DFS), New York, 2009. UN: *The New Horizon Initiative - Progress Report No. 1*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support (UNDPKO and DFS), New York, 2010. UNDPKO (2008), pp. 18-19. UN discourse uses overarching definition *peace operations*.

<sup>83</sup> NATO: *Multiple Futures Project – Navigating Towards 2030*, Final report, April 2009. NATO: *NATO 2020 - Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement*, Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New a Strategic Concept for NATO, May 2010. NATO: *Strategic Concept - Active Engagement, Modern Defence*, 2010. See also: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49192.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm), (14.1.2011). NATO discourse uses definition *crisis management*.

<sup>84</sup> For an example of NATO experiences see Cimballa, SJ and Forster, PK: *Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing*, Ashgate, Surrey, 2010. For an illustration of how non-UN operations contribute to peace and security see Bellamy, AJ; Williams, PD: *Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace operations*, *International Security*, 29 (4): 157-195 SPR 2005.

<sup>85</sup> Rintakoski et al (2008), pp 23-29. Also Comprehensive Approach Seminar: *Common Challenges and Shared Opportunities*, session II, Helsinki, 2008.

## 2.4 Theoretical Approaches

The future research interests of *neoclassical realism* (Morgenthau) include the challenges posed by rogue and failed states, security crisis created by terrorism and the contemporary version of the Concert system of great powers, which safeguards international peace and security. The permanent members of the UN Security Council and led by the United States would be the foundation of such a system.<sup>86</sup> The prospect of rogue and failed states seems valid in the coming decade, but the idea of one unrivalled power does not seem plausible. Furthermore, the expansion of security threats to include an array of threats (e.g. international crime, climate change, unequal development, refugees, and struggle for resources) alongside international terrorism calls for another approach.<sup>87</sup>

*Neorealism* is not sufficient to explain why intrastate political divisions (e.g. ethnic, religious, class-based) occur or why they might be important causes of conflict. This is because neorealism understands states as unitary actors and explains state behaviour deriving from structural changes in the international system. The issue of anarchy seems relevant, but the anarchy of civil war emerges because of domestic political competition – and is not a constant structural condition.<sup>88</sup>

On the other hand, *neoliberalism* has focus on domestic political institutions. It considers non-state actors (e.g. ethnic networks, crime syndicates, multinational corporations) and appreciates their influence on risk of conflict. However, neoliberalism is neither able to explain alliances and conflicts among insurgent groups, nor is it able to explain domestic institutional change or use of force in ethnic hostility. To some degree, international relations theory is supported by empirical evidence; that living near countries with internal war or authoritarian polities may increase a country's chance of experiencing an ethnic war.<sup>89</sup> Relevant for this research thesis is that international relations theory and empirical findings support the point that spillover effects from one country to another are conceivable. Furthermore, neoliberalism appreciates non-state actors having a role in conflicts. Such appreciation supports applicability of spoiler theory in crisis management.

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<sup>86</sup> Jackson (2007), p. 94.

<sup>87</sup> Future scenarios described in chapter 3 support this argumentation.

<sup>88</sup> See Doyle et al (2006), p. 40. Here Doyle and Sambanis provide argumentation on the matter. As reasonable as it seems, their claim on anarchy not being a structural condition domestically is not supported by any citation.

<sup>89</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 39-41.

Doyle and Sambanis point out an important gap in existing research. There is a *lack of analysis on the link between international and internal war*. Although external intervention studies are related, they do not cover the regional dimensions of internal wars in an integrated way. Some evidence supports the links between external and internal conflict, and display that they have a jointly negative impact on economic activity. This further increases the risk of violence, and makes the point of ‘conflict traps’ that lock poor countries and neighbouring regions in a cycle of deterioration and recurring violence. Furthermore, Doyle and Sambanis summarize that post-war peacebuilding environment might be different in conflicts that are internationalized, and that external impartial intervention might be required to break the conflict trap.<sup>90</sup>

Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams argue that there are distinct differences between problem-solving and critical theories of peace operations. Firstly, problem-solving theories focus on establishing instrumental practices to address pre-existing problems, where as critical theories are premised on an explicitly normative agenda. The *instrumental approaches build on several normative assumptions that are left unexplored*. An assumption is that international peace and security is a moral good itself, and violent conflict represents a ‘breakdown’ of normal social relations. Instrumental approaches assume that the great majority of people prefer peace to war and need only be presented with ‘paths’ to peace. There is a direct link between international peace and good governance at the domestic level. Furthermore, ‘good’ governance equates to Western-style statehood, democratization, neo-liberal economics and the existence of an active civil society. Secondly, another problem arises when peacekeeping activities are taken as a starting point and examined how they could be done better – this is self-referential. The problem is that this approach reveals little about the evolving role of peace operations in global politics or about the underlying rationale of the activities themselves. The instrumental approach is important in understanding peace operations and how they could be implemented more effectively. However, one should not miss on other theoretical engagements. It may be that without dealing with the structural causes of violent conflict (e.g. in global economy), the reassessment of peace operations’ techniques might be futile. Regardless if the two propositions are correct, the important point is that instrumentalism has been dominant and hence these questions have seldom been raised.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 40-42.

<sup>91</sup> Bellamy, Alex J.; Williams, Paul: *Peace Operations and Global Order*, Routledge, London, 2005, pp. 19-26.

This thesis attempts to avoid the trap of being self-referential. To achieve this, the research design attempts to match existing knowledge and insights to plausible futures. Furthermore, this thesis appreciates the structural causes of violent conflict and the existing gap caused by instrumentalist approaches. However, exploring further these normative assumptions fall beyond the scope of this thesis. One may argue that such exploration is not directly within the research interest of military strategic studies. Rather they are questions for political science in general - and security studies within international relations theory in particular<sup>92</sup>. In this thesis, strategy is understood as applying the military instrument in a prudent way within estimated future scenarios. The research interest is not on changing current or future world order, thus relying on critical theory is not feasible for this research.

Many theoretical approaches have been taken to explain the occurrence, duration, termination, and magnitude of civil war. Economic, political, psychological, rational choice, constructivist theories all provide valuable insights. *Economic theories* suggest that unless property rights are respected and if economic activity is unprofitable; individuals and groups will have greater incentives for misappropriation. This would also lead to each individual and group privately providing for their security, thus challenging the authority of the state. Economic theories make the point that there exists a trade-off between productive efforts and criminal economic behaviour. The greater the amount of resources that can be appropriated, the weaker the state, and the lower the economical 'opportunity cost of conflict'<sup>93</sup>, the greater will be the available supply of recruits to a conflict.<sup>94</sup> Economic theories make the point that crime and criminality are risk conditions for a future conflict. Moreover, the factors that economic theories have identified may have an impact on the duration or 'robustness' of a conflict.

However, a consensus on the explanatory power of these economic theories is yet to be reached. Empirical tests suggest quite robustly, that low levels of capita income (poverty) significantly exacerbate the risk of civil war. The negative effects of natural resources are difficult to demonstrate empirically and robustly, but certain so called 'lootable' resources (e.g. oil, precious stones) have been linked to conflicts and sustaining conflict factions. Research suggests that countries with a high dependence on natural resources face greater difficulties in reaching a durable peace.<sup>95</sup> For the benefit of this research, economic theories

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<sup>92</sup> See Williams, Paul D. (ed.): *Security Studies: an Introduction*, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 2-10. Williams provides an overview on *security studies*. For a perspective on research interests of *military strategic studies* pertaining to crisis management see Kerttunen (2010), p.42-43.

<sup>93</sup> i.e. the lower the expected gains from productive economic activity.

<sup>94</sup> Collier et al. (2004), pp. 253, 267-268. See also Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 31-40.

<sup>95</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 31-40.

support the prospect that future conflict environments include impoverished areas. Furthermore, the duration of the conflict may be longer if the local economies are highly dependent on natural resources.

*Political theories* have focused on group incentives, capacities and opportunities for an intrastate conflict. Plato himself identified key factors that are regime characteristics and political instability. Conflicts (i.e. in this case rebellions) are products of political grievance. They are more likely when there are opportunities for organized action. However, the interdependencies of democracy and civil war have not been statistically proven. Some preliminary evidence links peace to proportionate representation and systems with significant executive constraints. Moreover, research is controversial on the relation of ethnicity and violence. According to most studies, high levels of ethnic fractionalization do not increase the risk of civil war onset. However, they might make conflict duration longer and recurrence more likely. Some researchers point out very clearly that ethnic fractionalization is not the right approach in assessing risk between ethnicity and violent conflict. Stronger evidence has been found on explanatory power of ethnic polarization and dominance - rather than fractionalization. Polarization and dominance increase the risk of civil war occurrence. Ambiguity exists on how to measure this dominance. It is also uncertain what type of ethnic affiliation is most important (e.g. linguistic, religious, etc).<sup>96</sup> The details of this debate go beyond the scope of this thesis. However, political theories make the point that ethnic polarization and ethnic dominance generate risk conditions for conflicts. Theories also suggest that systems with proportionate representation are more likely to be peaceful.

Establishing a correlation between ethnic fractionalization and nationalist ideology is challenging. There is a disjuncture between theory and empirical evidence. Nationalism is often seen as increasing risk of ethnic rebellion. However, measuring the conditions in which ethnicity will be used to support violence is difficult. Thus, it is logical that research explanations do not view ethnic identity as an inherent conflict cause. Instead, explanations utilise social interactions and systems to explain violence. It is of importance to note, that these research explanations ultimately rely on some pre-existing level of hostility.<sup>97</sup> Pertaining to the focus of this research it is essential to understand that ideology alone may not be the sole reason for conflict.

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<sup>96</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 31-40.

<sup>97</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 31-40.

*Political theories* also make the case on geographical location. Where ethnic groups are territorially concentrated, there is a higher risk of intrastate conflict. The aims of such conflict may focus on more self-determination or even secession. Secessionist wars will occur with greater probability for several reasons. First, when institutional centres collapse creating power vacuums. Second, where regional inequality creates demands for autonomy, which are not met. Third, where income gains from remaining within the predecessor state are not sufficient to offset the gains from greater autonomy. Fourth, where the ethnic makeup of regions is very different, supporting growth of nationalist ideology.<sup>98</sup> These political theories substantiate that failed governance and challenging state authority are plausible risk conditions of the future.

Economic and political theories suggest that risk of war recurrence and peacebuilding failure is higher in countries with low levels of local capacity (i.e. slow economic growth, high levels of poverty, and significant resource dependence) and in politically divided societies with many factions engaged in conflict over issues that define the identity of these factions.<sup>99</sup> Pertaining to this thesis, the above findings raise several considerations. If a society is politically divided, who should an intervening party support and on whom should it induce consent? On what foundations are such judgements made? The theories also emphasise that military means are not enough to achieve sustainable peace. However, the military component has a role by providing a safe and secure environment, which is a prerequisite for legitimate economic activity and transformation of the society.

While some crisis management operations have succeeded and some failed, a partial explanation why this happens is the root causes. If the root causes are left untreated, and the capabilities for violence are left intact, then a risk of a failure of the peace is significant. One way to identify root causes is to divide them into defensive and offensive incentives. *Defensive incentives* arise in conditions of anarchy, where any central authority has collapsed, and each faction seeks to arm itself to protect itself. This causes a '*security dilemma*' both in intrastate and interstate anarchy, where each defensive armament constitutes a threat to others. *Offensive incentives* arise when leaders and factions impose ideology or culture, seize property, or exploit state power and public sources for private gain, or all of these. At some

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<sup>98</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 31-40.

<sup>99</sup> Doyle et al (2006), pp 40.

juncture during a conflict, the factions may have come to a ‘hurting stalemate’ in which no faction sees it can win, and are experiencing net costs of the continuing conflict.<sup>100</sup>

In this thesis, there is a need to identify between the *mission* of a crisis management operation and the *process* that leads through a safe and secure environment to an enduring peace. One must understand that the successful implementation of the mandate is not sufficient for a successful peace process. Peace may be defined as an outcome of a dynamic process where the performance of crisis management, the reactions of the actors to the conflict, local capacities and the level of hostility, all have an impact on the outcome. This thesis will focus on the process. It is argued that for a peace process to endure it needs: (1) concentration of central power (i.e. the powerful must be recognized as legitimate, or the legitimate made powerful); (2) increasing state legitimacy through participation (e.g. elections, power sharing); (3) raising and allocating economic resources in support of peace<sup>101</sup>. Generally, a conflict-torn area requires external, international assistance or authority so that these three conditions prevail.<sup>102</sup> The above arguments support the concept of comprehensive crisis management.

According to Doyle and Sambanis’ study, there is a positive influence of *transformative* UN peacekeeping, which has *combined multidimensional and enforcement* missions. Multidimensional peacekeeping works well both with achieving sovereign and participatory<sup>103</sup> peace. UN missions seem to have their best effect in preventing lower-level violence and enabling countries to democratize and rebuild after intrastate wars. This is the case rather than UN missions’ ability to prevent resumption of full-scale war.<sup>104</sup> In these cases, war recurrence is related more strongly to the levels of economic development<sup>105</sup>. Doyle and Sambanis appreciate the positive impact of UN missions, but underscore the effect of a strong economy.

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<sup>100</sup> Fortna (2003), pp. 340-344; Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 27-68; Horowitz, Donald provides useful illustration on reasons for ethnic conflict in Boris Pleskovic, Joseph E. Stiglitz (ed.): *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1998*, The World Bank, Washington, 1998, pp. 345-366. Note that the studies focus on civil war (intrastate), but wider applicability (i.e. to conflicts in general) and relevance to this research is supported by the analogies provided by Doyle and Sambanis (2006).

<sup>101</sup> Collier et al. (2004), pp. 267-268.

<sup>102</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 27-68.

<sup>103</sup> Doyle and Sambanis define the *absence of war* as ‘negative peace’. *Participatory peace* is more demanding that is ‘positive peace’.

<sup>104</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 109-115, 332-337. See also Mason, TD et al. (2006), pp. 145-146. Peceny and Pickering show that UN interventions tend to democratize governments. This is whilst US interventions also achieve similar results provided they are deployed in opposition to the target regime.

<sup>105</sup> Fortna (2004a), p. 282-288. Fortna finds that peace will generally be easier to maintain after wars that end with a decisive victory than after those that end in an informal truce. Peace will also be easier to keep after long wars and in countries with higher levels of development. But peace will tend to be harder to maintain after very deadly wars.



Furthermore, there is some positive correlation between a UN mission and a peace treaty, which is not surprising, as many UN missions have required the existence of a treaty. Doyle and Sambanis find that enforcement alone cannot achieve participatory peace. Interesting though not surprising is that all traditional peacekeeping operations failed to support participatory peace. Traditional peacekeeping does not deliver, particularly compared to multidimensional peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping operations may be able sustain such a peace that exists, but are unable to build self-sustaining peace.<sup>106</sup>

To conclude these theoretical considerations, this thesis builds on liberalism as a point of view. The international system is understood to be a dynamic social structure. Security is achieved by integration, democratization, rule of law and conflict resolution.<sup>107</sup> Furthermore, deriving from the previous theoretical considerations is the theory of a peacebuilding space, which is explained in the next chapter. The theory is useful, because Doyle and Sambanis' explore the fit between mandates of peace operations and the type of conflict. This thesis has a similar focus.

## 2.5 The Scope, Framework and Focus of Research

Focusing on the consent of the parties to a conflict is justified for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the consent principle is what one could call 'primus inter pares' amongst the principles of peacekeeping. These principles are *consent of the parties; impartiality; and non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate*<sup>108</sup>. If one does not seek and expect the consent of parties to a conflict, in most cases one will take a side in the conflict. In such circumstances, the principle of impartiality is violated. Furthermore, the idea that consent needs to be induced to the parties only through military means does not resonate well with idea of non-use of force. Secondly, the existence or non-existence of consent amongst parties to a conflict has implications on a multitude of factors. Some of them are listed below:

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<sup>106</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 109-115. Doyle and Sambanis dedicate some effort on the analysis of the peacekeeping troops to square kilometre ratio. The analysis of this factor seems quite irrelevant from a military-strategic perspective, as it does not take into account other vital inter-related factors. To provide examples: quality and training of the troops, military technology available, terrain, individual features of an area of operations, mission and tasks etc. *The amount of troops might be an indicator of international commitment, but as an isolated factor has no relevance for the capability of a peacekeeping force.* Thus, Doyle and Sambanis' deductions on the impact in the area of operations are out of context of the application of military force.

<sup>107</sup> Williams (2008), pp. 29–30, 42–43.

<sup>108</sup> UNDPKO (2008), pp. 31-35. This provides a useful elaboration for understanding how these principles should be applied. See also *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, UKMOD (2004), pp. 17-18, 34, 37, 45. The British manual points out a need to develop principles, but admits

- Political legitimacy within contributing nations' domestic politics as well as international relations: Will the idea of inducing consent be feasible in a unilateral, bi- or multipolar world?
- Legal authority derived from e.g. UN or NATO Charter: Is the operation in question mandated to operate as a UN Chapter VI or VII mission? Is it a NATO Article 5 or non-article 5 operation? These aspects reflect on: the rules of engagement for a military force; military force structure and posture, its capabilities and *modus operandi*. A consideration is do regional organizations have the necessary capabilities.
- Overall effectiveness and accomplishment of aims: How well has inducing consent actually supported reaching the overall aims of crisis management? Operations in areas of Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti, DRC<sup>109</sup> and Afghanistan serve as basis for such reflections.

Although this thesis will not be able to focus on these considerations, they make the point that it is actually consent that is 'primus inter pares' amongst principles in peace support operations.

This thesis will limit its scope to the following three dimensions. Firstly, military crisis management (i.e. peace support operations) is understood as relating to *multinational and comprehensive* crisis management. Such efforts are undertaken in support of a peace process, or a prospect of such a process. Secondly, the thesis will focus on *military – political strategic level* considerations<sup>110</sup>. This is because the military–strategic level provides advice to the political decision level. Such advice pertains to deployment and employment of military means and ways in a crisis management operation. Thirdly, the focus is on the *time before political decisions to commit to a crisis management operation*. This is because military advice should be delivered prior to authorizing military crisis management operations. The time before political decisions is relevant for military-strategic advice, whilst after the

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that consent remains fundamental. The term *campaign authority* is utilised encompasses aspects related to consent.

<sup>109</sup> i.e. Democratic Republic of Congo

<sup>110</sup> In this thesis, *strategic level* refers to UN Secretary General - UN Secretariat – Head of Mission level within the UN context, see UNDPKO (2008), p. 67. Within the EU this refers to the EU Military Staff – EU Military Committee – The Political and Security Committee level, see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-military-staff.aspx?lang=en> (1.7.2011). In the EU context at a political strategic level, a crisis management concept (CMC) usually outlines the politico – military objectives, which are derived from an agreed political objective. Furthermore, a CMC provides an understanding of the initial duration for an operation and possible military strategic options. Thereafter military-strategic options (MSO) are developed to depict military role, as derived from the CMO. Thereafter a MSO would depict requirements and considerations on practical execution of the options. The findings of this research may have ramifications on such process, as well as on staff interaction between EUMS – EUMC – PSC. In parallel in the UN context, the findings relate to the UN Secretariat namely UNDPKO Office of Operations and Military Planning Service, as well as the Department of Field Support.

decision the military efforts gravitate towards more of an operational nature (i.e. implementation of mandate).

This study does not focus on which actor should intervene (e.g. UN, EU, NATO, AU etc.). On the other hand, this thesis appreciates that who intervenes has important implications on legitimacy and prospects for success.<sup>111</sup> Nonetheless, this thesis provides examples of some activities these actors undertake, and reflects on matters related to legitimacy.

Neither is the development of applicable military capabilities for peace support operations in the scope of this study. Such development efforts derive from political-military strategic level definitions of aims, freedoms and possible constraints. Only thereafter, it is possible to develop operational requirements for future capabilities<sup>112</sup>. Therefore such considerations fall into the realm of operational art as well as capability development and procurement. Thus, they are beyond the scope of this thesis.


*The framework of this thesis is founded on three cornerstones: peacebuilding space; the scope of peace operations (see picture 1 before); and spoiler theory.* The peacebuilding triangle (see picture 2 below) is a metaphor for the peacebuilding space after a conflict. The available space is determined by the interaction of the triangle's three sides: local capacities (LC), international capacities (IC), and hostility (H) level. The greater local and international capacities and lower the hostility; the greater will be the space for peacebuilding. The theory assumes a strictly positive level of IC, given the support and legitimacy offered sovereign states by international law and norms. All three variables: LC, IC, and H, can be measured as indices, ranging from zero to one. Doyle and Sambanis argue with validity and reliability that this peacebuilding triangle is the political space, or effective capacity, for building peace.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Peceny and Pickering provide empirical evidence on the matter in Mason, TD and Mernik, JD (ed.): *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Post-War Studies*, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 130-145.


<sup>112</sup> E.g. Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework (MODAF): MODAF Support to Gap Analysis, <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/InformationManagement/MODAF/> (18.1.2011)

<sup>113</sup> Doyle and Sambanis (2000), p. 782. Also Doyle and Sambanis (2006), pp.63 -65.



Picture 2: The peacebuilding triangle (Doyle and Sambanis).


As an example, picture no. 3 below depicts a peacebuilding space where all variables are approximately at 0.5 levels.



Picture 3: Example of peacebuilding space.

Furthermore, the framework builds upon the idea that the political process of a peace operation takes place within such a peacebuilding triangle. This suggests that crisis management operations should not be attempted unless such a space is available. Thus, the


activities of a peace operation are fitted into this peacebuilding space as depicted in picture 4 below.



Picture 4: Political process of a peace operation fitted into the peacebuilding space.

*The conceptual framework* of this thesis draws upon the idea; that there are identifiable and plausible future scenarios pertaining to the global international system (see picture 5 below). Furthermore, within these future scenarios it is possible to identify specific risk conditions that constitute for crises. Some of these crises merit for military crisis management operations, which include the usage of military capabilities primarily for peace enforcement and peacekeeping. These operations support a political process and operate within the peacebuilding space described earlier. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities are utilised to protect a political peace process, which is a vulnerable target to spoilers. Theoretical approaches on such spoilers and typology<sup>114</sup> of spoilers are described in chapter 4. *The research focus is on feasibility of peace enforcement (i.e. inducing consent) and peacekeeping (i.e. relying on compliance), their relation, as well as how they overlap with peacemaking* (see picture 5 below).

<sup>114</sup> Typology: "study of or analysis or classification based on types or categories", <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/typology>, 22.2.2011.



Picture 5: The conceptual framework of the thesis.

## 2.6 The Research Aim and Questions

This research aims to promote understanding and increase awareness, within military professionals as well as their political superiors, on what can be achieved<sup>115</sup> by the use of military force in crisis management operations in conflicts of the next decade. To achieve this aim, the research concentrates on the focal research question: *Should military components induce consent or rely on the compliance of conflicting parties in crisis management operations of the next decade (2020 – 2030)?* This focal problem necessitates responses to the following supporting research questions:

- What kind is the operating environment of crisis management in the next decade?
  - What are the essential changes to the contemporary environment?
- What are the preconditions and implications of attempting to induce consent vis-à-vis to relying on compliance?
  - Under what circumstances is it advisable to attempt inducing consent?

<sup>115</sup> Mats Berdal advocates this distinction: "...what it is we expect the use of force or forces to *achieve* as opposed to *do*." See Berdal (2009), p. 121, and Adebajo et al. (2001), p. 71.

- Under what circumstances it is of decisive importance to seek and nurture the compliance of the parties?

As pointed out earlier the most outstanding conceptual challenge of modern crisis management is the principle of consent. And it is not a problem only at the operational level - but challenges the entire decision-making structures of crisis management operations. This standpoint validates the relevance of the research problem.

## 2.7 The Research Method and Process

This thesis utilizes qualitative methodology supported by the Delphi-method. The utilization of Delphi-method is described in chapter 3. Analysis is founded on content analysis, whilst interpretations are based on the accepted scenarios and responses provided by Delphi-panellists. Where applicable, interpretation was supported by questions that pertain to strategic studies<sup>116</sup>.

The research process followed the below structure and sequences. In the first phase, the contemporary crisis management operations were described based on document research. Thereafter *strategic trends and drivers*, which may have an impact on global future scenarios, were described. These trends and drivers encompass political, economical, social, technological, environmental and military dimensions. They were identified from the UK Ministry of Defence and NATO publications. Derived from identified trends and drivers by NATO, *four different future scenarios* were presented. They depict the overall strategic context in which conflicts occur, and any future crisis management operation may have to operate. Subsequently, the *outlook of future conflicts* was described both in general terms and specific context (i.e. causes of conflict or risk conditions). Based on the depicted document content analysis deductions were made on the operating environment of a future crisis management operation and the first round of Delphi-questions were formulated.

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
<sup>116</sup> Here I refer to the following questions: "(1) *What is it all about? (i.e what are the stakes at hand?);* (2) *What strategic effect are we having?;* (3) *Is the strategy selected tailored to meet our political objectives?;* (4) *What are the propable limits of our power as a basket of complementary agencies to influence, and endeavour to control, the enemy's will?;* (5) *How could the enemy strive to thwart us?;* (6) *What are our alternative courses of action or inaction? What are their prospective costs and benefits?;* (7) *How robust is our home front?;* (8) *Does the strategy we prefer today draw prudently and honestly upon the strategic education that history provides?;* (9) *What have we overlooked?."* See Baylis, John; Gray, Colin S.: *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.

The aim of the first round of Delphi-questions was to identify the risk conditions that merit for a military crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation including peacekeeping or peace enforcement). These questions were presented to a panel of experts (i.e. Delphi-panel). By identifying the risk conditions, as well as the overall strategic context that the conditions relate to, it was possible to define the *operating environment of a future military crisis management operation*. These definitions were validated based on the recommendations of the Delphi-panel. The first round of Delphi-questions provided the basis for relevant hypotheses of the second round of Delphi-questions.

The identified operating environments provided the background, against *which the idea of inducing consent or relying on compliance was tested and analysed*. Descriptions of operating environment and hypotheses on feasibility of peacekeeping and peace enforcement were tested on the Delphi-panel during the second round of Delphi-questions. The aim of the second round of Delphi-questions was threefold. First, to identify what kind of peacebuilding space is likely in each risk condition. Second, to distinguish what is the ‘ecology’ of a conflict. Third, to identify significant and other spoiler types, which have an impact on political processes and subsequently on peace support operations. Once the peacebuilding space, the ecology of conflict and the spoilers pertaining to each risk condition were defined; it was possible to evaluate how applicable peace enforcement or peacekeeping activities would be for a desired end state. Spoiler management strategies depicted by Stephen Stedman were matched to each conflict, and their applicability evaluated.

Thereafter, the collected data was collated and analysed to determine a collective view of the panel, as well as to identify contradictions or insubstantial arguments (chapter 4.3). Preconditions and implications that were raised in a similar way by at least two panellists were accepted, permitting that other panellists did not contest these views. Some unique, yet plausible, preconditions and implications were accepted, permitting sufficient argumentation of these views was provided. Tentative unique findings, contested views, contradictions and insubstantial arguments were iterated with the panel. Acceptance of hypotheses is based on panellists’ responses, and they depict a collective majority view. Categorization of collected material followed the framework of research questions and hypothesis. The overall findings were then evaluated against contemporary literature to ascertain validity and reliability (see chapter 4.3.3). Finally, derived from the research findings deductions and recommendations were made. Picture 6 depicts the research process.





Picture 6: Research process.

### 3 FUTURE PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

*“The problem of uncertainty remains notwithstanding changes in organization, technological advances or any so called ‘revolutions in military matters’. Uncertainty derives from the complex and interactive nature of war. In the foreseeable future this fog of war will remain; thus it is better to adapt by adapting ways and means – and allowing one to act in spite of this uncertainty.”<sup>117</sup>*

To envisage future there is a need to be cognizant of current affairs. For defining the operating environment of a future peace support operation, a prerequisite is an understanding of contemporary crisis management and peace support operations. These operations are described in chapter 3.1. The rest of chapter 3.1 will identify the plausible global futures, prospects for conflicts in general, and prospects for peace support operations in particular. These futures and prospects are foundations for identifying future operating environments of peace support operations, which is done in chapter 3.2. This chapter describes the Delphi-method that was used to gather research data. Thereafter, the aim of the first round of Delphi-questions is described as well as the findings of the first round. Pertaining to operating environments of a future peace support operation Chapter 3.3 provides a summary of the deductions made. Overall, chapter 3 answers to the first supporting research question: *What kind is the operating environment of crisis management in the next decade?*

#### 3.1 Identifying Futures

##### 3.1.1 Contemporary Peace Support Operations

Contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations focus on four thematic issues. Firstly, they support ceasefire agreements between two or more parties. Secondly, they support peace processes and national authorities after civil conflict. Thirdly, they extend initial security and stability gains into longer-term peace building. Fourthly, they provide security and protection in response to conflict.<sup>118</sup> The African continent is the focal area for UN peace operations<sup>119</sup>.

<sup>117</sup> Desportes, Vincent: *Deciding in the Dark*, Economica Ltd, Paris, 2008, pp.113.

<sup>118</sup> UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6.

<sup>119</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): *Multilateral peace operations: Africa, 2008*, SIPRI Fact Sheet, July 2009, <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS0907Af.pdf> (29.6.2011). The UN sent 70% of all peace operation personnel it deployed worldwide in 2008 to Africa. Eight of the 13 operations in 2008 with Chapter VII powers were in Africa. For further details of contemporary

Pertaining to supporting ceasefire agreements, there are long-standing monitoring and observation missions in Cyprus, the Golan, Jammu and Kashmir, and Western Sahara that continue to help deter violence. *These missions are limited in size, mandate and cost. However, in some cases their presence may encourage Member States to divert attention away from finding a political solution.* The UN mission in Lebanon illustrates how resource-intensive and challenging such operations can be in a volatile environment.<sup>120</sup>

In supporting a peace process and national authorities in some countries, peacekeeping missions face distinct challenges in helping to lay the foundations for sustainable peace. A troubled transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and a difficult peace process between northern and southern Sudan are straining these two large missions. *These missions are struggling to strengthen political processes, which depend on regional and international support.* Deterring and containing violence and protecting civilians are critical and demanding parts of their task. Execution of these tasks, in the face of ongoing conflict, is complicated by two specific challenges. Firstly, there are inadequate capabilities for the tasks on hand. Secondly, there are differences of view on what ‘robust’ peacekeeping can and should be expected to accomplish. Large and remote territories in which these missions operate increase their difficulty as well as cost.<sup>121</sup>

Many UN peacekeeping missions are attempting to extend initial security and stability gains into longer-term peace building. In Haiti, Liberia and Timor-Leste, these missions have succeeded in establishing basic security and supporting political processes. The conditions for sustainable peacebuilding are in place. Supported by the UN, international financial institutions and other partners, national governments must lead in setting strategies to deliver tangible peace dividends and economic development. *Peacekeeping missions must improve their ability to contribute to peacebuilding and, where called upon, to coordinate a broader effort.* Peacekeeping transition and exit strategies depend on countries providing for their own security, and the UN will need to find effective ways to support this goal through better rule of law and assistance to security sector reform.<sup>122</sup>

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operations, see: SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operation Deployments, <http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIKOMAP1210.pdf> (29.6.2011). See also The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): *The Military Balance 2010*, Oxford University Press, London, 2010.

<sup>120</sup> UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6.

<sup>121</sup> UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6.

In Chad and Sudan's Darfur, UN missions are trying to minimize the effects of ongoing conflict. Their activities are focused on protecting civilians and providing security for humanitarian efforts. *The willingness of major parties to these conflicts to accept and cooperate with peacekeepers is critical.* The scale and remoteness of the territory make these two missions among the most expensive and difficult UN operations ever. In the absence of an agreed political solution, mitigating the conflict and preventing mission failure are the only viable strategies. These missions will likely continue to require major investment of capacity and resources for years to come.<sup>123</sup> Overall, the above problems are compounded by a perception that the Security Council has forgotten to observe guidance provided by Brahimi. The guidance called for the need to match politics to peacekeeping, and resources to mandates.<sup>124</sup>

As relevant examples, NATO, European Union and the African Union also conduct contemporary crisis management operations.<sup>125</sup> Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of UN, NATO has ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo<sup>126</sup>. The current operation in Afghanistan is NATO's most significant operational commitment to date. Alongside, NATO is using coercive military force in an effort to protect civilians under threat of attack from the Gaddafi regime of Libya. In Kosovo NATO is supervising the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps and helping to create a professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force. Alongside these operations, NATO is focused on detecting and deterring terrorist activity in the Mediterranean, and at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, NATO supports the African Union in its peacekeeping missions on the African continent. In Iraq NATO continues to support the establishment of effective and accountable security forces.<sup>127</sup> Overall, NATO aims defend its interests and contribute to peace in every part of the Euro-Atlantic region<sup>128</sup>. Since 2004, the European Union has been conducting EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under a UN resolution,<sup>129</sup> this mission has an executive function and is able to deploy considerable reserve forces to the area at short notice. Since 2008, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA has protected vessels delivering food aid to Somalia, and vulnerable vessels in the area. The operation also aims to deter and prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. EU also supports Somalia by training

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<sup>122</sup> UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6.

<sup>123</sup> UN New Horizon (2009), pp. 5-6.

<sup>124</sup> Jones et al. (2009), p. 8

<sup>125</sup> For further details of contemporary operations, see: *SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operation Deployments* and *IISS: The Military Balance 2010*.

<sup>126</sup> UN resolutions : UNSCR 1386 (2001), UNSCR 1970 (2011), UNSCR 1244 (1999)

<sup>127</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_52060.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm) (29.6.2011)

<sup>128</sup> NATO Strategic Concept, pp. 7-12, 20.

Somali security forces in Uganda.<sup>130</sup> The African Union is conducting peace support operation in Somalia (AMISOM) to stabilize the security situation, and to create a safe and secure environment in preparation for the transition to the UN<sup>131</sup>.

### 3.1.2 Selecting Scenarios

Tarja Meristö and Mika Mannermaa have defined a good scenario. According to them, a scenario should be plausible including context, chain of events as well as in a psychological sense. Comprehensibility and clarity are trademarks of a good scenario. Meanwhile a scenario should be trustworthy and logically coherent. The assumptions within the scenarios regarding actions and choices made by humans are founded on values, attitudes, cultural perceptions and traditions. Thus, the scenarios do not conflict with social reality. A scenario comprises of relevant actors, actions, choices, references, connections, timings and materials. Scenarios are neither generalized or summarized opinions of a desired or feared state of the future; nor should they be variants of a common basic trend. Scenarios should derive from different foundations and therefore be fundamentally different descriptions of states of the future.<sup>132</sup>

For the requirements of this research, the future scenarios need to be unrestricted so that they qualify for a diploma thesis for the Department of Strategic and Defence Studies. Restricted scenarios would be available, but for reasons of transparency, they were not applicable. Secondly, the scenarios need to define the operating environment where crisis management is conducted. Finally, the scenarios need to evolve from and focus on security related context. This is paramount so that the scenarios provide a platform for examining the research focus of consent and compliance in a crisis management operation.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Multiple Futures Project – Navigating Towards 2030 fulfils the general and research specific requirements. The study focuses on future threat environments, thus it is suitable for this research. The study has been conducted by identifying drivers that may have an impact on the future. Thereafter four different futures have been defined based on the drivers. Related to these different futures specific risk conditions have been identified. By examining these risk conditions against each future, the study has come up with deductions on security and military implications.

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<sup>129</sup> UNSCR 1948(2010), EUFOR acts under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN.

<sup>130</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=en> (29.6.2011)

<sup>131</sup> African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) homepage, <http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/amisom.htm> (29.6.2011).

Although the NATO study fulfils the requirements, one must point out certain reservations also. First, the study is very much risk and vulnerability centric, it is not phenomena centric. Therefore, it may miss certain issues - mainly positive (benign) developments that have global impact. Secondly, it focuses on protecting the people of the NATO Alliance. Thus, it concentrates on well-being of population within the Alliance, and may miss negative (malign) developments harmful to populations elsewhere. Thirdly and obviously, the study has political and normative intentions in the background. In most cases, for a security institution any study assessing the operating environment will attempt to justify the institutions *raison d'être*. Notwithstanding these reservations, the NATO study is rigorous in its logical approach and amongst the available studies, the best suited for this research. Where relevant the NATO study is augmented with the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence study on the future character of conflict, as well as by the State of the Future 2010 study<sup>133</sup>.

### 3.1.3 Strategic Trends and Drivers as Foundations

Strategic trends that are visible today are likely to have an impact on the global scenario around 2020 to 2030. *Climate change* will be the most significant; and unless significant measures are achieved by 2020, its impact may be impossible to contain. With the power of China, India and possibly Brazil rising, a simultaneous shift towards *multi-polarity* will be underway. *China's* economic power will be predominant in Asia and its influence will be global. Other powers, such as Russia and Iran, will also be seeking to secure wider influence. All these emerging powers will seek requisite influence in international organisations. Critical *resource shortages* may also be reached by 2020; with some oilfields in the Middle East exhausted. Developed nations' relative advantages in *defence technology* may have been surpassed by emerging powers. However, the United States may have maintained its relative military advantage.<sup>134</sup> This means that there may be a more heterogeneous international system. Whilst there are more actors with influence, there are more potential partners and adversaries. The heterogeneous system may have more potential conflicts of interest, and it is likely that any Western oriented value system is not globally predominant. Any strategic assessment of feasible crisis management approaches need to take note of the above. In a complex, heterogeneous, interdependent and contested system all comprehensive and effect-based approaches become even more challenging.

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<sup>132</sup> [www.tulevaisuus.fi/topi](http://www.tulevaisuus.fi/topi), (18.11.2010).

<sup>133</sup> The Millennium Project: *2010 State of the Future*, Print section, Washington, 2009.

Alongside these strategic trends one must identify drivers that may have an impact on possible futures. Friction, integration and asymmetry are *structural drivers*, which have been influential throughout history. They are assessed to remain so for centuries. *Friction* over distribution of power is the degree of ease with which decisions are made in the international system. In essence, friction functions as a relative power meter - ranging from cooperation to confrontation. Economic *integration* including globalisation is the degree to which national and regional economies trade. It portrays their levels of functional integration. States will continue to rely on globalisation for their prosperity. As globalisation requires cooperation, it will have a stabilising effect. However, globalisation also creates tensions. In some cases, it may be a driver of instability and conflict. *Asymmetry* of states and political entities is the relative discrepancy between states in terms of wealth and power. Asymmetry influences international relations in terms of both development and security. Examining the interrelation of the structural drivers highlights six *deterministic drivers*. They are: (1) *changing state capacity*, (2) *resources and their allocation*, (3) *climate change*, (4) *use of technology*, (5) *demographics*, and (6) *competing ideologies*. It is assessed that these deterministic drivers will have the greatest impact on security in the coming decades.<sup>135</sup> These drivers provide the foundation for the possible futures, thus it is pertinent to define them in more detail.

*Changing state capacity* reflects the distribution and management of power at the state level. States that cannot adapt to the changing global context will risk collapse, and many such failures will be accompanied by substantial outbreaks of violence. The poor governance, economic deprivation and inequality that characterises failed and failing states is likely to spread to neighbouring states. *Resources and their allocation* encompass availability, affordability, access and competition for essential resources, including energy, water, food and other essential commodities<sup>136</sup>. During the future decade, it is expected that there is a considerable increase in demand for energy. Many countries will remain critically dependent upon energy imports and securing them will be vital. Any long-term significant change in the 'average weather', *climate change*, may have an impact on international relations and create instability, especially in those states that are already vulnerable to other pressures. *Use of technology* denotes the evolution and availability of technology up to 2030. The physical and virtual networks that support globalisation will have to be protected. *Demographics* reflect

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<sup>134</sup> United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: *Future Character of Conflict*, (2010), pp. 29–38.

<sup>135</sup> NATO Multiple Futures Project (2009), pp. 13-16 and *Future Character of Conflict*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>136</sup> See The Millennium Project (2009), pp. 14-17, for prospects of conflict due to lack of water and imbalance of resource allocation including regional considerations.

domestic population trends related to birth, death, age, income, ethnicity, and the other characteristics of a state's population. It includes migration, urbanisation, and other external factors. The world's population is rising and this will lead to increased demands for resources. Some states will regard the security of their food and water supplies as issues of national survival and will act accordingly. Within EU countries, a changing demographic balance towards a more multi-ethnic society means that some conflicts may create risks, including extremism, within EU communities. *Competing ideologies* and worldviews deal with alienation and confrontation based on different values, religions, identities and historic geopolitical perspectives. Ideologies and worldviews will remain significant factors and people will continue to fight for their beliefs. Neither ideologies nor worldviews will be geographically bounded.<sup>137</sup> The trends and drivers described above are the building blocks for the futures that follow. Plausible futures stem from the interaction and interdependency of these drivers.

#### 3.1.4 Four Plausible Global Futures

The relevant drivers in Future One “Dark Side of Exclusivity” are climate change, resource allocation, economic integration, and competing ideologies and worldviews. The Dark Side of Exclusivity describes how globalisation, climate change, and the misallocation of resources significantly affect the capacity of states to maintain sovereignty. Weak and failed states generate instability in areas of interest, and present the states of the developed world with strategic choices regarding how to react. This future *concentrates on the friction between the developed or ‘market’ states and the developing states*. The future is complicated by nationalism, the misallocation of resources, poverty, frustration, demographic pressure, and deteriorating environmental conditions.<sup>138</sup>

The relevant drivers for Future Two “Deceptive Stability” are asymmetry, demographics, resource allocation, and competing ideologies and worldviews. Deceptive Stability highlights the requirement to manage the demographic shift resulting from aging populations and young migrants. Additionally, resource allocation is both effective and efficient as the resource-rich parts of the world become part of the dominant system. However, a wide range of problems persists in the less developed regions of the world that are resource-poor. This dichotomy is further exacerbated by the lack of intervention by liberal democracies absorbed with domestic

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<sup>137</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 15-16. and Future Character of Conflict, pp. 2-14.

<sup>138</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 19-20.



priorities. Ensuing tensions and poor economic and cultural integration worsen pre-existing domestic and transnational security issues such as crime and terrorism. The overarching theme of this future is *preoccupation with domestic concerns in the developed states, which leaves them less able to react to instability and geopolitical risk*.<sup>139</sup>

The relevant drivers in *Future Three “Clash of Modernities”* are competition of ideologies and worldviews, demographics, and the use of technology. Clash of Modernities sketches a world where a strong belief in rationalism coupled with technological innovation has enabled advanced-network societies to connect virtually across the globe. Continued globalisation and technological advances have helped drive urban centres in the developed world to become mega-hubs of wealth and culture. The governance of this developed sector is diffuse, multi-layered and network-centric. Thus, virtual networks create problems and solve them in real time. The *disconnected, segregated, and disassociated frontier areas* suffer the greatest tension. Further destabilising these regions are organised criminal elements that engage in human and black-market trafficking, intellectual and technological piracy, and illegal arms trading. Authorities within developed states focus primarily on keeping these disruptive forces at bay by managing flows of trade, information, resources, and the recruitment of workers that traverse the borders between the *urban cores and outlying areas*.<sup>140</sup>

The relevant drivers of *Future Four “New Power Politics”* are friction in international decision-making; competing ideologies and worldviews; conflict over resource allocation; and a lack of economic integration. New Power Politics describes growing absolute wealth, accompanied by the widespread proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or effect. Power politics characterize this future. *Competing regional powers dominate a truly multi-polar world*. These powers have established a fragile balance in which globalisation and international rules and norms are challenged by competition for resources and influence. These states may not have a global reach, but regionally they play a significant role in shaping world politics by promoting their strategic interests and competitive advantage. Competition and demand for resources, particularly in ungoverned spaces, continues unabated as the most powerful states continuously strive to improve their economies and protect their populations.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Multiple Futures Project, p. 20.

<sup>140</sup> Multiple Futures Project, p. 21.

<sup>141</sup> Multiple Futures Project, p. 22. The Millennium Project (2009), pp. 16-17.

One may argue that these futures are comprehensible. Importantly, they do not appear as generalized or summarized views. This is because they derive from distinct combinations of the structural and deterministic drivers. Thus, they appear logically coherent – and are not sheer imagination. With these scenarios as overall strategic settings, it is pertinent to examine in more detail future conflicts, which are described in the following chapters.

### 3.1.5 Prospects on Future Conflicts

*General landscape of conflict.* Future conflict will not be a precise science. Thus, conflict will remain an *unpredictable* and uniquely human activity. Adversaries (i.e. states, state-proxies and non-state actors) as well as conventional and unconventional threats will *blur*. Conflicts will include conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal elements in mixed modes of operations. Some adversaries will not respect distinctions between civil and military operations. The battle space will be global in both geographic and virtual space, and highly *congested*. All domains of conflict, including densely populated and poorly governed urban areas will be *contested* by a wide variety of actors. Volatile commodity prices and financial markets, transnational organized crime and environmental changes may lead to political and security instability. This pertains to societies that lack the resources to cope with such shocks. Countries emerging from conflict are particularly vulnerable. The *range of threats will spread*, with increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberspace, and other irregular threats. There is a real risk that these threats will be met with limited or partial responses<sup>142</sup>. Conflict will remain focused on influencing people, and thus the battle of the narratives will be a focal point.<sup>143</sup>

Struggle for control over resources may increase the likelihood of conflict. Direct conflict between an EU country and a major power is judged unlikely. However, wars involving the major powers or their proxies are probable. It is possible that EU countries will be involved in coalition action against a state actor possessing significant military capabilities. The incidence of intrastate violence, with both state, proxy and non-state actors will remain a continuing theme. Positive impacts of globalisation should drive greater interdependency. However, resource shortages build and pressures caused by climate change create potential for instability. Thus, *underlying tensions are likely to further increase*. The developed world may not be able to retain sufficient military advantage over rising powers in all circumstances,

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<sup>142</sup> For an elaboration on viable responses, see The Millennium Project (2009), pp. 30-31.

which *may embolden actors where previously they had been deterred*. Access to resources and the ability to move them will become an increasingly important facet of international tension and conflict. Thus, a competition to secure these assets may ensue.<sup>144</sup>

In the future decade there will be a growing number of states competing for access, resources and influence which, coupled with the failure of some states, is likely to result in a background of *intrastate violence in Africa, Central America, Central Asia and the Middle East*.<sup>145</sup> Additional factors, such as religious-based extremism, can be expected to add further volatility to this mix. Rivalry may take the form of conflict between proxies, although these proxies could remain difficult to control. Having seen the continued proliferation of WMD, many states may have developed and deployed these systems. The possession of nuclear weapons will remain a goal of many aspiring powers. This is because possession of such weapons is perceived as essential for survival and status.<sup>146</sup>

Access to technology required to overmatch adversaries may be severely eroded and *may increase the political risks of intervention*. Non-lethal and directed energy weapons, space and cyber technologies will be available to many actors. Disruptive technologies may emerge that overturn conventional military thinking and render specific capabilities less effective or even ineffective. For example, high-end novel threats, including counter-space capabilities, could seriously challenge access to theatres of operation. Easily obtained but relatively low-tech light weapons may constrain freedom of manoeuvre. Throughout history, the ‘paradox of war’ reveals that thinking adversaries avoid strengths and gravitate towards areas of perceived weaknesses. Adversaries will avoid conventional military operations in which they are unprepared to confront developed world forces. Instead, they will attack in ways that one might consider irregular or asymmetric, but are anything but asymmetric to them.<sup>147</sup>

The distinctions between state and non-state actors will blur even further. Violent non-state actors will evolve to be better able to exploit information based technologies, to influence global opinion and to disrupt communication and economic links on an even greater scale. They will have developed higher levels of lethality to counter protection systems, and they may have access to weapons of mass destruction together with the will to use them. In the

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<sup>143</sup> Future Character of Conflict, pp.6-7; UN New Horizon (2009), p.6; Multiple Futures Project, pp. 47-48.

<sup>144</sup> Future Character of Conflict, pp.29 – 33.

<sup>145</sup> One elaboration on the specific areas of potential conflict is provided by the NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement study, pp. 14-17.

<sup>146</sup> Future Character of Conflict, pp.29 – 33.

future decade non-state actors are not second-rate threats. Military activities across the mosaic of conflict will become increasingly blurred. It could become increasingly difficult to achieve military objectives in a complex urban and overpopulated environment in which one may be forced to operate. *While military defeat of adversaries will be achievable and indeed a necessity, this in itself will rarely deliver political goals without cohesive comprehensive approaches.*<sup>148</sup>

*Context and origins of future conflicts.* In the “Dark Side of Exclusivity” future the prospect of failed governance and challenges to state authority are key risks. Previously stable governments may be destabilised, and an increase of potentially hostile states is possible. Proliferation of WMD continues. This development undermines national and international law. The friction between developed and developing states is likely to cause uncontrolled migration, illegal immigration and human exploitation. Violations of territorial integrity are possible as well as population unrest. Overall, these developments may lead to vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and thus affect free flow of resources. The spread of radical ideologies alongside the prospect of ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts and spillover are likely.<sup>149</sup> Failed states, uncontrolled migration, ideological conflict, endangered rule of law and threats to resource allocation portray the conflicts of this future.

Whilst uncontrolled migration and ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts remain risks; an additional important risk in future two “Deceptive Stability” is transnational organized crime. Alongside crime, a key risk in this future is related to the demographic shifts.<sup>150</sup> Uncontrolled migration, ideological conflicts and organised crime are the likely portrait of conflict in this future. The conflicts of future three “Clash of Modernities” might have a slightly different emphasis. In this future extremism of marginalised groups, conflicts between incompatible belief systems and ideological conflicts are highlighted. Criminal or rogue elements may exploit technology and thus disrupt vital interdependent computer networks<sup>151</sup>. This future’s conflict landscape includes extremism, ideological conflict and technological network crime.

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<sup>147</sup> Multiple Futures Project, p. 47; MoD Future Character of Conflict, pp.29 – 33

<sup>148</sup> MoD Future Character of Conflict, pp.29 – 33.

<sup>149</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17. The Millennium Project (2009), pp. 18-19. This provides prospects on democracy emerging from authoritarian regimes including regional considerations.

<sup>150</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17. The Millennium Project (2009), pp. 24-25.

<sup>151</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17.

Competition for ideological supremacy and resources that may lead or include interstate rivalry are the dominant features of conflict in the fourth future “New Power Politics”<sup>152</sup>.

There are some potential sources of threat: individuals, criminal organisations, non-state actors, specific states and nature. *Super-empowered individuals* who have overcome constraints and rules may wield unique political, economic, intellectual, or cultural influence over people and events. Another threat is *organised crime* with the aim of committing serious crimes or offenses in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. Non-sovereign entities (*i.e. non-state actors*) expressing extremist values and ideas may exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national, and in some cases international, level. *Rogue states* may act without respect for other states or global norms. *Confrontational powers* resort to force or threaten the use of force disproportionately to what is at stake. Finally yet importantly, *nature* may also pose a threat. The physical world exists and changes on its own accord.<sup>153</sup>

### 3.1.6 Prospects on Future Crisis Management

Predicting future demand for peace support operations (*i.e.* peacekeeping or peace enforcement) is notoriously difficult. In 1998 for example, it was generally agreed that large-scale UN operations were ending, discredited in the Balkans and Central Africa. Yet the next year, UN transitional administrations were launched in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. Nevertheless, these operations did not give a clear picture of peacekeeping’s future. No further transitional administrations have been mandated since 1999. No new UN missions of any kind have been deployed in South America and the Asia-Pacific region. The UN will face similar surprises and anomalies in future.<sup>154</sup> The strategic uncertainties of the future decade will challenge predictions even further.

Past trends suggest that a rapid decline in state income is a likely predictor of internal conflict. Alongside this, it is possible to identify a number of regional trends that are likely to shape the future of peace support operations. In both Asia-Pacific and continental South America, large-scale peace operations are not a typical feature of conflict resolution. Although a number of regional organizations do deploy monitoring missions in these areas, there is currently little demand for a UN role. In Europe, peacekeeping remains an important tool for stability.

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<sup>152</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17.

<sup>153</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 28-29.

However, strong regional organizations limit the demand for the UN and it retains only a residual role in Kosovo and Georgia. The main potential theatres for peace support operations are *Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caribbean and Central America*.<sup>155</sup>

The future of peace support operations depend on their ability to manage volatile environments, to take on varied tasks in managing threats to peace, and to help put in place the critical early foundations for sustainable peace. Consensus as well as clarity on policy and requirements for robust peacekeeping and protection of civilians is central to the success of future peacekeeping operations. Peace support operations remain a part of a political solution, not an alternative. They are one of a range of international peace and security tools and must be considered alongside other available responses. Peace support operations must be engaged only as an accompaniment to an active political strategy, which provide clear direction. The global resources available for UN peacekeeping are finite. *Political strains in one context can reverberate as weakened consensus in another context*. Resource demands of one operation can mean diminished personnel, equipment and funding for others. Perceived weakness or capitulation in one environment can lead to increased provocation of UN peacekeepers in another.<sup>156</sup> In the next decade, the *interdependence of politics, resources and use of military force in peace support operations* remains an integral feature.

Divisions over peacekeeping and sovereignty are misleading because the majority of large-scale UN operations are deliberately *designed to extend rather than limit the authority of states*. The Security Council is normally in the business of strengthening governments rather than changing regimes. This fact, often overlooked, is essential to explaining some recent successes and failures of peacekeeping.<sup>157</sup> Understanding this underlying feature may help guide future deployments.

Current debates about a possible UN peacekeeping operation for Somalia present *an extreme case of what the extension of state authority may require*. There are roughly 80 000 armed individuals in Somalia. Their loyalties are fluid, and it is unlikely that they will ever form a coherent coalition for or against a UN mission. Yet currently, several factions deemed hostile to UN control a large swathe of Somali territory, while the government (with an army of approximately 2,000 only) has control primarily in and around the capital. Additionally, there

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<sup>154</sup> Jones et al., pp. 49- 50.

<sup>155</sup> Jones et al., pp. 49- 50. There is a elaboration on which countries or areas specifically may require peace support operations,

<sup>156</sup> UN New Horizon, p. iii-iv.

is a substantial threat from foreign fighters using Somalia for a proxy war. Deployment of a peacekeeping operation to extend the authority of the Somalia government is a conceptual possibility. However, it faces three key obstacles. First, the scale of the challenge would require UNIFIL-scale<sup>158</sup> resources. Second, a lack of international and regional confidence in the viability of the current Somali state has meant that no such concentration of troop contributors is available. Third, in the absence of a broader political settlement, there is some evidence that international forces would not just encounter resistance but exacerbate it. Conversely, the last year has seen halting yet real progress towards a political settlement. It is possible that a viable peace – and, by extension, a viable Somali state – could emerge on two conditions. The first is sufficient political support to a national government from domestic actors, the UN and international community. The second is the deployment of a substantial international force against the backdrop of that political settlement to protect that government from inevitable spoilers and deter revolts. So long as those conditions do not apply (as they do not at present), the question of whether the Security Council decides to authorize a UN force for Somalia is secondary; the primary reality is that no one will contribute forces.<sup>159</sup>

Several factors may be deducted from the futures and future conflicts that will have an impact on future peace support operations. There will be a particular need for peace support operations, sometimes in large-scale theatres with limited infrastructure, requiring *robust* ‘*expeditionary*’ capabilities. These operations are likely to face opposition from *hardened and sophisticated* ‘*spoilers*’. Spoilers will often have international state or non-state support in both internal and interstate contexts. There will be further pressure on peacekeepers to play a primary or supporting role in *extending the authority of weak or contested* governments. *Complex and divisive politics* not only within conflict settings but also at the regional and international levels will add complexity. These divisions are about the conflicts and the interests and values involved in resolving them. Peace support operations will be challenged by *major financial and political obstacles* to increasing supply among existing troop contributors to the UN. To overcome these challenges reinforcements from diverse sources are a necessity. Continued involvement in challenging crisis management scenarios (e.g. Afghanistan) of troop contributing nations, will constrain their capacity to deploy or lead multinational operations, and limit alternatives for ‘robust’ UN peacekeeping.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> Jones et al. (2009), p. 11.

<sup>158</sup> UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. UNIFIL has more than 12000 personnel as of May 2011. See UNIFIL homepage, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/facts.shtml> (29.6.2011)

<sup>159</sup> Jones et al. (2009), p. 11.

<sup>160</sup> Jones et al.; pp. 49-55.

The global economic crisis is forcing many governments and organizations to scale back conflict management, humanitarian and development assistance. However, the global demand for military and police capabilities remains high. Stretched bilateral and regional capacities may increase likelihood of UN peacekeeping being called upon to act as an instrument of last resort, yet with fewer resources and diminished support.<sup>161</sup> Both unknown future demands as well as uncertainty about available global resources render the task of defining future needs of peacekeeping inherently difficult. UN peacekeeping remains a comparatively inexpensive provider of post-conflict security. Thus, demand for the tool is unlikely to falter. Future requirements will need to be considered in the context of a constrained financial environment. Meeting these demands will entail a new and comprehensive approach to resource generation and incentives required to deliver results in the field.<sup>162</sup>

Pertaining to the future, an interesting point of view is that due to better outlook of populations on a whole (i.e better education and so forth), the world and eventually operating environments of crisis management are changing. There are shifts in cultures and society classes, which need to be factored in any planning. Furthermore, all actors within a conflict appear parallel and ‘melt’ together. This means that within the same risk condition there are different factors with varying levels of impact on the conflict. The quest is for better understanding on what impact do these factors have.<sup>163</sup> Furthermore, the idea of ‘threat’ needs to be identified with more precision. This is because general security politics includes only domestic and international issues. To expand these limited points of view, human security allows addressing emerging threats more effectively.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> UN New Horizon (2009), p. 6.

<sup>162</sup> New Horizon, p. iv.

<sup>163</sup> Interview Carl Henrik Assargård, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2011. Mr Assargård is Honorary Consul of Sweden in Iraqi Kurdistan Region. He has more than 15 years of experience of working in post-conflict environments, mainly in the Balkans as political advisor the peace support operation leadership.

<sup>164</sup> Thomas, N; Tow, WT: *The utility of human security: Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention*, Security Dialogue, vol. 33 (2): 177-192 June 2002.



## 3.2 Identifying Operating Environments of Future Peace Support Operations

### 3.2.1 Utilising Delphi-method

The Delphi-method is useful when evaluating future societal or technological developments; changes in operating environments; and whilst formulating action plans for organisations.<sup>165</sup> Members of a Delphi-panel are usually recognized as experts in a certain field, and they are asked to give their future oriented estimations about the development of a certain matter. The method is often characterized as a method for structuring a group communication process, thus it has a wide number of applications in different areas. Fundamentally, the Delphi method is a version of survey analysis – especially a form of survey research that involves repetitive questioning of respondents.<sup>166</sup>

The key characteristics and foundations of the method are anonymity of respondents, iterative nature and feedback. The aim of anonymity is that persons or the organisations they represent do not argue, but rather the *arguments and their content form the fundamental part of the research material*. The iterative nature means that the respondents have the possibility of changing or add their arguments during the process. Feedback aims to increase the understanding and awareness of all the Delphi-panelists on the subject matter.<sup>167</sup>

Osmo Kuusi has defined that the Delphi-method requires for a panel of experts to be formed. These experts will inform the researcher separately about their view on the subject matter. The first round Delphi-questionnaire can be exact or cover wider questions that will be more exact in the following rounds. The experts will be given feedback about the other answers, though anonymous, before the next round of the questionnaire. This provides the possibility for the experts to change their answers, after getting the feedback, at least once during the process. Previously one of the main goals of Delphi-projects used to be consistency, but in Delphi-inquiries today this is often not seen necessary or even desirable.<sup>168</sup> The method is particularly applicable for this research as the future cannot be examined with precise analytical methods. Alongside that collective and subjective estimations are probably useful in the evaluation of

<sup>165</sup> Huttunen, Mika and Metteri, Jussi: *Ajatuksia operaatiotaidon ja taktiikan laadullisesta tutkimuksesta*, National Defence University, Department of Tactics, EditaPrima, Helsinki, 2008, p. 143.

<sup>166</sup> Sivelius, Desiree: *The Delphi Method – Theoretical Base for Use Delphi Method*, Tulevaisuudentutkimuksen oppimateriaali (TOPI), <http://www.tulevaisuus.fi/topi/default.asp> (18.11.2010).

<sup>167</sup> Kamppinen, Matti; Kuusi, Osmo; Söderlund, Sari (ed.): *Tulevaisuudentutkimus - perusteet ja sovellukset*, Helsinki, 2002, pp. 205–225.

the focal research problem, which occurs in a wide and complex context. In order to avoid the majority influence and the influence of strong personalities; the anonymous work of the panel is useful.<sup>169</sup> The Delphi-panellists for this research are depicted in table no. 1 below.

panelist	organisation	reasons for selection
Norman Atkins, Colonel Royal Netherlands Army	Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations	Sudan Integrated Operational Team, Office of Operations, DPKO. Previously team leader in Military Planning Service, DPKO with 5 years working experience at DPKO level.
Pekka Haavisto, Member of Parliament	Parliament of Finland	Special Representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Crises in Africa; Member of Foreign Affairs Committee and Defence Committee since 2007.
Gabor Horvath, Brigadier General Hungarian Defence Forces	European Union Military Staff	Director of Plans and Policy Directorate in the European Union Military Staff. General Horvath has more than 5 years of experience related to crisis management.
Kari Huhta, Journalist	Sanoma News Corporation, Finland	Diplomatic Editor of daily newspaper "Helsingin Sanomat". Kari Huhta has over 30 years of experience from reporting from conflict areas and following foreign and security policy issues.
Timo Kantola, Ambassador	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland	Ambassador of Finland to Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe. More than 23 years working experience on foreign affairs; served as Director of Unit for Security Policy and Crisis Management (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); and as Deputy Representative to the Political and Security Committee of the European Union.
Jasbir Lidder, Lieutenant General (retd.), Indian Army	United Nations Mission in Sudan	As current Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (since 2009) and former Force Commander UNMIS 2006 – 2008, General Lidder has extensive experience of operating at political – military level of crisis management. He has more than 6 years of experience related to UN peacekeeping at command or senior staff positions.
Anne Sipiläinen, Ambassador Permanent Representative	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland	Finland's Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee of the European Union from August 2007 until July 2011. Finland's Permanent Representative to Western European Union.

Table 1: Delphi-panellists.

These panellists provide views from a political point of view (Haavisto, Kantola, Sipiläinen); from a policy planner and adviser to political level (Atkins, Horvath, Kantola, Lidder, Sipiläinen); as political-military level experts (Atkins, Horvath, Lidder); and as an informed 'critical' view (Huhta). Although limited in number, these panel members provide comprehensive coverage of the political-military strategic level considerations. This is

<sup>168</sup> Sivelius, <http://www.tulevaisuus.fi/topi/default.asp> (18.11.2010).

essential for the scope and focus of this thesis. Furthermore, the panel members represent primary experts in either a national or an organisational context.

### 3.2.2 The First Round Delphi-questions

*The aim for the first round Delphi-questions was to identify and delineate the operating environment of a future military crisis management operation (i.e the first supporting research question).* The questionnaire had five main objectives. Firstly, it explored the validity and relevance of the structural and deterministic drivers. Secondly, it attempted to affirm the plausibility of the futures described, which were derived from the drivers. The third objective was to explore if the future conflicts derived from and connected to specific future scenarios were logical. The fourth objective was to identify the potential sources of conflict. The most important objective was to identify the risk conditions (i.e. conflicts) that would merit for a military crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation including peacekeeping or peace enforcement). Initially, there were 33 risk conditions relating to four different futures. The questionnaire is included as appendix 3 and respondents' responses as appendix 4. The questionnaire was sent to seven respondents in November 2010. By May 2011 five respondents had replied<sup>170</sup>. The below summary and deductions derive from those responses.

### 3.2.3 Summary of the Findings

*The panel found both the structural and deterministic drivers valid and relevant.* However, they made two significant observations. The first reservation was that the drivers are identified from an 'etatist'<sup>171</sup> approach rather than from a comprehensive one. One may argue that the structural drivers apply regardless of which entities are being analysed: states, societies, organisations, or inter-personal relations. The comprehensive viewpoint is constituted by the deterministic drivers, which cover all the dimensions of a PESTE<sup>172</sup>-analysis. The second reservation was related to the concept of competing ideologies. Some members of the panel

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<sup>169</sup> Sivelius, <http://www.tulevaisuus.fi/topi/default.asp> (18.11.2010).

<sup>170</sup> In addition to these five, one of the respondents (no. 3) concurs with the findings of the 1<sup>st</sup> round, although this respondent did not respond to the initial questionnaire.

<sup>171</sup> "Statism (or etatism) is a scholarly term in political philosophy either emphasising the role of the state in analysing political change; or, in describing political movements which support the use of the state to achieve goals." <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statism>. Etatist (adjective), etatism: statism (noun), <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/>, (22.2.2011).

<sup>172</sup> PESTE-analysis includes political (P), economical (E), society (S), technological (T) and ecological (E) dimensions.

argued that these ideologies actually do not compete, but should actually be countered with a respect for diversity. As it is implied that something needs to be countered, then the ideologies actually do compete – here one should not confuse original phenomenon with desired action.

*Similarly, the panel found the four different futures plausible.* The reservations presented focused on the viewpoint of the underlying descriptions. This was not surprising since the future scenarios are products of a collective security organisation of primarily developed world nation states. Importantly, the conflicts (i.e. risk conditions) that related to specific futures were accepted as logical and were not contested.

*The sources of threats were also accepted.* However, they were accepted with comments acknowledging other potential sources of threat. Firstly, it was highlighted that states would remain as sources of conflict - regardless if they were rogue or failed. Secondly, they stressed that overpowered and oligarchic international organisations could pose threats. Thirdly, whilst not strictly a source; the breakdown of the international legal framework, or organisations that uphold it, were identified as sources of threat.

In the fifth part and most importantly, the Delphi-panel agreed that the following *twelve (12) risk conditions would merit a peace support operation* including peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities. These risk conditions arose from 33 risk conditions in four different futures. The risk conditions below are listed in descending order according to support received:

1. Interstate rivalry
2. Failed Governance
3. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict
4. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces
5. Transnational criminal movements
6. Uncontrolled migration
7. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories
8. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes
9. Extremism of marginalised groups
10. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or weapons of mass effect (WMD/WME)
11. Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes
12. Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements

Table no. 2 below shows the number of respondents in favour, against or undecided on the idea that a risk condition would merit a peace support operation.

Risk conditions that merit a peace support operation	Respondents:		
	Aye	Nay	(?)*
1. Interstate rivalry	5		
2. Failed Governance	5		
3. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	5		
4. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces	4	1	
5. Transnational criminal movements	4	1	
6. Uncontrolled migration	3	2	
7. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	3	2	
8. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	3	2	
9. Extremism of marginalised groups	3	1	1
10. Proliferation of WMD/WME	3	1	1
11. Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes	3	1	1
12. Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements	1	3	1
<u>Uncertain:</u> "Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties" It was not possible to interpret the responses in an unambiguous manner. <u>Legend:</u> (?) * stands for undecided responses.			

Table 2: Risk conditions that merit a peace support operation.

These risk conditions pertain to specific futures. These futures have an impact on the overall strategic setting where a peace support operation functions. Thus, it is pertinent to make this differentiation. Table no. 2 below depicts these relationships.

Future 1: "Dark Side of Exclusivity"	Future 2: "Deceptive Stability"	Future 3: "Clash of Modernities"	Future 4: "New Power Politics"
1. Failed governance 2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 4. Uncontrolled migration. 5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 6. Proliferation of WMD/WME 7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes	1. Transnational criminal movements 2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict 3. Uncontrolled migration.	1. Extremism of marginalised groups 2. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 3. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements 4. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict	1. Interstate rivalry

Table 3: Risk conditions that merit a peace support operation within specific futures.

### 3.3 Deductions Pertaining to Future Peace Support Operations

The primary deduction is that the risk conditions that merit a peace support operation are *very distinct* from each other. This distinction is exacerbated by the *different overall settings* of the international relations system in each specific future. This implies that any *crisis management operation should be tailored to fit its respective case*.

The potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict is common to the first three futures. The existence of such a *crosscutting risk condition implies that future peace support operations will continue to be challenged by issues related to their legitimacy*. Furthermore, uncontrolled migration appears in two futures. In the first future, the uncontrolled migration appears in a world, which is polarized between developed and developing states. In second future, the uncontrolled migration appears in a world, where states with capabilities to react to are preoccupied with domestic internal issues. Thus, they are less able or willing to react.

Although it was not tested on the Delphi-panel, it is *reasonable to assume that the above-mentioned twelve risk conditions are likely to appear intertwined* – and not as isolated sterile conditions<sup>173</sup>. This is especially the case in future one, where failed governance may cause uncontrolled migration – or vice versa. Furthermore, failed governance may lead to uncontrolled spaces that threaten strategic chokepoints.

The *differences between the risk conditions are highlighted when they are tested against fundamental strategic questions*<sup>174</sup>. To provide a few examples, failed governance may not directly threaten other states, but the vulnerability of strategic chokepoints does. Failed governance is likely to have many undesired effects but it raises the issue of viewpoints and standards by which judgments are made. For instance, viewpoints of international organisations, superpowers, nation-states, leadership and population are varied. Different *stakes* are at hand, if one compares transnational crime with conflicts related to ethnicity,

<sup>173</sup> During the 2<sup>nd</sup> round of delphi-questions, several respondents emphasise that risk conditions appear intertwined.

<sup>174</sup> Here I refer to the following questions: “(1) *What is it all about? (i.e what are the stakes at hand?)*; (2) *What strategic effect are we having?*; (3) *Is the strategy selected tailored to meet our political objectives?*; (4) *What are the propable limits of our power as a basket of complementary agencies to influence, and endeavour to control, the enemy’s will?*; (5) *How could the enemy strive to thwart us?*; (6) *What are our alternative courses of action or inaction? What are their prospective costs and benefits?*; (7) *How robust is our home front?*; (8) *Does the strategy we prefer today draw prudently and honestly upon the strategic education that history provides?*; (9) *What have we overlooked?*.” See Baylis, John; Gray, Colin S.: *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.

religion or ideology. To suppress crime one defends legality within a national and - or international legal framework. To mitigate ethnic, religious, or ideological conflict one needs to balance between reciprocal respect and the legitimacy of alternative views. The nature and scale of immediate security concerns are quite different, when interstate rivalry is compared to uncontrolled migration. Uncontrolled migration is extremely vague by definition. In practice, it raises questions on scale, direction, impact, responsibility to protect, moral norms, legitimacy and legality of actions<sup>175</sup>. Comparing interstate rivalry and uncontrolled migration, one realises that the stakes involved are different. Thus, it is expected that political objectives are different – hence the *strategies* selected should also be different. Pertaining to proliferation of WMD/WME, nation-states and international organisations are faced with the dilemma of preventive (i.e. against potential threat) and pre-emptive (i.e. against imminent threat) measures. In these cases legality, legitimacy, likelihood and lethality arise, as well as the merits of *action against inaction*. To conclude, all the above considerations have an impact on the robustness of home fronts of countries participating in a peace support operation.

Furthermore, the concept of an opposing force, or enemy in classic military terms, is also very different. In an interstate rivalry situation, the intervening force may be looked as an impartial party by the rival parties – or biased towards the other. In the risk conditions pertaining to crime, identifying the opposing force (i.e. criminals by legitimate legal standards) is straightforward - at least on a conceptual level. The same applies to extremism of marginalised groups – as long as they are perceived as extremist both legally and legitimately. However, identifying opposing forces in risk conditions related to uncontrolled migration or ideological conflict is precarious – and quite likely a futile counter-productive exercise.

The Delphi-panel *was actually responding to the question of overall international capacity to intervene by pondering which risk condition merits a peace support operation*. This finding will be elaborated in the second round of Delphi-questions, which assumes that the potential overall international capacity to conduct peace support operations is high. However, in the future “Deceptive Stability” the will to do so is low. This is due to the risk of so-called ‘strategic inattention’.

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<sup>175</sup> Bali, Sita: *Population Movements*, in Williams, Paul D. (ed.): *Security Studies: An Introduction*, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 468 -475, 480 – 481. The Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) and Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) provide the international legal framework on the matter. It is of importance to note that *none of the agreements or practices actually guarantees anyone the right to refugee status, only the right to seek it*. Practice is that there is a wide acceptance in

*From a historical perspective, the risk conditions are neither novel nor new. These risk conditions derive from both the recent past and times even centuries ago. For instance, one may argue that piracy at sea in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, or the contemporary drug-trade related conflicts of Latin America, as well as modern cyber-crime are all forms of transnational crime. Such crime has exploited and continues to exploit existing technologies. All other risk conditions have also occurred in the past. Thus from the viewpoint of practicing strategy, we are actually fortunate. History provides strategic education. The distinction is that the risk conditions occur in novel futures. Hence, lessons learned from the past should be fitted to the case at hand.*

## **4 INDUCE CONSENT OR RELY ON COMPLIANCE**

*“Ridiculing idealism is short-sighted, but idealism untested by pessimism is misleading.”<sup>176</sup>*

Chapter 4 begins by explaining theory pertaining to spoilers. Thereafter, deriving from spoiler theory and the peacebuilding triangle consequent hypotheses are presented. These hypotheses are tested with the Delphi-panel and subsequent specific research findings and future prospects are presented. Chapter 4 concludes in a summary of the findings and a discussion supported by contemporary literature.

### **4.1 Theoretical Perspectives and Consequent Hypotheses**

It is common that peace processes have spoilers. The problem of spoilers is activated once there is a commitment, either formal or informal, towards a peace process. In order to conduct peace support operations one must know who's peace is being kept (i.e. parties of the peace process) and the substance of that peace<sup>177</sup>. Furthermore, one must comprehend by whom, where, when, how and why is a peace process threatened. To manage the spoiler problem one needs better comprehension of the actual problem. First, one needs to understand typology of spoilers. Secondly, one needs to explore intellectual approaches or strategies in managing specific spoiler problems. Finally, one needs to be aware of challenges related to implementing these strategies.

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international society of the right of every sovereign state to decide for itself who should be allowed entry into its territory.

<sup>176</sup> State of the Future 2010, p.9.

<sup>177</sup> See Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 56-59 for elaboration on strategic peacebuilding.



### 4.1.1 Managing Spoilers Within Peace Processes

Spoilers do not exist in wars, but are created within peace processes. *Spoilers exist only when there is a process to undermine.* Such a peace process begins when at least two parties to a conflict have committed themselves to a peace agreement. A peace process creates spoilers because it is rare in conflicts for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. A compromise in the form of a negotiated peace usually has losers: some who do not achieve their war aims. A compromise by definition requires the parties to accept that some of their demands are not met.<sup>178</sup> One may argue that there is an analogy between peace processes and the UN Charter. One can elaborate that individuals and groups that threaten local, regional or global peace are spoilers of the UN Charter's aims of international peace and security<sup>179</sup>. Thus in this research Stedman's spoiler definition<sup>180</sup> is expanded to include threats (i.e. groups and individuals) to international peace and security.

To understand the *typology of spoilers*, one must appreciate that spoilers have different dimensions, which are: number, position, type and locus. If the *number* of spoilers is more than one, the peace process faces a compound challenge. Any approach chosen to deal with one spoiler has implications for approaches used to deal with others. For example, actions taken to weaken one spoiler may inadvertently strengthen others. By *position* spoilers are either inside or outside of an agreement. To undermine a peace process inside spoilers typically use strategies of stealth, whilst outside spoilers often resort to violence.<sup>181</sup>

Limited, total or greedy are different *types* of spoilers. *Primarily they differ on the aims of the spoiler, and secondarily on the commitment to achieving those aims.* Limited spoilers have limited goals (e.g. a share of power, basic security for followers etc.). Limited goals do not imply limited commitment – goals can be non-negotiable. At the other end of the spectrum are

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<sup>178</sup> Stedman, Stephen John: *Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes*, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 5-7. Stephen J. Stedman (PhD) has been a professor of political science and senior fellow at Stanford University since 2002, and provided the first systematic analysis of the spoiler problem in 1997; see Doyle et al. (2006), p. 58. Stedman remains valid hitherto, as the original distinction between total, greedy and limited spoilers has not been further developed in research literature. However, spoiler theory remains widely cited with 95 citations between 1997-2011 according to Web of Science (ISI). See also Berdal (2009), pp. 101, 200.

<sup>179</sup> UN Charter, Article I reads: "*To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;- -*".

<sup>180</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 5-7.

<sup>181</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 7-12. See also Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 56-59.

total spoilers. They pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority whilst holding immutable preferences: that is their goals are not subject to change. Furthermore, pragmatism required for compromised settlements is rare. *Total* spoilers often advocate radical ideologies, for them total power is the means for radical transformation of society. Between the limited and total spoiler lies the *greedy* spoiler, that holds goals that expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk. When faced with low costs and low risks the greedy spoiler may expand its limited goals. Vice versa, when faced with high costs and high risks spoiler's goals may contract.<sup>182</sup>

The final differentiation that Stedman provides is the *locus*<sup>183</sup> of spoiler behaviour – that is whether it is the leader or the followers that generate the behaviour. If it is the leader, then parties may alter the spoiler type if their leadership changes. Such a change may be enough to transform a total spoiler to a limited spoiler. However, in some cases the followers are the locus of spoiler behaviour. Stedman's case study suggests that in Rwanda in 1994 this locus of spoiler behaviour was witnessed.<sup>184</sup>

International actors that have overseen the implementation of peace agreements, custodians of peace processes, have pursued *three general conceptual strategies in managing spoilers*. The first of them is *inducement*, which is giving the spoiler what it wants.<sup>185</sup> It entails taking positive measures to address the grievances of factions who obstruct the peace process<sup>186</sup>. The other is *socialization*, which means changing the behaviour of the spoiler, so that it adheres to a set of established norms. The third is *coercion*. That is punishing a spoiler for its behaviour or reducing its capacity to undermine and destroy a peace process. In practice, each of these conceptual strategies has specific configurations more complex than the general version described. It is also important to note that international actors have shown to employ more than one strategy – either simultaneously with different emphasis or in a sequence.<sup>187</sup> For the benefit of this research, coercion is examined with more depth.

*Coercive diplomacy and the application of force are two variations of the coercive strategy. The other two are what Stedman calls the 'departing train' and 'withdrawal' variations. The*

<sup>182</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 7-12.

<sup>183</sup> "Locus: a center of activity, attention, or concentration; the place where something is situated or occurs.", <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/locus>.

<sup>184</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 7-12. Stedman provides convincing case examples (e.g. Cambodia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe) in order to portray different types of spoilers.

<sup>185</sup> See Stedman (1997), pp. 12-14 for detailed description and examples.

<sup>186</sup> See previous chapter 2 on reasons for conflict (especially opportunity and grievance factors) as well as theoretical perspectives (especially offensive and defensive incentives).

departing train strategy combines a judgment that a peace process will go irrevocably forward, regardless of whether a spoiler joins or not. The metaphor implies that a peace process is a train leaving the station at a preordained time: once set in motion, anyone not on board will be left behind. This strategy may require active measures to limit the ability of spoilers to destruct the peace process and protect those that are committed to the process. The withdrawal strategy builds on an assumption that a spoiler wants an international presence during the peace process. The aim of the strategy is to punish the spoiler by threatening to withdraw international support and peacekeepers from a peace process. It is a blunt instrument. If implemented, it hurts those that have fulfilled their obligations and rewards any spoilers opposed to international involvement.<sup>188</sup> Overall, the idea of using force against spoilers raises several challenges for peace support operations. First, identifying the typology of spoilers is one challenge. Second, if a spoiler group represents a significant proportion of the local population, then using force against popular local groups may make the process of national reconciliation exceedingly difficult and jeopardize the prospects for a self-sustaining peace.<sup>189</sup>

Stedman provides a theoretical approach to *matching the above strategies to different spoilers*. Stedman's standpoint is that total spoilers cannot be accommodated. Thus, they must be defeated or marginalized. Stedman argues that greedy spoilers can conceivably be brought into a settlement – if the costs of war are sufficiently high. Furthermore, a limited spoiler can be accommodated by meeting its non-negotiable demands. Greedy spoilers may also be accommodated. However, there are risks in such accommodation, as it may whet the greedy spoilers' appetite to demand more concessions.<sup>190</sup> These considerations suggest that peace enforcement could be feasible against total and greedy spoilers.

According to Stedman, total spoilers cannot be appeased through inducements, nor can they be socialized. Coercive diplomacy may also be dangerously counterproductive; if custodians fail to carry through threats, a spoiler's position may be strengthened. By revealing the inadequacy of international force, a total spoiler adds to its domestic reputation for coercive strength. The withdrawal strategy is not feasible, as the total spoiler has all to gain if the peace process fails. *However, appropriate strategies for managing total spoilers are the use of force or the departing train strategy*. Stedman claims that few custodians are willing to use force, thus they should strengthen the parties of peace so they could defend themselves. The

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<sup>187</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17.

<sup>188</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17.

<sup>189</sup> Bellamy, Alex J.; Williams, Paul; Griffin, Stuart: *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 227 - 229, 280 – 283.

<sup>190</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17.

departing train strategy would legitimize the parties of peace and delegitimize the spoiler. It would deprive the spoiler of resources (e.g. capital and weapons) that can be used to undermine peace.<sup>191</sup>

*Inducement is an appropriate strategy for managing limited spoilers*, but it depends on the bargaining range established by the other parties who have already committed to peace. If the demands of a limited spoiler cannot be accommodated, then the remaining strategies are socialization and coercion. Obviously, the threat or the use of force may prompt a counter escalation of violence by - so far - a limited spoiler.<sup>192</sup>

As the greedy spoiler is not a total spoiler, there are at least prospects of bringing it into a peace process. *Socialization is the appropriate long-term strategy towards a greedy spoiler. In the short term, this spoiler presents a serious dilemma.* As inducements alone will only whet the appetite of the greedy spoiler; the legitimacy and illegitimacy of its demands must be clearly distinguished. In addition, depending on the risk-taking and cost insensitivity of the spoiler, the use of coercive measures may be required to impose costs and create limits to the spoiler's demands. However, relying solely on a coercive strategy ignores that even greedy spoilers have legitimate security goals, which can only be accommodated by inducements.<sup>193</sup>

In practice the selection and implementation of appropriate strategy is influenced by limitations that custodians of a peace process are subject to. The best strategy for managing a conflict may not be a feasible strategy for a custodian considering a wider range of interests. *What needs to be done and what actors are prepared to do should not be confused.* This applies both to individual states as well as to international organisations. Even the UN has an interest in protecting its reputation and peacekeeping institution. Moreover, the UN has specific limitations as its representatives in the field (i.e. the Special Representative of the Secretary General, SRSG) are constrained by the direction and commitment of the Security Council. The SRSG's ability to induce or punish, or rule on the legitimacy of demands, depends on the support of the member states. Besides these limitations, the most considerable liability in managing spoilers is member states that are *patrons of the spoilers*. However if these patrons are sincerely supportive of the peace process; then they provide the SRSG substantial leverage and credibility. The typology of spoilers advocates that a peace process entails numerous uncertainties and immense complexity. To manage the spoiler problem one

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<sup>191</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17.

<sup>192</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17.

<sup>193</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17.

must identify several factors. One must identify the aim of the spoiler; intentions behind acts of non-cooperation or aggression; and commitment of the spoiler. Furthermore, one must distinguish spoiler leaderships' control over its followers; unity within a spoiler; and likely effects of actions. Such actions should have an impact on the spoiler's willingness to continue aggression. Impact of actions on other parties to a peace process and interested external actors should also be appreciated.<sup>194</sup>

Case studies conducted by Stedman suggest four general findings about managing spoilers. First, case studies illustrate that spoiler type, number of spoilers, and locus of the spoiler problem are variables that affect robustness of strategies for managing spoilers. Second, studies highlight that peace process custodians must understand and diagnose the spoiler problem correctly. Third, quite often the custodians' rules and beliefs used to cope with the complexity of peace processes actually defeat them. Fourth, there are examples of successful spoiler management, which implies that spoilers need not destroy peace processes. This is if custodians create robust strategies, seek international consensus for such strategies, and recognize the applicability of normative power.<sup>195</sup> These findings call for prudent analysis, appropriate cognizance of problems, correct selection on point of view and matching applicable strategies to manage a peace process.

Furthermore, Stedman provides examples of organisational blinders. A custodian must not assume that parties to a conflict, or peace process, will act in good faith throughout the process. Such a process is uncertain, complex and *dynamic* – it will evolve. If within such a process, a custodian follows blindly 'traditional' peacekeeping values (i.e. neutrality, impartiality and consent), it will constrain attempts to challenge spoiler behaviour. Therefore, principles of UN peacekeeping have developed to: (1) *consent of the parties*; (2) *impartiality*; and (3) *non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate*<sup>196</sup>. When faced with uncertainty and complexity, custodians have a tendency to redefine their aims and measures of success to one overriding accomplishment. Stedman defines this as a 'holy grail' syndrome. For instance, when implementing a peace agreement, the UN often drops its commitments to various other components of the agreement to focus on holding an election. When spoilers plunge their countries into war, the UN attempts to obtain a cease-fire.<sup>197</sup> This critique is partly true and logical, and partly not. Case studies support this point, but from an

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<sup>194</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 18.

<sup>195</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 43-44.

<sup>196</sup> UNDPKO (2008), pp. 31-35.

<sup>197</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 48-51.

organizational aspect, especially a military dimension, the selection of aim and main effort are justified and prudent practice. Secondly, it is logical that custodians should be responsive to the dynamics of a peace process<sup>198</sup>.

Unity and coordination among external parties, correct definition of the problem<sup>199</sup>, establishing legitimacy for strategy, and applying such a legitimate strategy are all common denominators for successful spoiler management. External patrons' support to spoilers, or to ending of such support, has been a focal denominator of failures and successes in spoiler management. This implies that a *common understanding of legitimate and illegitimate demands of the spoilers* must exist. Such an understanding defines a unified stance on what demands should be met and what rejected. Existence of such understanding has been a success factor. This legitimization is an integral part of spoiler management, which implies two points. First, solutions to internal conflicts do not arise solely from the parties of a conflict. Successful management of internal conflict has relied on willingness of external actors to take sides on legitimate and illegitimate demands. Second, if external consensus and a coherent strategy are used in conjunction, the setting of a normative standard can be an effective tool for crisis management.<sup>200</sup> These findings necessitate some considerations. Pertaining to contemporary affairs and as an example, is the Taliban movement a total, greedy or limited spoiler? In addition, does it represent a significant part of the population? Pertaining to the future and the international capacity dimension of a peacebuilding space, will requisite normative standards exist to make such judgements in the next decade? Furthermore, do these two findings, understanding and legitimization; apply only to post-conflict and intrastate conflict situations? One may argue that achieving such normative standards requires comprehension and consequent legitimization, even before a conflict and in a wider international setting.

In planning for and executing a spoiler management strategy it is important to identify patrons, sensitize them to their appropriate role and utilise the leverage they provide. The focal question is what is the typology of spoilers in each risk condition? Regardless of the typology of spoilers, all of them may require coercive measures to be managed. Stedman provides a theoretic model, but one has to consider that all conflict situations have mutations

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<sup>198</sup> For support on this obvious point, see Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 56-59.

<sup>199</sup> Werner et al. (2005) pp. 273-276. For example, third party intervention must be careful when they pressure belligerents to ceasefire that they are not encouraging a settlement, which is not consistent with belligerents' perception about likely causes of conflict. Luttwak (1999), pp. 36-44 provides related argumentation.

<sup>200</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 51-52.

of all three spoilers. Stedman's approach is initially incremental: first an array of political crisis management measures then coercive measures. *To summarize the strategies, total spoilers are managed by the departing train or use of force strategies. Limited spoilers merit for initial inducement and if that fails then socialization and coercion. Initially greedy spoilers are managed by long-term socialization and inducement on their legitimate demands. In the worst case, the illegitimate demands of greedy spoilers must be countered with coercion.* The incremental approach related to these strategies has an important consideration for military capabilities. One cannot design and mount a military component initially as a peacekeeping force and thereafter expect it to move into peace enforcement mode – without prior planning and preparations<sup>201</sup>. Thus, deciding on posture of a peace support operation is a pertinent strategic decision at the outset before committing to an operation.

#### 4.1.2 Incentives and Ecology of a Peacebuilding Environment

Though the idea of matching spoiler management strategy to the typology of spoilers is useful, the issue needs more scrutiny. Understanding *incentives* of spoilers is important alongside the typology. Establishing stable peace requires that the *defensive and offensive*<sup>202</sup> incentives of factions, including leaders and followers, be addressed. If a peace treaty that outlines the post-conflict settlement is signed, then the parties' preferences and incentives have been revealed to some extent. However, as peace treaties are rarely followed to the letter, the patterns of compliance with a treaty help to distinguish true preferences and identify moderates from extremists. Thus, custodians must understand treaties as well as parties stand towards these treaties in all respects. Furthermore, it is a prerequisite that custodians follow how compliance evolves in a dynamic setting of peacebuilding.<sup>203</sup> Whilst peace support operations have grown in size and complexity, so too has the nature and organization of spoiler groups evolved. The spectrum of spoilers ranges from comparably rag-tag rebel groups to organized armies or fighters using asymmetrical tactics. In cases where there is no adhered peace agreement, at least UN peacekeepers are increasingly the object of spoiler violence – including from the involved states themselves.<sup>204</sup> Overall, peace operations need to be flexible. They need to

<sup>201</sup> This deduction is supported by the Brahimi report and Bellamy et al. See UN: *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*, 2000; and Bellamy (2010), pp. 280-284.

<sup>202</sup> Described in chapter 2. Defensive incentives arise in conditions of anarchy, where any central authority has collapsed, and each faction seeks to arm itself to protect itself. This causes a "security dilemma" both in intrastate and interstate anarchy, where each defensive armament constitutes a threat to others. Offensive incentives arise when leaders and factions impose ideology or culture, seize property, or exploit state power and public sources for private gain, or all of these.

<sup>203</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 56 - 58.

<sup>204</sup> Jones, Bruce (ed.): *Robust Peacekeeping: the Politics of Force*, New York University, 2008, pp. 13 – 18; Sherman and Tortolani: *Implications of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in UN Mandates*.

adjust their mandate given the observations of cooperation or conflict on the ground, and based on the assessment of the operation about the nature of the conflict<sup>205</sup>.

Furthermore, spoilers do not operate in a vacuum. Successful implementation of peace support operations requires that the ‘ecology of the peacebuilding’ environment (i.e. operating environment in military terms) is understood.<sup>206</sup> The ‘ecologies’ are a combination of three dimensions. The first dimension is coherence. Are the factions *coherent or incoherent*? That is, do they or do they not follow the orders of their leaders? Secondly, the factions reflect varying degrees of *reconciliation or hostility*. If they have reached a ‘hurting stalemate’, they accept the peace process. On the other hand, if they have been dragged to peace negotiations; they do not sincerely accept the peace process<sup>207</sup>. Thirdly, there are few or many factions.<sup>208</sup> In a strategic situation where factions of a conflict are few, hostile and coherent<sup>209</sup>, both formal and effective authority, including the will to use them, is needed. This suggests that a capability for peace enforcement is necessary. If factions are few, hostile and incoherent<sup>210</sup> prospects of sustainable peace are extraordinarily difficult. Such situations call for exceptional multilateral and international commitment. A grim outlook for a peace process is where there are many, incoherent and hostile factions in an area of extremely low local capacity (e.g. poor economy). For such cases partition, and for the remainder of country, a substantial civilian and developmental capacity-building effort with a long-term approach alongside trusteeship-like authority is suggested<sup>211</sup>. All these ecologies call for various levels of external political authority. Thus, they make a case in support of peace enforcement that supports such an authority.

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<sup>205</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 56 - 58.

<sup>206</sup> See Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 321-333. Doyle and Sambanis use ‘ecology’ as a definition. “Ecology - the relationship of living things to their environment and to each other, or the scientific study of this,” Cambridge Dictionaries online. For an elaboration and summary see Fortna (2004a), p. 275.

<sup>207</sup> Luttwak (1999). Luttwak draws attention to the idea that allowing for wars to be fought to decisive ends ultimately brings peace. Luttwak’s propositions appear designed as deliberately provocative for international relations researchers. Although Luttwak is widely cited, the idea in its original form does not appear to have been developed further within research community.

<sup>208</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 321 – 333.

<sup>209</sup> Doyle and Sambanis’ corresponding case examples are: Angola (UNAVEM), Bosnia (i.e. early stages of Dayton peace process), Cambodia (UNTAC), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Georgia (UNOMIG) and Western Sahara (MINURSO). Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 321 – 333.

<sup>210</sup> Doyle and Sambanis’ corresponding case examples are: East Slavonia (UNTAES), municipality of Brcko in Bosnia (UNMIK) and Rwanda (UNAMIR). Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 321 – 333.

<sup>211</sup> Doyle and Sambanis build on Somalia as an example. Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 321 – 333.



### 4.1.3 Consent and Use of Force

*Consent is not an absolute quality.* On the contrary, it can be enlarged and built upon by an enterprising outside force. However, the basic distinction between consent-based operations and enforcement, where *some degree* of war fighting logic must be accepted, remains valid. “In war, however limited the objective or the resources allocated to achieve it, the need to break the will of the opponent and bear the risk to these resources marks the difference from peace.”<sup>212</sup>

Developing on the idea that consent is not an absolute quality; then consent may be recognized as variable, multilayered and malleable. The level and nature of consent changes across a mission, thus it may be recognized as *variable consent*. Parties that give their consent at the outset may change their minds and vice versa. Parties may also be divided in their view of whether or not to grant consent. The level of consent may be shallow or deep. Shallow consent occurs if parties tolerate a peace operation, and they seek to neither undermine an operation nor cooperate proactively. In contrast, deep consent implies that actors actively cooperate with the peace operation.<sup>213</sup> Thus, the idea of consent being variable resembles the idea of the existence of greedy spoilers and the possibility of recognizing locus of the spoilers.

The idea of *multilayered consent* affirms Stedman’s distinction on the locus of spoilers. While the leadership of a faction may give their consent, it does not always imply that local fighters will do likewise – and vice versa. This is emphasised when the conflict is not between two disciplined armed forces, which is often the case in ‘new wars’. In these cases instructions from political leaders are less likely to be implemented by subordinates. It is argued that the level of *consent is malleable* (i.e. influenced or controlled) through ‘consent management’ activities. If consent is understood to be a fluctuating factor; then peace support operations have an important role. Peace support operations should be able to promote and maximise consent, as well as mitigate the possible loss of consent in cases where the use of force is essential. The aim of consent management is to strengthen an operation’s legitimacy<sup>214</sup>. As an example, consent management techniques include patrolling in order to engage closely with the local community; public information campaigns; conducting quick-impact projects; and providing capacity-building assistance. Although these activities contribute to peacebuilding, their primary objective is to improve relations between the peacekeepers and the local

<sup>212</sup> Adebajo et al. (2001), pp. 70 – 71. Berdal quotes an unknown British officer.

<sup>213</sup> Bellamy et al. (2010), pp. 280 – 283.

community. The overall aim is to strengthen and deepen consent, and enable consent management in challenging times.<sup>215</sup> Conceptualizing consent in these three categories corroborates the logic of Stedman's ideas on spoiler management. Coercive spoiler management includes the use of force, which peace support operations are able to conduct.

The concept of peace support operations insists that it is possible to *use force in a peace operation without losing impartiality. This is based on the idea that neutrality and impartiality are distinctly different concepts*. Impartial peacekeepers discriminate between belligerents and treat similar breaches in comparable ways. Impartiality means treating everyone according to the same principles, whereas neutrality means opting not to take a position. Impartiality might actually require the use of force, if spoilers seriously challenge an ongoing peace process. Any such use of force must be directed at specific breaches of a peace agreement or mission mandate. Furthermore such actions must be conducted discriminately and proportionally, and meticulously explained to the host population.<sup>216</sup> This is because consent remains the foundation of a peace operation - although it is variable, multi-layered and malleable. Thus, consent cannot be overlooked.

The following example and argumentation suggest that consent of state actors is required, which gravitates peace support operations towards peacekeeping. Alongside this, the argumentation suggests that consent of non-state actors is not always required, which then pertains towards peace enforcement. Earlier missions were able to use force decisively or at least project it, while the mission in Darfur has been far more troubled. This suggests that rather than talking about a 'Mogadishu line' in peacekeeping (i.e. deploying where there is no consent from some non-state actors) we should identify a 'Darfur line' that *the UN peacekeeping* cannot afford to cross. This is deploying where there is no real consent by the state. With only weak consent of the state missions may be able to mitigate humanitarian crises, but they will not be able to establish or sustain a political or security framework. Lack of consent by a non-state actor does not necessarily undermine the logic or support for peacekeeping, if there is a recognized state and a broadly supported political framework for that state's extension of its authority in the country. Haiti's gangs did not consent to the use of force to clear them from the slums of Port-au-Prince – but the operations against them have still contributed to peace.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> UK MoD: *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, 2004, pp. 2-13 – 2-14.

<sup>215</sup> Bellamy et al. (2010), pp. 280 – 283.

<sup>216</sup> Bellamy et al. (2010), pp. 280 – 281.

<sup>217</sup> Jones et al. (2009), p.12.

Reflecting on the idea that logic of war fighting applies to peace enforcement; it is pertinent to highlight an ingenious formulation of UNTAC Force Commander General Sanderson. He stated that in peace operations military missions should follow: “... *an interposition strategy, but not between opposing forces. Rather, it is between a highly moral act sanctioned under international law and supported by international consensus, and any person or group which might threaten it.*”<sup>218</sup>

#### 4.1.4 Hypotheses on Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping


Reflecting on the UN model of peace operations and theorizing on the timeline before and after a peace treaty: it is obvious that hostility of factions exists before a peace treaty. However, spoilers are in most cases identifiable only after a peace treaty. Thus, for the sake of peace enforcement both ecology of a conflict (especially hostility of factions) and typology of spoilers (especially greedy or total spoiler) are plausible determinants for peace enforcement. Peacekeeping as safeguarding consensual factions and limited spoilers is also evident. To theorize further, peace enforcement activities could be divided into three conceptual categories, as depicted in picture 7. Firstly, in the timeline before a ceasefire, one may argue that there may be peace enforcement, which is biased towards one or more of the parties of a conflict (i.e. PE biased)<sup>219</sup>. The primary motive of such enforcement is to protect any peacemaking activities, deter its opponents and coerce different factions and parties towards peacemaking. At a minimum, such enforcement should constrain total spoilers, until a time that they no longer affect the process. Secondly, there is peace enforcement that is impartial towards all parties of a conflict (i.e. PE impartial). This type of peace enforcement does not favour any faction and applies an equal ‘yardstick’ towards all parties. The primary motive of this enforcement action is to protect the peacemaking activities. Thirdly, in the timeline after a ceasefire, there is the third conceptual peace enforcement activity. This enforcement targets the spoilers of a peace process (i.e. PE spoilers). The primary motive is to coerce spoilers towards acceptance of a peace process and deter any spoiler from disrupting the process. Pertaining to evident dynamic nature of peace operations, one may argue for a desired *direction of transition*. The biased peace enforcement should cause transition towards

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<sup>218</sup> General John Sanderson as quoted in Jianwei Wang: Managing Arms in Peace Processes - Cambodia, UNIDIR, 1996, p. 71, downloaded from <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-111-4-en.pdf> (12.01.2011). UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

<sup>219</sup> For a comprehensive discussion of pre-emptive and preventive measures, see Doyle (2008).

impartial or spoiler types of peace enforcement. Peace enforcement related to spoilers should ideally transition to peacekeeping.



Picture 7: Conceptual categories of peace enforcement.

Drawing on the theoretical models of peacebuilding triangle, ecologies of conflict and spoiler typology; it is feasible to formulate hypothesis relevant to the research interest. The foundations and logic in formulating hypotheses are presented in the following. *Pertaining to the peacebuilding triangle and level of hostility*, if the level of hostility is high, then it is expected that there is a requirement for peace enforcement. Alternatively, if the level of hostility is low, then peacekeeping may be sufficient. *Pertaining to the peacebuilding triangle and international capacity*, if the amount of international capacity is high, then it is expected that there is a possibility for peace enforcement. Alternatively, if the amount of international capacity is low, then only peacekeeping measures may be plausible. *Pertaining to the peacebuilding triangle and local capacity*; if the amount of local capacity is high, then it is expected that peace enforcement may not be possible. This is because external intervention may encounter robust resistance. Alternatively, if the amount of local capacity is low, then peace enforcement may be possible. This is because it is likely that external intervention would encounter less highly capable military capabilities. This is to say that the intervening force would be able to maintain ‘escalation dominance’ relying on both qualitative and quantitative relative advantage.

The three ecologies of peacebuilding, that are relevant for examining use of force, all call for various levels of external political authority. Therefore, they make a case in support of peace enforcement - in support of such an authority. In these ecologies, a key factor that merits peace enforcement appears to be the hostility of factions. *Pertaining to ecologies of conflict*

*and perspectives for peace enforcement*; if factions are *few, hostile and coherent*, the hostility factor may necessitate peace enforcement. Coherence of the factions implies that the effects of coercive measures are more predictable, than with incoherent factions. In parallel, peace enforcement may be necessary, if factions are *few, hostile and incoherent*. However, incoherence challenges predicting effects of coercion. As said earlier, an ecology of *many, hostile and incoherent* factions is a grim outlook for a peace process. Alongside long-term capacity building and external transitional authority, even in this ecology the hostility factor may necessitate coercive measures – that is peace enforcement.

*Pertaining to spoiler typology*; a conflict that involves either *total* or *greedy* spoilers or *both*; then there is a requirement for peace enforcement. Consistent with Stedman's spoiler management strategies, limited spoilers do not merit peace enforcement at outset. This being the case, existence of limited spoilers was not evaluated to merit peace enforcement measures when formulating the hypotheses. They were not considered as primary reasons for coercive measures.

Furthermore, as this research is future oriented, it is pertinent to evaluate *future overall setting* in which peace support operations might be conducted. Peace support operations are not conducted in a vacuum. The identified four plausible futures all provide specific settings for these operations. For the purpose of this research, these settings relate to the peacebuilding triangle's dimensions: *international and local capacity*. International capacity is evaluated being high within developed states in all futures except in "Deceptive Stability". However, one may evaluate that actual political will to utilise this high capacity remains variable and difficult to predict. In the future "Deceptive Stability" the underlying theme is strategic inattention, thus the international capacity for military interventions is evaluated as low<sup>220</sup>. Within a majority of the risk conditions (i.e. 8 out of 13) local capacity is predominantly low, although asymmetric situations may occur. Asymmetry pertains to situations where, one or more of the parties to a conflict possess high capacity, whilst one or more have a low capacity. Situations with more or less equal capacities are obviously plausible.

These theoretical considerations are within the scope of this research in formulating hypotheses. However, using peace enforcement requires prudent assessment. Amongst many considerations, one must assess what strategic impact coercive use of force may have on the operating environment. Effects of short-term tactical engagements are likely to have crucial

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<sup>220</sup> For a recent example see Berdal (2009), pp. 114-115.

importance for the effectiveness of stabilising a peacebuilding environment. Unless this thoroughly understood, it is uncertain if the occasional robust actions would be productive<sup>221</sup>. Therefore the research questions also evaluate the preconditions and implications.

Each risk condition that merits a peace support operation has been assessed and described. The hypotheses are formulated primarily to assess the feasibility of peace enforcement. Vice versa, the risk conditions that do not explicitly merit peace enforcement action are expected to cope with peacekeeping approaches. The assessment and description has been done within the theoretical framework of peacebuilding triangle<sup>222</sup>, ecologies of conflict<sup>223</sup> and spoiler typology. Table 4 illustrates descriptions of the risk conditions and related hypotheses.

No.	DESCRIPTION OF RISK CONDITION AND RELATED HYPOTHESES
1	<i>Failed Governance.</i> Consistent with the risk condition's definition local capacity is low. Plainly due to the fact of failed governance local hostility level is not necessarily high – thus it is assumed low. Obviously, hostility can rise over time due to other intertwined risk conditions. By definition, the ecology is incoherent. The significant spoiler type is assumed to be greedy, which could be the failed state's leadership regime. Alongside greedy spoilers, limited spoilers are likely. They could be both the failed state's leadership regime and the local population. <i>Hypothesis no. 1: It is likely that in such a risk condition, greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.</i>
2	<i>Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict.</i> The level of local hostility is potentially high and also very significant. The factions are assumed to be coherent as ethnicity, religion or ideology unites them. In the worst case, the significant spoiler type is total alongside limited spoilers, which are moderates within the factions. <i>Hypothesis no. 2: It is likely that in such a risk condition, total spoilers exist, and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures). Hypothesis no. 3: It is likely that in such a risk condition the levels of local (i.e. within in mission area of operations) hostility are high, thus military capabilities are necessary to protect any political peace process.</i>
3	<i>Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces.</i> Levels of local capacity are low, which is due to the overall setting that this specific future implies. Local level of hostility is not a significant feature – thus it is assumed low. The ecology of conflict may be any combination. The significant factor is that the significant spoiler type is likely to be greedy, with the potential for total spoilers. <i>Hypothesis no. 4: It is likely that in such a risk condition, greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.</i>
4	<i>Uncontrolled migration.</i> It is likely that local capacity is low at migration's areas of origin, but local capacity may be either high or low at receiving areas, where migration directs itself. The local level of hostility towards developed states has the potential to be high, which is consistent with the overall setting of the future scenario. The significant spoiler type is limited. It is likely that there are many factions, which are generally reconciled and incoherent, due to the lack of organized leadership. <i>Hypothesis no. 5: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any humanitarian aid operation. Hypothesis no. 6: It is likely that international and national legitimacy and legality considerations restrain from the use of any military force at arrival areas, to prevent migration directing itself to those areas.</i>
5	<i>Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories.</i> It is likely that levels of hostility, between parties of any dispute and towards any external intervening forces, are high. The ecology of conflict is likely to involve few factions that are coherent, as the disputed issues unite the factions. The factions are hostile towards each other and parties that are external to the dispute. The significant spoiler type is limited, which have both legitimate and illegitimate claims to previously uninhabited territories. Alongside this greedy spoilers are likely to be involved and emerge. <i>Hypothesis no. 7: It is likely that limited spoilers with both legitimate and illegitimate demands are involved, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political mediation process as well as coerce limited spoilers on their illegitimate demands. Hypothesis no. 8: There is an evident potential for the emergence of greedy spoilers, which justifies for peace enforcement measures.</i>
6	<i>Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or weapons of mass effect.</i> It is not possible to estimate the levels of local capacity – both high and low are plausible. However, the levels of hostility towards any external intervenor are

<sup>221</sup> See Berdal (2009), pp. 100-121 for contemporary examples.

<sup>222</sup> Doyle and Sambanis (2000), pp. 781 – 783.

<sup>223</sup> Doyle and Sambanis (2006), pp. 321 – 333.

	potentially high, thus the ecology is hostile. Factions are likely to be few and coherent. The significant spoiler type, be it a statelike organisation or non-state actor, is likely to be greedy. The aim of such a spoiler is to gain as much power and influence as possible. Alongside this, there is the potential for total spoilers. <i>Hypothesis no. 9: It is likely that both greedy and total spoilers pertain to these cases, which justifies for peace enforcement measures (pre-emptive measures) in support of any political peace and mediation process.</i>
7	<i>Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes.</i> In this case, the levels of local capacity may be either high or low. There is no evident reason for the level of hostility to be high, thus it is assumed as low. Furthermore, it is assumed that populations that are affected remain reconciled and coherent at least initially. If any spoilers arise, they are likely to be limited, with legitimate and possible illegitimate demands. <i>Hypothesis no. 10: It is likely that in such a risk condition, only limited spoilers are initially plausible. This necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any humanitarian aid operation.</i>
8	<i>Transnational criminal movements.</i> In this case, the ecology of conflict is hostile as criminal elements oppose those safeguarding legality. The significant spoiler type is greedy. <i>Hypothesis no. 11: It is likely that in such a risk condition, greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.</i>
9	<i>Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties.</i> In this case, it is reasonable to assume that the significant spoiler type is limited, which have both legitimate and possible illegitimate demands. <i>Hypothesis no. 12: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political peace and mediation processes.</i>
10	<i>Extremism of marginalised groups.</i> In this case, the local capacity level is likely to be low, which is usually related to marginalisation and eventual extremism of different groups. The local level of hostility is likely to be high towards external parties and especially towards developed nation-states. The ecology of the conflict is hostile with few factions. These factions are more coherent than incoherent, as the extremist groups usually feature internal cohesion. The significant spoiler type is total. Alongside total spoilers, limited spoilers may appear. Limited spoilers would be the moderates of these factions, but extremism implies that the amount of moderates is not significant. <i>Hypothesis no. 13: It is likely that in such a risk condition, total spoilers exist, and this justifies for and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures).</i>
11	<i>Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes.</i> In this case, the local capacities may be varied: e.g both high against high and high against low are possible. The local level of hostility towards external parties and developed states is potentially high; thus the ecology of the conflict is hostile. However, the significant spoiler type is limited, with both legitimate and illegitimate claims. Greedy spoilers may appear and emerge alongside limited spoilers. <i>Hypothesis no. 14: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political peace and mediation processes. Hypothesis no. 15: It is likely that greedy spoilers appear alongside limited spoilers, which would necessitate peace enforcement measures.</i>
12	<i>Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements.</i> In this case, the ecology of conflict is hostile as criminal elements oppose those safeguarding legality. The significant spoiler type is greedy. <i>Hypothesis no. 16: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.</i>
13	<i>Interstate rivalry.</i> In this case, local capacities are assumed to be high (relative to opposing force) as they are used to challenge external states. Initially the level of local hostility is low, but as rivalry develops, it has the potential to be high. Therefore, the overall ecology involved few parties that are likely to be coherent in a hostile setting. As states compete, the significant spoiler type is greedy. <i>Hypothesis no. 17: It is likely that in such a risk condition, greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.</i>

Table 4: Descriptions of risk conditions and hypotheses.

These descriptions and hypotheses were tested with the Delphi-panel during the second round of Delphi-questions. Alongside these hypotheses, the respondents were questioned on their views on existing trends and perspectives for each risk condition. See appendix 5 for questionnaire. The responses are described in the following chapters.

## 4.2 The Second Round Delphi-questions and Responses

The following chapters draw upon Delphi-panellists' responses provided during the second round of Delphi-questions. The detailed responses are in appendix 6. Importantly, the following chapters contain the consolidated findings to the second supporting research

question: *What are the preconditions and implications of attempting to induce consent vis-à-vis to relying on compliance?* Furthermore, the respondents' consolidated views on the hypotheses are described.

#### 4.2.1 Failed Governance

*Preconditions.* Cognizance of *what is good governance versus what is failed governance* is a fundamental precondition for anyone planning, participating or conducting a peace support operation.<sup>224</sup> *Acceptance* from the international community, relevant regional actors and local parties are preconditions that need to be met for a peace support operation to be conducted successfully. Beside acceptance, sufficient support from the international community is a prerequisite. Guiding principles on what merits intervention would be useful, although currently such principles do not exist<sup>225</sup>.

To launch an operation there must be a *clear interest to intervene*. These interests of different nation states and international organisations derive from at least the political and economical dimensions. Furthermore, interests must translate to a *clear will to intervene*. The political and all other operational considerations must translate to mandate documents (e.g. a UN Security Council Resolution). The military perspective requires a definition of the *desired end-state for a logic sequence of planning including an exit strategy*. The extent of the planned effort must be manageable. This means that the *practical resources* must be sufficient for the scope of the mission.

A *political process* must be in place - even if it involves greedy spoilers. A feasible political process remains crucial in any crisis management undertaking, with the military capabilities supporting that effort. Pertaining to the political process and for remaining impartial a prerequisite will be the involvement of all relevant parties and factions. On another issue, the panel provided a pertinent contradiction. One view suggests exploring that, to avoid becoming a part of the crisis, the military action should ideally have 'one time only' character.

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<sup>224</sup> This point is supported by the argumentation available in United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: *Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2040*, Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 4<sup>th</sup> edition, 2010, pp. 10-14, 17. Also Hermann, MG; Kegley, CW: *Ballots, a barrier against the use of bullets and bombs - Democratization and military intervention*, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol 40 (3), September 1996, pp. 454.

<sup>225</sup> On the point pertaining to desire for documented principles, the view of the respondent is in slight contradiction to what Jane Stromseth has argued (see chapter 2, Holzgrefe et al. (2003), p.233).



Furthermore, the military actions should have a *decisive impact* on the developments.<sup>226</sup> The opposing view argues that this simplifies peace operations too much. Furthermore, it argues that crisis management is a political-military endeavour. Thus, the two elements cannot and should not be separated.<sup>227</sup> In light of what chapters 2 and 3 offer, that peace operations are dynamic in nature and require perseverance, the latter argumentation seems more relevant.

A fundamental precondition is that defining spoilers is founded on the selected point of view. One must appreciate that *spoilers are defined from the peace process point of view* (i.e. parties of a peace process and their external interlocutors). If this is the case, then a military prerequisite is that *specific guidance is needed on directing actions against spoilers*. Spoilers must be universally agreed within the peace process as spoilers.

The responsibility to protect civilians will have an emphasis in the future. If there is a prospect of a great number of civilian casualties or large refugee movements, then intervention is more likely. The level of hostility that is visible is not a single factor, as alongside that the potential for escalation of hostility needs to be considered. Another consideration relates to the potential for greedy international spoilers alongside spoilers defined within the process.

*Implications.* Implications are related to preconditions, because the initial standpoints themselves are not rigid. In a crisis there is a dynamic influencing the preconditions. *From the outset of a peace support operation an 'evolution' of the preconditions begins.* Such an evolution involves the nation states and international organisations amongst various other dimensions.

An important implication arises from the passage of time since the beginning of an operation. Unless substantial progress is apparent, a review of the mandate will surely take place especially if the situation turns more hostile. An operating environment can quickly change.

Using peace enforcement in failed governance situations has both advantages and disadvantages. Peace enforcement may bring order to states and assist states in stabilizing security situations. However, peace enforcement may cause serious local fractionalisation. For instance, displacing a former leader may be successful, but the leader's followers may not back down as easily<sup>228</sup>. Interventions may also escalate the level of hostility.

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<sup>226</sup> Respondent 6.

<sup>227</sup> Respondent 3 during iteration of second round findings.

<sup>228</sup> This is supported by Stedman's ideas on locus of spoilers.

Establishing a *safe and secure environment* has an important implication. In such an environment the population has no incentives to arm itself. However, it is self-evident that sustainable development cannot be provided by military means. Military means can merely protect aid and development endeavours. A situation of failed governance implies failure in governance across the board, which implies that one cannot focus on one area alone. The problem that arises is ‘local ownership’ of a process. One can build a ‘façade’ but true local ownership is still challenging to develop.

*Hypothesis.* Hypothesis no. 1 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. Overall, this hypothesis is *accepted*.<sup>229</sup> However, some reservations are highlighted. A fundamental reservation is that defining spoilers is a point of view, as was elaborated earlier. It is accepted that the greedy spoiler type is likely to be significant. However, the scenario is likely to be complex. It is plausible that other spoilers exist alongside the greedy spoiler. Thus, it is pertinent to appreciate any local demands that no one group or spoiler raises above the others.

Regarding the coercive measures, it is vital to comprehend that overall circumstances dictate. If the level of violence is low, it would not convince the international community that a crisis-management operation is necessary. The low level of violence would imply a more peacekeeping character for the operation – this is monitoring and verification type activities<sup>230</sup>. These actions are in support of the governance and not coercive.

However, the potential for escalation and possible follow on effects should be considered. This implies that the military capabilities must be prepared for coercive measures. To stress this point, it is understood that decisive actions could be necessary in support of a political peace process, whilst all relevant actors should be involved in that process.

#### 4.2.2 Potential Spillover of Ethnic, Religious or Ideological conflict

*Preconditions.* A political framework and a strong peace negotiation process are the overarching matters in this scenario. Alongside the generic preconditions, this scenario of potential spillover raises several questions: What is the interest to intervene amidst tensions?

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<sup>229</sup> Respondents on hypothesis 1: two accept, three partly accept, one does not accept as a generic rule, one undecided.

Is it possible to define the mission specifically enough? It is clearly a *balancing act between interests and defining a mission*. There must be a consensus on the legitimacy of any intervention. To reach such consensus those intervening must rally for support. Overall, the political framework must provide an idea of a ‘way to success’ and a ‘way out’.

Initially it was argued that this is an ‘illogical’ type of conflict as versus a ‘logical’ type of conflict. As an example, a logical type of conflict may have its root cause in economy. Furthermore, it is argued that illogical type of conflict has root causes in ethnicity, religion or ideology. Based on this point of view it is important to highlight ideological reconciliation. However, during the iteration it was argued that such a distinction between logical and illogical conflict is not plausible, and such distinction simplifies conflict resolution. Argumentation builds on the view that even in an ideological based conflict the underlying logic can be identified. Such conflict arises from various reasons with economic deprivation amongst them.<sup>231</sup> Based on what chapter 2 offers on identifying offensive and defensive incentives as well as addressing opportunity and grievance factors, one may argue that an underlying logic can and must be identified. *However challenging the identification of conflict logic may be, one is inclined to argue that such logic exists.*

Furthermore, it will be of utmost importance to identify the total spoiler or spoilers. This identification is fundamental for the political process, comprehensive approach and military planning sequence. This remains the case although there is not a direct causality between the existence of a total spoiler and a high level of hostility<sup>232</sup>. It is likely that there will not be a peace enforcement mission, unless the level of hostility is high.

The approaches towards this risk condition *must be solid. One must appreciate that there are no ‘quick fix’ solutions*. For example, in a conventional conflict a ‘quick fix’ is usually available: capture the land or kill the enemy. However, in sub-conventional conflict there is no quick fix. This calls for robust comprehensive capabilities, which are not necessarily military capabilities.

*Implications.* There are varieties of implications that interventions may cause in this risk condition. A specific challenge is that some conflicts have *root causes that extend to almost prehistoric times*. This only emphasises the previous appreciation that there are no quick fix

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<sup>230</sup> For support of these measures see e.g. Fortna (2003), pp. 365-367.

<sup>231</sup> This contradiction arised from views between respondent 1 and respondent 3.

<sup>232</sup> Political theories pertaining to ethnicity provide support for this finding, see chapter 2.

approaches to this scenario. Thus, it is expected that reaching sustainable peaceful conditions will take a long time. A view in support of this point is that a number of the long duration UN operations follow the borderlines of cultural belief systems.

Depending on the circumstances, intervention may cause a complete breakup of socio-economic structure – and thus cause a ‘vacuum’. Planners at all levels need to look at all implications - the implications need to be appreciated and responses planned. A key concern is what impact does intervention have on stability: *does it disrupt or support stability?*

Another specific challenge is the *prospect of becoming a party to the conflict*. This is because a failed governance scenario is not the ‘classical’ setting of peace support operations. For example densely populated areas, cities and towns, are particularly challenging operating environments. Beyond the physical domain, the perspective that a conflict is ‘illogical’ makes operational judgements challenging. It is likely that without a strong peace negotiation process the military component will evolve into being a party to the conflict.

*Hypotheses*. Hypothesis no. 2 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition total spoilers exist, and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures). Hypothesis no. 3 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition the levels of local (i.e. within in mission area of operations) hostility are high, thus military capabilities are necessary to protect any political peace process. *These hypotheses were accepted<sup>233</sup>, but reservations are also raised*. As the levels of hostility are likely to be high, it is pointed out that this scenario is not necessarily a crisis management operation environment, but rather a war-fighting scenario. Pertaining to hostility an important point was raised. It is argued that there is no direct causality between the existence of a total spoiler and high level of hostility<sup>234</sup>. This is to say that not all total spoilers automatically generate high levels of violence. This argumentation is elaborated, that if there is hostile total spoiler then surely peace enforcement is used. However, if level of hostility is not high there will not peace enforcement type mission. In any case, the follow on effects must be considered.

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<sup>233</sup> Respondents on hypothesis 2: five accept, one undecided.

Respondents on hypothesis 3: four accept, two undecided.

<sup>234</sup> This point is supported by Stedman (1997), pp. 26 – 36. This finding also validates that it would not be sufficient to assess an operating environment on spoiler typology only. The ecology of conflict (i.e. the levels of hostility) must also be appreciated.

### 4.2.3 Strategic Chokepoints and Infrastructures in Ungoverned Spaces<sup>235</sup>

*Preconditions.* This is viewed as a logical type of conflict scenario, where the players are more predictable and their interests are easier to find out as compared to other risk conditions. The risk condition has a clear relation to economic interests. Thus, it is possible to plan for a clear-cut concept of operations – yet the classic tenets of planning apply<sup>236</sup>. However, the *timeline cannot be open-ended*. Although international capacity maybe high, the time one can sustain operations is a concern.

The perception of this conflict being a logical type conflict is substantiated by the view that this conflict arises from economical interests<sup>237</sup>. Therefore, it is difficult to identify military actions conducted by the international community in this scenario. However, this does not exclude that individual states or coalitions may take military action. Piracy may be the exception, where the EU or NATO would intervene, but intervention would require more prerequisites. The key question is *which actors have strategic interests in the issue?* Alongside local actors, these actors can also be states that are located faraway.

One may argue that this risk condition does not have relevance to the contemporary anti-piracy operations of the Horn of Africa, where the only weakness is the legal constraint. This is to say that the coercive measures are not strong enough. The *vulnerability of strategic chokepoints is a more grand interstate level conflict scenario*. The Strait of Hormuz serves as an example. Iran does not dare to threaten the strait, which is not coincidence. A view is that such a threat would be an immediate case for war by the USA side. This makes the point that faraway states may have interests in truly strategic chokepoints or infrastructures. Nevertheless, it is consistently argued that there is scope for peace support operations in this scenario<sup>238</sup>.

The Delphi-panel provided conflicting views related to acceptance. It is argued that *the political will to intervene is paramount, whilst the local acceptance is not considered*. This suggests that the priority order of preconditions changes in this scenario. The conflicting view

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<sup>235</sup> The definition of *ungoverned space* was elaborated during the interviews. The respondents provided their responses within a background where ungoverned was extended to geographical space in general.

<sup>236</sup> This refers to the generic preconditions described with failed governance risk condition.

<sup>237</sup> Respondent no. 5.

<sup>238</sup> Firstly, this risk condition was accepted to merit a peace support operation during the first round of Delphi-questions. Secondly, this view was reaffirmed during the iteration by respondent that had not provided an answer during the first round.

is that *vulnerability should also be experienced as a problem at the local and regional level*. A mission cannot appear from nowhere. It is also argued, that there should not be a conflict of interest with a powerful local or regional actor. Local or regional actors should have similar or parallel interest as any intervening force. Furthermore, it is argued that intervention is not plausible in a chaotic situation.

Pertaining to implications, the conflict should be *compartmentalized* to a specific area, with the intent that the conflict should not have an effect in a wider sphere. To be successful a crisis management operation, with military capabilities, needs to balance and phase its efforts. There may be *phases* with a preventive role. Obviously, there should be way out of the conflict – one must offer some closure for those threatening chokepoints. This implies that one needs to negotiate with the actors and offer a course out towards an end state. A crisis management operation cannot simply deploy, execute the tasks and leave. Within a reasonable timeframe, one must reach a lasting and durable solution.

*Hypothesis*. Hypothesis no. 4 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. Overall, this hypothesis is *accepted*<sup>239</sup>. The reservations are not directed at the hypothesis as such, but rather towards the definition of a strategic chokepoint and the originator of an intervening force. The panel has different views on what is truly strategic, as was elaborated earlier. In relation to this, the panel provides a view that international community as a whole would not be likely to intervene. Rather an intervention would be conducted by individual states or coalitions with a strategic interest in the matter.

#### 4.2.4 Uncontrolled Migration

*Preconditions*. The classic generic tenets of planning remain valid, but the *principle of responsibility to protect civilians is stressed*. The contemporary peacekeeping operation in Sudan's Darfur supports the point. The operation is a deterrent and committed to protection of civilians. Even without a peace agreement, troops are there. On the other hand, *political preconditions are different and more diffuse*. For example, there is willingness to conduct a peace support operation in Sudan but not in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the interest viewpoint is

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<sup>239</sup> Respondents on hypothesis 4: three accept, two partly accept.

emphasised in this case. The political pressure of nations to participate is a precondition, as well as humanitarian and logistic pressures.

Regarding military capabilities, one cannot dismiss the possibility that military capabilities are used. However, the security situation should be extremely severe for it to necessitate military means. In a failed state scenario, military capabilities may be used, but not targeting the population. Military means may be needed to secure delivery of aid, but mindful that the humanitarian aid agencies are extremely careful about their integrity. Overall, this risk condition does not fit well as a scenario for military crisis management. This risk condition is more related to humanitarian aid efforts and policing.

*Implications.* Operating in an uncontrolled migration scenario is judged as not particularly risky for a peace support operation. Therefore obtaining a mandate for the operation should not be difficult. It is likely to receive wide support from the citizens of participating nations. *However, on an operating level there is always a potential for skirmishes.* This raises the question on how to step in and remain impartial. Furthermore, it is important to note, that the hostility towards states at areas of arrival is not a precondition. Rather it is an implication of the effects of migration, such as deteriorating living conditions.

*Hypotheses.* Hypothesis no. 5 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any humanitarian aid operation. Hypothesis no. 6 is: It is likely that international and national legitimacy and legality considerations restrain from the use of any military force at arrival areas, to prevent migration directing itself to those areas. *The hypotheses are accepted with reservations<sup>240</sup>.* The main and obvious reservation is that military capabilities would not be used to target any population. On a wider and different perspective, uncontrolled migration is not seen as a scenario that would merit for military means in a crisis management operation, but rather frontier guard and border control capabilities.

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<sup>240</sup> Respondents on hypothesis 5: three accept, one accepts if situation severe, one undecided. Respondents on hypothesis 6: four accept.

#### 4.2.5 Potential Disputes over Previously Uninhabited and Resource-rich Territories

*Preconditions.* These disputes are more likely to occur intrastate. They are not likely in uninhabited areas<sup>241</sup>. Examples of disputes that pertain to uninhabited areas are few. The risk condition involves not only the states involved but also external stakeholders. For example, one has to assess what is the influence of USA, China, Russia or India in such a risk condition. Although there is no imbalance yet – there is an imbalance developing. *In this scenario, it is likely that a peace support operation would be mandated, but the strength of the mandate remains in doubt.*

If the dispute has high impact on states, then military means may be employed even in a preventive manner. The challenge is finding a balance between the international demands and international law. If the dispute is highly violent, then the threshold for international intervention is high and very much dependent on how critical the resources are. Furthermore, *the distinctions between the spoilers are not pertinent to the actions taken in this scenario*<sup>242</sup>. This is to say that military means are employed regardless of the spoiler type – the interests involved dictate in this case. Evaluation of the conflict's effects should not be limited to the local area. Effects on a regional or even global level should also be evaluated. Alternatively, one may evaluate the potential time span that the dispute would affect international trade. Identifying the local counterpart and existing interests is an important precondition, as well as a solid answer on local ownership.

Overall, the setting is problematic, as there are a limited number of areas where such disputes may arise. The Arctic area does not provided such scenario as disputes have been and are likely to be settled through political means. Alongside this, the demands of China at South China Sea have been countered by political and diplomatic means: that is states emphasising their strong ties with the US. In contrast, areas that are resource-rich but habited may cause conflicts; as is the case in the Great Lakes area in Africa. *These potential conflicts would be the school examples for robust intervention, where the responsibility to protect would be the main incentive.*

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<sup>241</sup> Researcher's comment: The risk condition's definition 'uninhabited' may be there because of political considerations and potential political ramifications. As it is a NATO public document it could purposefully avoid pointing out inter- or intrastate disputes; in order not to escalate such disputes.

<sup>242</sup> This view is supported by two members of the panel. Respondent 4: *The spoiler in this risk condition can be any of the three: limited, greedy or total.* Respondent 5: *In this scenario, the distinctions between the spoilers are not pertinent to the actions taken.*



*Implications.* The evident implication is that these disputes are likely to be settled through political means. However, in certain areas the responsibility to protect would be a significant incentive for interventions. Besides these considerations, one must prepare for contingencies to avoid flare up and seek agreement over arising disputes.

*Hypothesis.* The hypotheses no. 7 is: It is likely that limited spoilers with both legitimate and illegitimate demands are involved, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political mediation process as well as coerce limited spoilers on their illegitimate demands. The hypotheses no. 8 is: There is an evident potential for the emergence of greedy spoilers, which justifies for peace enforcement measures. *Hypothesis no. 7 is accepted and hypothesis no. 8 is partly accepted*<sup>243</sup>. *Acceptance is subject to reservations.* Firstly, it is pointed out that actually all three types of spoilers (i.e. limited, greedy or total) may appear as the significant spoiler. Secondly, it is highlighted that this scenario is likely to happen in habited areas rather than in uninhabited areas.

#### 4.2.6 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction or Weapons of Mass Effect<sup>244</sup>

*Preconditions.* For this risk condition to merit for an intervention or a crisis management operation it is tantamount that misuse is not only a local concern, but leads to larger areas. Thus, the risk condition has an evident escalatory potential. It is understood that this risk condition is an extremely dangerous one, as implications of actions are numerous and they could be grave. The implications include at least spillover effects, accidents and contingencies. Overall, *nothing should be left for chance* in the planning for countering this risk condition<sup>245</sup>. However, it is argued that the military preconditions are less generic. There is more ‘free hand’ in this case<sup>246</sup>. This is to say that the military planning must take into account all imaginable contingencies, but there are fewer restrictions imposed on the planning.

The political preconditions come back to classics. The evaluation comprises of the risks (i.e. scope and type of risks) as well as the overall setting. *In this case, preconditions are*

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<sup>243</sup> Respondents on hypothesis 7: four accept, one partly accepts.

Respondents on hypothesis 8: three accept, two partly accept.

<sup>244</sup> Henceforth WMD/WME.

<sup>245</sup> This view is supported by respondents 2 and 5.

<sup>246</sup> This is an individual view on which iteration round did not provide further support. However, the view appears plausible.

*dependent on the spoiler type.* If the spoiler is a small non-state actor<sup>247</sup>, then it is likely that actions by the international community would be taken quickly<sup>248</sup>. This would not be the case if the spoiler were a state actor (e.g. North Korea or Iran). This is due to the grave escalation prospects.

A similar and almost parallel argument is that in order to intervene, the country that is about to gain WMD/WME capability must be new and an emerging one – not a country that has already established that capability (e.g. Pakistan). Gaining legitimacy for such an intervention should be possible (e.g. Second Iraq War 2003). Furthermore, it is also hard to imagine anything beyond a setting, *where one actor is in illegitimate possession of WMD/WME*. Anything with more actors or more complicated is hard to portray.

It is argued that a political process must be executed before any military action. Actions taken must be precise and short duration. The exception is the safeguarding of WMD/WME facilities, which may be a long-term undertaking. Besides this, it is plausible that against relatively weak actors pre-emptive or preventive interventions could be conducted. Furthermore, in a crisis the relevant organisations must be able to work multiple times faster than now. Their current mode of operating is too protracted.

As a counter-argument, it is stated that matching a crisis management strategy to this scenario is extremely difficult, and therefore it should not be explored further<sup>249</sup>. This counter-argument is indirectly supported by the argumentation that states that this risk condition negates the international organisations. Support can also be deducted from the statement that the military planning has more liberty (i.e. ‘free hand’) in this case.

*Implications.* As stated earlier the implications include at least spillover effects, accidents and contingencies. If there is a substantial amount of WMD/WME involved, or the use of military force is very likely, then the planning must be conducted so that success is assured. Success must be very sure, because the political risks are so great. Although the physical effects of a failure may be limited to local or regional level, the political effects will have a much larger impact.

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<sup>247</sup> This argument by respondent no. 5 is supported by respondent no 2, who states that the scenario has links to rogue organisations not to nation states.

<sup>248</sup> This argument by respondent no. 5 is partly in conflict by respondent no. 2, who states that this risk condition negates the world bodies, but it is possible that superpowers take action.

*Hypothesis.* The hypothesis no. 9 is: It is likely that both greedy and total spoilers pertain to these cases, which justifies for peace enforcement measures (pre-emptive measures) in support of any political peace and mediation process. *The hypothesis gains acceptance amongst the panel, although the finding is not robust*<sup>250</sup>. The reservations are encompassed in the above preconditions.

#### 4.2.7 Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes

*Preconditions.* The generic preconditions remain pertinent in this risk condition, and it is likely that fewer restrictions are imposed on planning. Evaluating the extent (e.g. type, amount and time) of support provided would take into account what else is going on. In addition, internal political and foreign policy considerations would be conducted. Regarding compliance of the effected countries, it may be that the countries are not necessarily fully compliant. For example, Pakistan displayed some reluctance in receiving aid after the earthquake in 2005. This example emphasises that countries do have a constitutional right to decline from external help.

It is worthwhile to note, that this risk condition is not directly linked to the security situation. For example, NATO's relief operation after the earthquake in Pakistan had no security implications. Thus, there is no clear linkage between this risk condition and the applicability of spoiler theory. This is because the risk condition does not directly originate from human actions.

*Implications.* It is important to understand the desired end-state. That is *how to hand over responsibility to civilian elements*, and especially how to hand over the responsibility in a deprived yet developing country. To stress this point, the effects of tornados in USA are completely different from the impact they would have in a developing country.

*Coordination by the supporting international community is vital.* The coordination issues relate to interoperability and command and control structures. Furthermore, coordination is required to manage the challenges presented by supporting states will to be seen and recognised.

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<sup>249</sup> This refers to responses by respondent no. 4.

If conflict components appear in this scenario, then that would obviously change the situation. It may also be that there is an ongoing conflict that had not merited a crisis management operation, but then an environmental catastrophe occurs which merits a crisis management operation.

*Hypothesis.* The hypothesis no. 10 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition, only limited spoilers are initially plausible. This necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any humanitarian aid operation. *The hypothesis is accepted*<sup>251</sup>. Military capabilities might be needed to prevent looting, protect against gangs and so forth. The only reservation is related to the point of view, that there is not a linkage between this risk condition and the applicability of spoiler theory.

#### 4.2.8 Transnational criminal movements

*Preconditions.* This risk condition does not constitute for a full-blown peace enforcement operation, but *rather peace enforcement in support of a law and order policing operation*. These operations do not necessarily require an international commitment, as a lot can be achieved by bilateral or regional multilateral cooperation. For instance, many naval forces of the world are countering the drug barons in the West Indies and proliferation of their activities.

*The approach towards this risk condition should be low key and benign.* If in support of police forces, the key preconditions arise from the capability evaluation of the police component. If their capabilities are not sufficient, then military capabilities may be used in support. Thus, military capabilities should be used as a last resort.

Contemporary examples of this risk condition can be seen in Mexico, Central America and even in Russia. *The precondition is that the local capacity to resist intervention is low, but other factors need also be considered.* For example, the Mexican government resists international intervention to support its campaigns against the drug cartels – Mexico is one of the states that emphasises sovereignty. Emphasis of state sovereignty varies from country to country and from region to region, *but in certain areas, the participants of an intervention*

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<sup>250</sup> Respondents on hypothesis 9: two accept, one partly accepts, three do not provide adequate response and one does not see the risk condition relevant for crisis management operations.

<sup>251</sup> Respondents on hypothesis 10: four accept.

*force are a very crucial factor. As Afghanistan shows fighting criminality (e.g. drug crime) and attempting nation building simultaneously is extremely challenging. However, USA conducts joint campaigns with Columbia targeting drug crime there (i.e. Plan Colombia). The challenge is that drug crime instigates many other forms of activity (e.g. corruption of law enforcement bodies). In Columbia, there is functioning government albeit its legitimacy may have been questioned. The Plan Colombia has slightly increased its legitimacy, and the government is more or less approaching democratic standards. However, fighting crime in one country has the effect of moving crime to another deprived area<sup>252</sup>. Therefore, this is a serious threat for example in Mexico, small Central American states, Caribbean states and West African states.<sup>253</sup>*

A full-blown crisis management operation would not be conducted without an UN Security Council resolution. To pass a resolution the risk condition needs to have a clear linkage to security and stability. *Peace enforcement is plausible in this scenario but only with specific restrictions.* Criminal movements with elements of terrorism, drug trade or human trafficking could merit for peace enforcement type measures. These movements are likely to be connected to failed governance type scenarios. Enforcement should be precise (i.e. ‘surgical’) measures.

To summarize these preconditions - this risk condition merits a peace support operation in support of wider law and order policing operations. The military aspect should be low key and benign. The military capabilities deployed should be tailored to supplement and augment the police forces. The political considerations relate to state sovereignty and compliance towards external interventions. Furthermore, the findings suggest that a functioning government in the area provides a better starting point for combating transnational crime. The challenge of simultaneous risk conditions (e.g. transnational crime in a failed or deprived country) calls for phased and comprehensive approach, which is likely to require a full-blown peace operation mandated by the UN.

*Implications.* Four main issues relate to the implications. Firstly and after all, this is a criminality problem thus *legal considerations* become a priority. Considerations must cover penal code and the right to arrest type matters. As an example, the right to arrest on national as

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<sup>252</sup> The author's experience from UNMIS-operation (Sudan) substantiate this point. The neighbouring operation's posture (i.e. MONUC-operation in DRC) towards the so called Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) caused the LRA to evade from DRC to southern Sudan. This was evident in the intermission liaison during September 2007.

well as international waters must be clearly mandated. During the operation, one must have a lucid understanding about: “Who are you countering?” Secondly, implications are related to *international legitimacy*. For instance in the case of piracy, there must be a definition between the problems of criminality and the problems related to unhindered sea lines of connection. Thirdly, without a clearly defined *timeframe* for the operation, there is a risk of losing focus and exhausting resources. The fourth point is that both the authorizers and the participants of an intervening force must be prepared to counter *follow on effects*. Overall, unless these considerations are sufficiently covered, there is the prospect of drifting into a violent spiral.

*Hypothesis.* Hypothesis no. 11 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. This hypothesis divided the Delphi-panel. Those accepting the hypothesis emphasised specific restrictions. Criminal movements with elements of terrorism, drug trade or human trafficking could merit for precise peace enforcement type measures, which would require a UN mandate. Those not accepting the hypothesis argue that peace enforcement in support of law and order policing operations is accepted. However, the important distinction is that there is no compromising with criminal elements. There will be no negotiations with criminal movements – but rather efforts to prevent and limit criminal actions alongside other policing measures. Therefore, criminal elements cannot be defined as greedy spoilers, and *the hypothesis is not accepted in this form*<sup>254</sup>.

#### 4.2.9 Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties

Hypothesis no. 12 is : It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political peace and mediation processes. This hypothesis *was not accepted*<sup>255</sup>. This is consistent with the findings of first round of Delphi-questions, which were ambiguous on this risk condition. Some panellists agree with the description that limited spoilers exist. However, the linkage to the spoiler type is especially difficult. It is argued that if the case is about a total spoiler, may be then it would easier to visualize.

It is argued that interventions are done only on a very selective basis. For instance, no discussion of intervening in China or Russia has occurred in the past decades, although

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<sup>253</sup> Respondent no. 7.

<sup>254</sup> Respondents on hypothesis no. 11: three accept, two do not accept.

internal tensions have existed. In Libya's case, Gaddafi's rule has been tolerated for decades. This suggests that the power politics of great powers overrides concerns about responsibility to protect.

The threshold for intervening with incentive of 'responsibility to protect' is high, and is likely to even higher in the future as authoritarian regimes gain more influence within the international system. *The threat must be a direct threat to the physical security of a population.* Current situation in North Africa in general and in Libya in particular serve as examples. Only when the physical security of citizens was clearly threatened was there enough incentives for the UN Security Council to pass a resolution and nation states to act accordingly.

A point of view that accepts the hypothesis raises the question: Where is the point that actually sparks the international community to take action? This would encompass a series of actions including sanctions, arms embargo and movement restrictions (e.g. no fly zones). If intervention is conducted, it happens on a case-by-case basis. The generic preconditions apply: (1) one must be able to define the mission; (2) there must be sufficient resources; and (3) there must be an interest to intervene. There are examples where this type of intervention has occurred, and the implication has been the change of the ruling regime. This implies that the local ownership has to be planned beforehand.

#### 4.2.10 Extremism of marginalised groups

*Preconditions.* Extremism of marginalised groups is a risk condition that is *always present* in a crisis management scenario. In these scenarios, there are multiple actors present, of which some are likely to be marginalised and become extremist groups. However, the impact of extremist marginalised groups is *often local or at the most regional*<sup>256</sup>. Furthermore, extremism is usually religion oriented. It is important to note that such groups are not inevitably total spoilers<sup>257</sup>. However, groups like Al-Qaida could be considered as total spoilers. In contrast, Hezbollah and Hamas can be considered as greedy spoilers. They work as proxies for Iran and Syria at times, but act as limited spoilers in their aims pertaining to their own area. Hezbollah has been flexible - which supports the greedy spoiler theory; whilst Hamas has functioned tactically – which also supports the greedy spoiler theory. However,

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<sup>255</sup> Respondents on hypothesis no. 12: three do not accept, one accepts.

<sup>256</sup> This is an individual view by respondent no.7, respondent no. 6 provides some support for this view.

Hamas has behaved as a total spoiler towards Israel. This is an interesting point. It suggests that overall, a spoiler may be considered greedy, but it has elements of a total spoiler towards one or more parties. The fundamental question is from *whose point of view is a group considered a total spoiler*. Al-Qaida arrived to the scene as a new phenomenon, not respecting boundaries. In contrast and as an example, a Palestinian suicide bomber may attack in Israel - but is not likely to attack in Spain.

The quality of the extremist group has an impact on the international community's standpoint. If the situation builds up international support for intervening, then intervention may happen quickly. Otherwise, an intervention does not occur quickly. Unless the level of violence is high, it is unlikely that an intervention would be conducted. In addition, the military capability of the country in question has an impact. A dangerous prospect is if a country with high military capability is falling to extremist hands. Nevertheless and as a contrast, if the rise of an extremist group is about to oust otherwise difficult actors, then this may imply that the international community only follows the developments.

Alongside the classic tenets of planning, several preconditions should be emphasised when attempting to counter extremism of marginalised groups. Any intervention must have *international legitimacy and the consent of the host state*. The intervening force must be aware that host states will invite, but will want to retain control. Consideration is also needed *on whose perspective justifies for peace enforcement*. Alongside this consideration, the level of violence is an obvious precondition. In planning and implementing a peace support operation it is important to remind oneself, that extremism is only a sub-factor of wider challenges. As a political precondition, it is essential that parties are brought to a negotiation table.

In relation to political preconditions, it is stated that by categorically excluding Islamists from peace negotiations the developed states commit a grave mistake. This exclusion is founded only on Western states' own perceptions. Such exclusion means that intervening international actors take sides with one or more of the actors. Furthermore, this implies that the intervening actors are actually a part of any such crisis. Thus, they are unable to get all the relevant actors into a negotiation process. A prerequisite for remaining impartial will necessitate the involvement of all relevant parties and factions.

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<sup>257</sup> Respondents no. 3, 6 and 7 state this quite clearly.



*Implications.* Implications depend on levels of severity and extremism. If extremism had led to armed conflict, they also depend on the presence of a cease-fire agreement. An extremist group may cease to exist or stop endangering the security situation, but another one may appear. This prospect pertains to a concept of ‘breeding ground’ for these movements.

One implication is physical segregation, which is against instinct of the panellist providing this view. However, one may establish zones of separation, as has been explored in the Darfur Peace Process. Such cantonments or demarcation lines must be an agreed effort, with external monitoring and verification of adherence. (e.g. UNAMID conducting monitoring and verification in Darfur). It is essential to consider thoroughly how different components of the population are treated.

In relation to repercussions, it is possible that such movements attempt to take revenge on intervening forces at their home fronts. The political evaluation and considerations must take into account the possible ramifications against the states participating in the intervention. If external intervention is conducted, but there is support for the spoiler from external parties or states, then the process is likely to become more difficult. Overall, it is essential to be prepared for a long-term approach.

*Hypothesis.* Hypothesis no. 13 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition total spoilers exist, and this justifies for and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures). *This hypothesis was accepted with substantial reservations*<sup>258</sup>. It is most pertinent to note that the panel does not conceive extremism of marginalised groups inevitably as a total spoiler. Furthermore, the requirement of a political process is stressed. Alongside these reservations, the supporting contemporary example is the operation in Afghanistan.

#### 4.2.11 Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes

*Preconditions.* The dispute over Kashmir area is a classic example of this type of dispute. In the dispute between North and South Korea, the northern counterpart could be considered as a classic greedy spoiler. The case of North Korea may require preventive measures, as there is a potential for serious counter-reactions. Generally, more often the case is about protecting an

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<sup>258</sup> Respondents on hypothesis no.13: three accept, one undecided.

achieved peace process. It is usually not a case of intervening and using peace enforcement means.

There is always room for negotiation, but the challenge is that one must reach agreement on a huge array of issues. However, it will not be possible to identify legitimate or illegitimate demands. Furthermore, it is likely that external military capabilities are only used, once parties are committed to a peace process. This is done to safeguard the process.

Legitimacy for the intervention is a precondition. Thus a mandate is necessary, but not necessarily a UN Security Council resolution. The mandate should have a sufficient peace enforcement dimension (e.g. UN Charter chapter VII type mission). Even if parties to dispute have not requested external parties to intervene, they should allow it and not actively resist it.

*Implications.* A peace agreement itself is an implication. An agreement is the objective towards which all efforts are aimed at. The first priority is an effective political process, which requires unity on the issue from the international community. The use of military capabilities is a supporting measure.

*Hypotheses.* Hypotheses no. 14 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition limited spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political peace and mediation processes. Hypotheses no. 15 is: It is likely that greedy spoilers appear alongside limited spoilers, which would necessitate peace enforcement measures. *These hypotheses were accepted*<sup>259</sup>. It was agreed that the presence of a greedy spoiler would merit for a full-blown peace enforcement operation. In this case, more judgement is required to balance mission requirements with deployable resources. Pertaining to hypothesis no. 14, the specific challenge is the difficulty of identifying legitimate and illegitimate demands.

#### 4.2.12 Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements

*Preconditions.* Countering this risk condition requires that a combination of police forces, security agencies and military services act in cooperation. The same precondition exists in countering transnational crime. Crimes that occur in cyberspace are related to this risk condition. Military crisis management has limited roles in these scenarios. Military means are

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<sup>259</sup> Respondents on hypothesis no.14: four accept, one partly accepts.  
Respondents on hypothesis no.15: three accept, two partly accept.

likely to be limited to intelligence gathering and logistical support. Almost contrary to this it is argued that peace enforcement against cybercrime would be most suitable and even subject to plausible development measures<sup>260</sup>.

Pertaining to interest to intervene, it is worthwhile to note that effects of exploitation may be very collateral. Criminal activities on the internet serve as an example. The criminal activities may not be physically tangible, but they are still very significant.

*Hypothesis.* Hypothesis no. 16 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. This hypothesis received lucid support alongside views, which do not accept it. The opposing views built the argumentation on the foundation that military ways and means, peace support operations, do not have a role in countering this risk condition. Quite intentionally, the hypothesis does not describe the ways and means how such peace enforcement could be conducted. It is plausible that the military means could be intelligence gathering and logistical support, but importantly the military could also kinetically target criminal or rogue elements that actually exploit technology with malicious intentions. These enforcement actions should obviously be conducted in support of law and order policing operations, if the exploitation is of criminal nature. With the above in mind, the *hypothesis is partly accepted, but the finding is not robust*<sup>261</sup>.

#### 4.2.13 Interstate rivalry

Interstate rivalry is a classical scenario, which typically has *regional power struggle* origins. Alongside this, new scenarios for interstate rivalry may emerge. For an example, the economical penetration of China to Africa may generate different scenarios than regional interstate rivalry. Furthermore, interstate rivalry is contextual. Rivalries exist even in Europe. In Asia, they relate to the rising powers: China and India are examples. Though rivalries exist, it does not directly translate to conflict. Many countries of the world are beyond a so called '*conflict mindset*'. Nonetheless, this is not the case in Africa.

Pertaining to the '*conflict mindset*'<sup>262</sup>, there are several factors that affect rivalry gravitating toward conflict. Firstly, there is political inclusiveness - specifically the *lack of inclusiveness*.

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<sup>260</sup> Respondent no.2 and no. 7 provide some argumentation in support of this view.

<sup>261</sup> Respondents on hypothesis 16: two accept, one does not accept, one does not see this risk condition matching with a peace support operation.

<sup>262</sup> In support of this point see also Fortna (2003), pp. 340-344 for useful elaboration.

This is considered as a factor, because rivalries do not tend to escalate in democracies. Secondly, the *level of development* has an impact. It is stressed that development also includes the level of democracy, which is a significant factor as autocracies are more likely to go to conflict<sup>263</sup>. Besides this, the *stakes involved* in the developing world are relatively lower. This is to say that a conflict would surely cause casualties, but not to the scale as a conflict between developed nations is likely to cause. This implies that for developed states the stakes are relatively higher.

*Preconditions.* The three generic preconditions apply when considering intervention in an interstate rivalry or conflict. Firstly, there must be a *definable mission* for the operation. The defined mission must entail a desired end-state as well as a plausible exit strategy. Secondly, there must be *sufficient interests* (e.g. political and economical) for different nation states and international organisations to intervene. Thirdly, it is obvious that *sufficient resources*, which correspond to the scope of the mission, are available. These generic preconditions are prerequisites for a logic sequence of military planning. Alongside these generic preconditions, several preconditions pertain especially to interstate rivalry.

Some form of a peace agreement or at least an armistice should exist. *Without a credible negotiation contact, armistice or agreement, intervening in peace enforcement mode is not plausible.* Such a negotiation contact or agreement reflects the level of *local acceptance* that should exist. Furthermore, international consensus on intervention is essential. *International acceptance* does not necessarily need to be thorough (i.e. 'full') acceptance<sup>264</sup>, but the intervention must abide to international law. Nevertheless, situations do not necessarily play out as interventions. Although wider international consensus exists, the regional consensus may not exist.

In most cases, interventions will require a UN Security Council resolution. The invasion and liberation of Kuwait serve as an example. Kuwait was a sovereign state, and its government in exile requested for assistance. The intervention was authorised by the UN Security Council Resolution. If the dispute is small-scale and has limited impact beyond the conflict area, then it does not necessarily require a UN Security Council mandate. However, some type of international structure should be in support of the process. For instance, some regional African

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<sup>263</sup> "Research has shown that democracies rarely engage in war with one another. – democracies are less likely to be targets of military intervention. See Hermann, MG; Kegley, CW: *Ballots, a barrier against the use of bullets and bombs - Democratization and military intervention*, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol 40 (3), pp. 454-456 September 1996.

conflicts would require mediation processes led by regional organisations (e.g. ECOWAS or AU<sup>265</sup>).

Pertaining to the overall circumstances, *there should be a common understanding that an intervention would be successful in stopping the rivalry*. This understanding would be substantiated if the rival parties are relatively weak or the level of rivalry is low.

Furthermore, it is stated that the intervening force should be able to overwhelm one or both parties simultaneously. This relates to the number of parties involved. Initially one would think there are only two. However, there can be numerous parties that affect the situation. Yet, some of these parties may not be as important as others.<sup>266</sup>

*Implications.* The implications of intervening in an interstate rivalry are numerous. A primary challenge is that impartiality should remain.<sup>267</sup> This view is supported by literature and pertains especially to peacekeeping operations. A peacekeeping mission must implement its mandate without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties. Impartiality, however, should not be confused with neutrality, inactivity or inaction. This is to say that peacekeepers should be *impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate*.<sup>268</sup>

Pertaining to a desired end-state, an operation intervening in interstate rivalry must support and build towards a sustainable peaceful solution. This emphasises that there must be a linkage to a realistic negotiation process and plausible exit strategy. After a decision to commit to a peace support operation, a practical implication and concern for all is the speed at which forces deploy.

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<sup>264</sup> Respondent no. 1 and 2 advocate this view.

<sup>265</sup> Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU)

<sup>266</sup> Respondents no. 5 and no. 7 advocate similar views on this point.

<sup>267</sup> A contemporary example of the challenges is evident in dealing with Libya. How can the EU be impartial, if its member states have participated in the campaign under the NATO framework?

<sup>268</sup> International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations: *Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Edita Västra Aros AB, Stockholm, 2010, p 14. See also United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO): *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - Principles and Guidelines* (2008), pp. 31-34.

*Hypothesis.* Hypothesis no. 17 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. *The hypothesis is accepted*<sup>269</sup>, *although its acceptance is subject to substantial preconditions*. One reservation is that this hypothesis applies to an interstate conflict with regional character, and especially to a conflict between neighbour states. Alongside two undecided respondents, one respondent does not accept the hypothesis. The respondent's opposing view is founded on the basis that as one must have the consent of the rivalries, thus a peace enforcement mode is not possible<sup>270</sup>. Overall, the formulation of this hypothesis was not fully appropriate. Although this risk condition pertains to interstate rivalry, the hypothesis did not explicitly distinguish if the spoiler is a state or non-state actor. However, the supporting description depicted that spoilers would be state actors. Thus, respondents appeared to respond as if the spoilers would be state actors.

#### 4.2.14 Future Perspectives

Regarding the international system, it is stated that the United Nations concept will remain in the next decade. The UN will remain as the authority 'setting the rules of play' and "news on the death of the UN are strongly exaggerated".<sup>271</sup> Whilst all new emerging powers remain involved in the UN system, the UN will be a forum of interaction and discussion. Pertaining to mandates for crisis management there is no change to current situation. There must be a mandate for crisis management actions, and these mandates should be evermore clear. The UN Security Council will be the authorizing body and provide these mandates. Organisations such as NATO will provide military capabilities, and continue to collaborate with other regional organisations (e.g. AU, Arab League) for support and coordination of efforts.

Pertaining to failed governance scenarios, it is challenging to identify trends, as all past and recent situations have been individual cases. Nonetheless, it is likely that these situations are not going to decrease, but rather increase. *However, the threshold for the international community to intervene is lower on a conceptual level, but not necessarily in practice*. The

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<sup>269</sup> Respondents on hypothesis no. 17: four accept the hypothesis; one does not accept peace enforcement mode but accepts a peacekeeping type operation; two panellists were undecided.

<sup>270</sup> However, one may argue that this opposing view does not fully appreciate the definition of impartiality. The definition pertains to the consent of the main parties of a conflict. If there are other parties involved or proxy forces that have become uncontrollable; peace enforcement may be a necessity in resolving an interstate rivalry. If either of the main parties behaves as a greedy spoiler, defining peace enforcement becomes difficult. One may further argue that even in such cases peace enforcement may be relevant, for at least limited periods of time, provided that the actions conducted are consistent with the mandate. This elaboration supports the earlier notion that spoilers are defined from the peace processes point of view.

<sup>271</sup> Respondent no. 6

military forces of many developed nations are being downsized, resulting in less facilitating military elements (e.g. material and personnel). This is to say that, developed nations will have less capability for faraway operations, whilst demand for them will remain great. Alongside the available resources, the contemporary will to commit to peace support operations is relatively low. There is a desire to limit commitments to short term only, which is evident in contemporary discussions within the EU. Large operations have gone on for long periods, and implementing exit strategies is challenging. Political will is waning alongside the strict financial limitations.

Future crisis management operations are not solely military operations: they must be comprehensive approaches, which include the political, civilian crisis management, police and military elements. Such an operation must have quick impact projects to demonstrate quick progress alongside long-term development programs. Progress may take time, but it should be evident for the international community that developing failed governances towards self-sustainability is important.

The demand for an *inclusive international process* will remain as a precondition to resolve many of the risk conditions. This precondition is emphasised in situations related to *potential spillover of ethnic, religious or ideological conflict*. As this research suggests, there are reservations on defining some spoilers as total spoilers. Thus there will be a need to negotiate and involve all relevant actors. Resolving these conflicts and achieving sustainable peaceful conditions requires long-lasting and serious-minded commitment from the international community. According to the Delphi-panel, *internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties* did not merit for peace support operation. However, such scenarios may receive more attention and even merit for interventions, especially as *media draws attention* to them. Alongside this, future settings pertaining to *extremism of marginalised groups* are somewhat diffuse. Related future scenarios are both difficult to visualize, and likely to be even more fragmented than they have been in the past.

Current trends continue to sustain migration including uncontrolled migration. Migration will continue in the next decade in either diffuse or forced forms. *Migratory tribes that are armed and do not appreciate nation state borders will remain a feature*. In these cases, one could explore the applicability and effectiveness of military capabilities as a deterrent. Alongside this specific type of migration (i.e. migratory armed tribes), *wide comprehensive means to manage uncontrolled migration* will be called for. Managing migration will raise ample

considerations. Some of these considerations pertain to the responsibility to protect. For example, challenging considerations are how to protect, when to protect and what are the interests of a limited number of people versus an entire nation's interests. In generic terms, the needs of the periphery must be factored in plans and actions, whilst appreciating that migration will exist in the future.

*Disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories are likely to occur.* However, these disputes are likely not to be so severe that they necessarily lead to armed conflict. Agreements are reached probably through political negotiations and mediation. Technology provides increasingly better estimates on availability and consumption of resources, and thus supports more accurate forecasts of potential problems. This provides the international community necessary awareness to mitigate potential disputes early on.

Responding to *consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes* will strain the developed and developing world alike. As said, the developed worlds facilitating military capabilities are decreasing. This highlights the prerequisite for *coordination amongst the international community*. The primary coordination requirements pertain to burden sharing, pooling of resources, interoperability and command structures. Alongside these practical requirements, the will of individual nations to be noticed internationally as aid providers must be managed in an even-handed way.

It is suggested that transnational crime will increase. If this criminality has high impact and thus is a major issue for external states, there will be interests to participate in controlling this risk condition. *The ability to utilise military capabilities in support of police operations may decrease, but international police cooperation is likely to increase.* The requirement for cooperation is exacerbated by any technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements, which are also likely to increase and challenge societies. Such an exploitative feature as well as involvement of rogue elements, are likely to call for pre-emptive and preventive approaches to counter these challenges.

*Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes are more likely to happen intrastate.* There is a possibility that territorial integrity is tested in Africa and the Middle East by manipulative power bases. However, pertaining to interstate rivalry it is stated that there is a greater potential for large-scale spillover in the next decade. Some of the rivals will have access to at least weapons of mass effect. Therefore, even local conflicts involving WMD/WME would be



an international concern. The earthquake and following tsunami in Japan (i.e. spring 2011) that caused a nuclear facility disaster demonstrates this. Effects will spread beyond a conflict area.

Furthermore, interstate rivalry is not likely to appear in the developed world. Moreover, it is a risk condition appearing in the developing world. This view is supported by the idea that the stakes involved are relatively higher in the developed world, and that developed nations are beyond the 'conflict mindset' that remains in the developing nations. It is likely that interstate rivalry will appear intertwined with different regional and ethnic dimensions. Despite this, *there is limited possibility for intervention in interstate rivalries in the future*. Some types of focused operations are possible, but operations involving large-scale military capabilities are not likely. Considerations related to intervening in these rivalries will take into account if the violence can be contained, and does rivalry in question have wider ramifications. Alongside these considerations, the applicability of peace support operations in interstate rivalry cases is related to the level, intensity and scope of violence.

On a more generic note pertaining to the use of military power, one could explore the possibility of using 'one time only' and 'decisive impact' actions in support of a peace process. This is rather innovative thinking, and maybe against the mainstream thoughts advocating comprehensive approach. However, it must be stressed that the political-military interdependence is an integral feature of peace support operations. This interdependence is not directly related to the *physical* use of military force. Notwithstanding such physical use of military force, the coercive and deterrence dimensions of military force will remain. Nevertheless, if clearly defined and appropriately executed, such decisive use of military means should not be excluded from a comprehensive approach. Alongside this, it is stressed that overall a mandate authorizes an operation, whilst specific actions must remain within authority provided by a mandate. Contemporary military crisis management operations (i.e. peace support operations) have been developed based on lessons learned in the wars of former Yugoslavia. It appears that the lessons learnt from Afghanistan are only starting to be incorporated into peace support operations. The question this raises is, will there be international capacity and willingness to utilise these enhanced means and ways of conducting peace support operations in the next decade?

### 4.3 Summary of the Findings

#### 4.3.1 Induce Consent or Rely on Compliance

Reflecting on the focal research problem: *Should military components induce consent or rely on the compliance of the parties of a conflict, in crisis management operations of the next decade (2020 – 2030)?* The research hypotheses were defined so that peace enforcement measures relate to inducing consent, whilst peacekeeping measures relate to relying on compliance. It is pertinent to note that peace enforcement measures *do not exclude* the use of peacekeeping measures. However, the hypotheses that suggest relying on peacekeeping measures *do exclude* peace enforcement measures.

This research finds that some degree of *peace enforcement will*<sup>272</sup> be feasible and necessary in at least the following risk conditions: (1) failed governance; (2) potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; (3) vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces; and (4) territorial and extra-territorial border disputes. Furthermore, some form of peace enforcement is *probably* necessary in risk conditions pertaining to: (1) extremism of marginalised groups; (2) potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories; and (3) interstate rivalry.

The research findings suggest that *peace enforcement is possibly* utilised countering risk conditions related to: (1) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or effect; and (2) technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements. Peace enforcement measures pertaining to countering transnational criminal movements are not uniformly accepted. This is mainly due to a conceptual reservation that criminal elements cannot be defined as greedy spoilers of a peace process. Nonetheless and based on the research findings, peace enforcement in support of police operations remains a *possibility*.

Furthermore, this research finds that *peacekeeping measures will* be feasible and necessary in at least risk conditions pertaining to: (1) potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict; (2) uncontrolled migration; (3) consequences from environmental catastrophes or

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<sup>272</sup> The term *will* implies that this will happen with a *high degree of certainty*. The terms *likely*, *probably* and *probable* indicate that this is more likely to occur than not occur. The terms *may* and *possibly* mean that this is more likely not to occur – that is to say, it cannot be excluded. Similar expressions of probability related to future studies are described in: United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: *Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2040*, Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 4<sup>th</sup> edition, 2010, p. 8.

changes; (4) territorial and extra-territorial border disputes; and (5) potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories.

Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties does not seem to merit peacekeeping measures. This finding is consistent with both rounds of the Delphi-questions, and suggests two interrelated key points. Firstly, any threat must be a direct threat to the physical security of a population. Thus, decisions to intervene are related to the level of violence. Secondly, the power politics of great powers overrides concerns about the responsibility to protect. The table below provides an illustrative summary of the findings<sup>273</sup>.

Posture of peace support operation	Associated risk condition	Primary reason for posture	Assessment of probability
peace enforcement	failed governance	greedy spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	total spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces	greedy spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	greedy spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	extremism of marginalised groups	total spoiler	probable
peace enforcement	potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	greedy spoiler	probable
peace enforcement	interstate rivalry	greedy spoiler	probable
peace enforcement	proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or effect	greedy and total spoilers	possible
peace enforcement	technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements	greedy spoiler	possible
peace enforcement	transnational criminal movements	support police operations	possible
peacekeeping	potential spillover of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	high hostility	highly certain
peacekeeping	uncontrolled migration	protection of aid efforts	highly certain
peacekeeping	consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes	protection of aid efforts	highly certain
peacekeeping	territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	limited spoiler	highly certain
peacekeeping	potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	limited spoiler	highly certain

Table 5: Illustration of key research findings.

<sup>273</sup> (1) *Pertaining to peace enforcement*. Hypotheses that were accepted: 1, 2, 4, and 15. Hypotheses that were partly accepted or with substantial reservations: 8, 13 and 17. Hypotheses no. 9 and 16 were accepted, but the finding is not robust. Hypothesis no. 11 was not accepted. (2) *Pertaining to peacekeeping*. Hypotheses that were accepted: 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14. Hypothesis no. 12 was not accepted.

### 4.3.2 Preconditions and Implications

Below is a summary of findings presented in chapter 4.2. The summary reflects on the second supporting research question: *What are the preconditions and implications of attempting to induce consent vis-à-vis to relying on compliance?*

Pertaining to *generic preconditions*, the findings offer several points. Firstly, there must a *definable mission* for the operation. The defined mission must entail a desired end-state as well as a plausible exit strategy. Secondly, there must be *sufficient interests* (e.g. political and economical) for different nation states and international organisations to intervene. Thirdly, it is obvious that *sufficient resources*, which correspond to the scope of the mission, are available. These are evident prerequisites for a logic sequence of military planning, and pertain to using military capabilities in all imaginable cases. Importantly and alongside these rather obvious preconditions, the research findings suggest that three further preconditions pertain to peace support operations. First, one must identify the *logic of conflict*, consequent incentives and dynamics<sup>274</sup>. This is a requisite however illogical the conflict may seem. Second, one must *understand transition* from war to peace, from conflict to stability, from failed governance to good governance - and so forth<sup>275</sup>. Third, one must appreciate that the *level of hostility* is a key precondition in relation to authorization of coercive measures<sup>276</sup>.

Alongside the generic preconditions, several *specific preconditions* should be summarized. Categorizing them is challenging, but in this research, they are elaborated based on the framework provided by the UN principles of peace operations<sup>277</sup>. Pertaining to *consent*, failed governance and interstate rivalry risk conditions specifically underscore the existence of a credible political process. Furthermore, extremism of marginalised groups as a risk condition emphasises international legitimacy for intervening. Although not robust, the findings suggest that inclusive peace process should be extended to include also total spoilers. Related to *the use or non-use of force*, it was highlighted that preconditions related to responsibility to protect civilians are somewhat diffuse on the political level. To merit coercive action there

<sup>274</sup> For support on this point and guidance, see United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UKMOD): *Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution*, Swindon, June 2009, pp. 9-1 – 9-12.

<sup>275</sup> For support on this point and guidance, see UKMOD (2009), pp. 3-1 – 7-17.

<sup>276</sup> This point is supported in Gilligan, M, Stedman, J: *Where Do Peacekeepers Go?*, International Studies Review, vol 5, issue 4, pp. 37-54, December 2003.

<sup>277</sup> As described earlier: (1) consent of the parties; (2) impartiality; and (3) non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

must be a direct threat to the physical security of a population<sup>278</sup>. In the risk condition related to extremism, the coercive measures have preconditions related to capability of resistance and justification. It was also suggested that threats to truly strategic interests would not merit peace support operations, but in contrary are causes for war. Overall, when intervening there should be a common understanding that an intervention would be successful in stopping the rivalry<sup>279</sup>. Maintaining *impartiality* was judged as especially demanding in the risk condition related to potential spillover of religious, ethnical or ideological conflict. It also is an important precondition in risk conditions related to territorial disputes. Time is a factor in maintaining impartiality – in several of the risk conditions there are no quick solutions. As an overarching issue the findings suggest that the spoiler theory is not applicable in all cases. However, when it is applicable - spoilers should be defined from the peace process point of view.

The list of *generic implications* is shorter than the one on preconditions. From the outset of a peace support operation, an ‘evolution’ of the preconditions begins. This implication encompasses escalation prospects and the need to avoid and prepare for spillover effects. Furthermore, one has to be cognisant that coercive measures are likely to have unknown and undesired consequences – alongside the intended effects.

Pertaining to *specific implications*, a self-evident implication is the need to generate a peace agreement - if it is not in existence at outset. The implication relates especially to territorial disputes. The use of force, especially in failed governance risk condition, must relate to the provision of safe and secure environment. Furthermore, the passage of time raises a dilemma. Crisis management should achieve results quickly; else political and home front support is challenged. However, as stipulated in many of the risk conditions there are no quick solutions. The passage of time also challenges operations. Pertaining to the risk conditions where defining what is being countered (e.g. risk condition related to criminality and exploitation), the idea of what is actually being countered must persevere over time. Else, an operation will lose focus and eventually fail, waste resources or both. Finally, a specific implication is that adversaries, especially extremists, taking hostile action beyond immediate area of operations, might challenge robustness of home fronts.

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<sup>278</sup> Evans, G; Sahnoun, M: *The responsibility to protect*, Foreign Affairs, vol 81 (6): pp. 99-100 Nov-Dec 2002. Evans and Sahnoun advocate this point by what they call ‘just cause’ threshold. They attach precautionary measures to the use of military force: ‘right intention’, ‘last resort’, ‘proportional means’ and ‘reasonable prospects’.

<sup>279</sup> See also Jakobsen, PV: *National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the cold war?*, Journal of Peace Research, vol 33 (2), pp. 205-215 May 1996.

### 4.3.3 Discussion on Research Findings

The aim of the following discussion is to reflect on research findings and evaluate them based on what contemporary literature has to offer. The research findings on the main research question validate this statement: “*Consent is a requisite for legitimacy and long-run sustainability, yet coercion will be required to deal with factions resisting or defecting from a peace process.*”<sup>280</sup> Even when there is broad support for a political process; splinter groups, rogue actors or individuals may use violence to undermine that process. Therefore, missions must be able to respond to them.<sup>281</sup> However, in the future, where a context of limited supply is likely; three sets of factors will affect states’ choices as to whether to deploy peace support operations through the UN or other platforms. The first factor is *risks and rewards*. Governments are inevitably motivated to deploy forces where they see their national security or interests at risk<sup>282</sup>. Conversely, states will also weigh the risks of casualties and potential rewards present in any theatre. The second factor is *range and regionalism*. With the important exceptions of European forces under NATO and Asian forces under UN command, the majority of peacekeepers deploy within their region of origin or its immediate neighbourhood. The third factor is *responsibility*. Involvement in peacekeeping is a sign of international responsibility, as in China’s growing commitment to UN operations and the efforts of AU members to tackle Darfur. States are also drawn to the incentive of responsibility within or over a mission. Countries that are given operational command positions in the field, or political decision-making power within institutions, tend to be more committed to operations. Brazil’s leadership role in Haiti provides an example of both points.<sup>283</sup> These three considerations supplement the identified generic preconditions.

Pertaining to coercion three interrelated points should be raised. First, Peter Viggo Jakobsen has studied UN mandated peace enforcement operations<sup>284</sup> and identified two distinct patterns leading to enforcement operations: one driven by national interest, the other by humanitarian sentiment. Obviously governments will work hard to mobilize support and accept a significant number of casualties when national interests are at stake. Humanitarian interventions, on the contrary, are driven by a combination of the CNN effect and good chances of success, as

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<sup>280</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), pp. 303-304.

<sup>281</sup> Jones (2009), p. 17.

<sup>282</sup> Neack (1995), pp.182-184, 194-195. Neack has advocated this realist explanation earlier.

<sup>283</sup> Jones (2009), p.13.

<sup>284</sup> Jakobsen’s case selection is: Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti. In this instance peace enforcement is understood as UN missions acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. However, this *does not imply* that in all cases the use of coercive military force was allowed - e.g. see UNSCR 917(1994) on Haiti and 918(1994) on Rwanda.

governments are reluctant to take casualties when national interests are not involved<sup>285</sup>. Thus Jakobsen's conclusions support the findings pertaining to preconditions on use of force, most notably the diffusion of political preconditions.

Second, Mats Berdal provides argumentation in support of peace enforcement. In Sierra Leone in 2000, the UNAMSIL-operation<sup>286</sup> should have given the impression of confidence and military superiority. Such impression would have been deterrence to spoilers. However, the mission failed to do so. Thereafter operation Palliser was launched in support of UNAMSIL by deploying British troops. Their *modus operandi* and eventual achievements prove that, in specific circumstances, peace enforcement and inducing consent are necessary. Operation Palliser played a key role in preventing UNAMSIL from collapse and Sierra Leone returning to full-scale war. Alongside other factors, this intervention was important. It put Sierra Leone on the path to recovery and sustainable peace with two primary contributions. First, the principal spoiler (i.e RUF<sup>287</sup>) was weakened. Two, the military intervention was followed by immediate diplomatic action and efforts for local security sector reform. This reform was crucially important for the long-term outcome.<sup>288</sup> Furthermore, experience of operation Palliser lends support for the idea that some military actions may be decisive and with 'one time only' character. This is plausible permitting that operations are prudently limited in scale, scope, and time. In addition, the objectives should not conflict with objectives of an overall peace operation.<sup>289</sup> Operation Palliser proved that peace operations could be placed back on track by weakening spoilers. This is true if a credible peace process exists. The key lesson is evident and supports research findings. Especially preconditions related to consent and defining spoilers from a peace process point of view gain support. One must evaluate military action in relation to long-term impacts within the peacebuilding space; and not merely focus on short-term impacts on the operational environment.

The third point pertaining to operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo speak against relying on peace enforcement. Peace enforcement, or inducing consent, was the argumentation in support of operation Artemis conducted in 2003 in eastern DRC. The operation claimed to be 'actively impartial'. However, here is the dilemma: while an intervening force may insist

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<sup>285</sup> Jakobsen, PV: *National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the cold war?*, Journal of Peace Research, vol 33 (2), pp. 205-215 May 1996.

<sup>286</sup> UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

<sup>287</sup> RUF: Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

<sup>288</sup> Berdal (2009), pp.103 – 107.

<sup>289</sup> Bellamy et al.: *Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization --*, (2005), p. 194. "In contrast to the U.S. experience in Somalia, a notable feature of Operation Palliser was its ability to operate in a 'firefighting'

that its actions are impartial and reinforce that message, the local impact of those actions will not be neutral in political and military consequences. MONUC operating in support of FARDC has weakened the legitimacy of MONUC and indirectly complicated the overall task of stabilisation.<sup>290</sup> Future peace support operations will remain challenged on how uphold a credible perception: impartiality is not neutrality towards the mandate; rather it is impartiality towards the parties.

If peace enforcement is not the ‘silver bullet’, should one rely on compliance? Pertaining to this it is highlighted that the majority of large-scale UN operations are *deliberately designed to extend rather than limit the authority of states*.<sup>291</sup> The Security Council is normally in the business of strengthening governments rather than changing regimes. This fact, often overlooked, is essential to explaining some recent successes and failures of peacekeeping – and may help guide future deployments. Missions often shift over time from having the implementation of a peace agreement as their base-line stance to extension of state authority as the central mission goal. Cases from the Sudan to Afghanistan have shown the limits on what troops can achieve when the credibility of national political process or national government is weak. In many cases, peace operations succeed thanks to effective mediation by their civilian leaders rather than simply by their military presence. Of course, a military presence is sometimes a precondition for mediation, deterring ex-combatants and creating ‘political space’ for cooperation. The UN has shown both the willingness and an *ability to shift from ‘implementation of a peace agreement’ as a baseline stance towards the ‘extension of state authority’*. Put differently, there are two forms of ‘a peace to keep’<sup>292</sup>: (1) a viable political settlement between opposing forces; and (2) international support to a recognized state, whose authority can be defended and extended. Either one has been shown to constitute a viable political strategy within which the UN can operate. Many missions shift from one mode to the other, especially after elections. The second type of operation is obviously harder. In each case where the UN has pursued ‘extension of state authority’ mode as its baseline stance, its forces have been either led or supported by states with advanced military

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and enforcement capacity alongside a pre-existing UN mission. This was made easier by the idea that impartiality should be defined in terms of the UN’s principles and the mission’s mandate.”

<sup>290</sup> Berdal (2009), pp. 107- 115. MONUC: United Nation Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. FARDC: Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (DRC Armed Forces). As of 1 July 2010, MONUC was renamed the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml> (2.7.2011).

<sup>291</sup> Current examples are UN operations in Haiti, Chad, Lebanon and Democratic Republic of Congo. The idea originates from Sierra Leone, when in 1999 the UN backed the government against opposing rebel forces.

<sup>292</sup> Fortna points to a dilemma related to the idea of ‘a peace to keep’ - if this is a strict threshold, then peacekeeping renders itself irrelevant. Fortna (2004a), p. 273.



capabilities.<sup>293</sup> *This elaboration supports the findings overall, but especially understanding transition and how to achieve it.* Furthermore and importantly, it supports the idea of relying on compliance is the viable long-term approach.

Further elaboration on the feasibility of ‘extension of state authority’ supports the generic preconditions, and especially cases of failed governance. First, an essential factor will be the international community’s belief in *legitimacy and long-term viability of a state in need of support*. Second, the Security Council will not authorize such options if the state in question does not enjoy a degree of international legitimacy. Neither will troop contributors volunteer to undertake such operations unless they *believe the state involved can ultimately cohere, or if the support that the state enjoys is outweighed by the dangers* of the operation.<sup>294</sup> Alongside this, an internationally authorized humanitarian intervention could proceed without host state authorization, but it will not succeed unless it wins the support of significant majority of the local population<sup>295</sup>. Thus one can initially enforce (i.e to create safety, security and stability), but one must transform to a consent based approach over time. This reaffirms the point on cognizance of transition, and that consent is integral to a successful sustainable end-state. This also relates to the time aspect. Achieving a transformation towards consent simply requires time – it will not happen overnight.

To conclude this discussion between the research findings and contemporary literature: one of the most compelling arguments in support of impartial peacekeeping as well as inclusiveness of peace process is UNTAC mission in Cambodia. There UNTAC did not resort to use of force against the Khmer Rouge although it did not comply with the peace agreement. In contrast, the SRSF consulted with them and devised a strategy of ‘patient persuasion’ and ‘sustained pressure’. The peacekeeping operation’s military force was not used to coerce the spoiler. However, the military component was reconfigured to protect the electoral process that was a fundamental part of the peace process. Furthermore, impartiality was reinterpreted as to using military units of all factions, except Khmer Rouge, to assist in providing security during the election. The departing train strategy used to counter the Khmer Rouge proved to be imaginative and effective. *UNTAC would not exclude a spoiler from the peace process, nor would the process be held hostage by the spoiler.* The UNTAC mission left the spoiler to

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<sup>293</sup> Jones (2009), pp. 16 – 18.

<sup>294</sup> Jones (2009), pp. 17 – 18.

<sup>295</sup> Doyle et al. (2006), p. 320. See also Werner, S: *The precarious nature of peace: Resolving the issues, enforcing the settlement, and renegotiating the terms*, American Journal of Political Science, 43 (3): 912-934 JUL 1999. Werner advocates that renegotiation of terms of peace is pertinent, as compared to enforcement of those terms.

reengage in the peace process if it wanted to.<sup>296</sup> This provides support especially for the research finding that existence of total spoiler does not translate to open hostility, which would then imply peace enforcement<sup>297</sup>. One may argue that revitalising what SRSG Akashi and Force Commander General Sanderson implemented in Cambodia in the 1990s would be useful. Useful for contemporary and future peace support operations that appear gridlocked with total spoilers this approach may provide renewed opportunities.

## 5 DEDUCTIONS AND DISCUSSION

Responses to the research questions were depicted in chapters 3 and 4. Deductions on risk conditions were presented in chapter 3.3. Chapter 5 will focus on deductions based on overall research findings; recommendations for Finnish national decision making on military crisis management; validity and reliability of this thesis; as well as propositions for future research.

### 5.1 Deductions

The overall interest of this research was to promote understanding on feasibility of peace support operations. Permitting that such understanding is achieved, the pendulum of intervention optimism and intervention pessimism may be avoided in the future. This research shows compelling evidence that such a pendulum is not substantiated. *Both peace enforcement and peacekeeping are sine qua non for successful military crisis management in the next decade.* Though not a surprising result, it is a robust one. This research advocates that instead of swaying between intervention optimism and pessimism: there should be honest and comprehensive appreciation of existing circumstances of any conflict. Founded on such appreciation, there should be legitimate authorization, prudent planning and determined execution of an applicable peace support operation.

To emphasise the previous overall deduction, a synthesis of plausible futures and research findings is in order – see table 6 below<sup>298</sup>. One realises that a majority of risk conditions that merit peace support operations are likely to occur in the first future - “Dark Side of

<sup>296</sup> For a detailed account, see Stedman (1997), pp. 26 – 36.

<sup>297</sup> See chapter 4 on potential spillover of conflict; respondents no. 5 and 6 advocate this view. See also Dandeker, C; Gow, J: *The future of peace support operations: Strategic peacekeeping and success*, Armed Forces and Society, vol 23 (3), pp. 327-347 Spring 1997. Dandeker supports this view: “--These are not so much the consent of the conflicting parties or the use of force alone, but the challenges of maintaining sufficient support (or a suitable absence of opposition) in the eyes of different audiences both in the host state and further afield.”

Exclusivity”. However, in this future developed states may be unwilling to manage threats. In the second future, “Deceptive Stability”, domestic priorities may distract developed states’ from responding to threats. On the other hand, their rationalism may distract them from understanding the logic of conflicts emerging in the third future “Clash of Modernities”. In the fourth future, a prerequisite for intervening will be that intervention is a mutual strategic interest of competing regional powers. Such a prerequisite has impact on probability. When mutual interest exists, intervention is probable to maintain a fragile balance. Furthermore, coercive measures against those distracting such stability may be authorized or at least not resisted. Overarching through three of the futures is potential spillover of ethnic, religious or ideological conflict; which could be managed by a combination of inducing consent (i.e. peace enforcement) and relying on compliance (i.e. peacekeeping). Authorizing peace support operations that pertain to some of the risk conditions is *not likely*<sup>299</sup>, but as it remains a *possibility*, they should not be excluded as potential reasons for peace support operations.

	Futures:			
	1. “Dark Side of Exclusivity”	2. “Deceptive Stability”	3. “Clash of Modernities”	4. “New Power Politics”
<b>PSO posture:</b>	<b>Risk conditions that <i>will or probably will</i> merit peace support operations:</b>			
peace enforcement	Failed governance  Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces		Extremism of marginalised groups	Interstate rivalry
peace enforcement and peacekeeping	Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict  Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict	Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict  Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	
peacekeeping	Uncontrolled migration  Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes	Uncontrolled migration		
	<b>Risk conditions that <i>possibly</i> merit peace support operations:</b>			
peace enforcement	Proliferation of WMD/WME	Transnational criminal movements	Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements	

Table 6: Scope and posture of peace support operations in the next decade.

<sup>298</sup> This table is a synthesis of tables 3 and 5.

The research findings also reaffirm what is integral for practicing strategy: it must fit the case at hand. To fit strategy to the case, one must have a thorough comprehension of the case. To support such comprehension, *this research accentuates pertinent preconditions and implications on conducting peace support operations in various risk conditions*. In reality, when features of different future scenarios and combinations of risk conditions appear intertwined, achieving explicit comprehension is blurred. In planning for and conducting peace support operations one must avoid such a blur. One should thrive to analyse existing overall scenario, comprehend significant risk conditions and related spoilers, and be aware of other risk conditions and spoilers. Furthermore, one must understand how these are interdependent, when selecting strategies to cope with them.

The identified preconditions are relevant, as they portray some thresholds that must be met to conduct a peace support operation. These lists of preconditions are not exhaustive, but valid and reliable. Once a peace support operation is underway, a dynamic process begins directly and indirectly affecting preconditions, as well as raising predictable and unpredictable implications. In this regard, the research highlights what at least should be anticipated. By identifying preconditions and implications that pertain to specific risk conditions, this research promotes understanding. The research highlights several unique findings related to preconditions and implications, which are elaborated below.

First, some risk conditions have a *logical* attribute to them, whilst others may *seem illogical*. Such an attribute affects identifying aims, interests and incentives of parties and spoilers. In a conflict that appears illogical, the identification of aims and incentives is even less straightforward than in a logical conflict. Regardless of this challenge, understanding the underlying logic<sup>300</sup> of a conflict is fundamental to understanding transition, which is described next.

Second, practitioners of crisis management must possess *cognizance of transition*. To provide examples, this means that one must understand features and differences between war and peace; threat and safety; conflict and stability; failed governance and good governance; ideological conflict and peaceful coexistence – and so forth. Furthermore, one must comprehend how spoilers may transform. For instance, what is the transition process of a total

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<sup>299</sup> I.e. proliferation of WMD/WME; transnational criminal movements; and technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements.

<sup>300</sup> E.g. aims; offensive and defensive incentives; security dilemma; opportunity and grievance factors; relationships between actors.

spoiler to a greedy or limited spoiler? Moreover, eventually how do spoilers transform to support a peace process? Understanding transition is imperative for managing the dynamic evolution of preconditions, which begins at the outset of a peace support operation.

Third, in crisis management operations *spoilers must be defined from a peace process's point of view*. Defining spoilers otherwise is consistent with neither theory nor prudent practice of peace support operations. *If spoilers are defined otherwise, it changes the nature of an operation towards war, where the logic is breaking the will of an enemy - and surrender. In peace support operations, the logic is different: actions towards spoilers are intended to cause transition towards consent - not defeat.* However, this research shows that spoiler theory is not applicable in all risk conditions where peace support operations are conducted. Within the realm of peace support operations, there are also other reasons for an operation's posture and actions – mainly this is the case in peacekeeping.

Fourth, it appears that *'sufficient' levels of hostility and violence is a prerequisite* for conducting peace enforcement operations. This raises a dilemma within multiple dimensions: moral, legal, legitimacy and military capability to name a few. For instance, intervention should be less demanding if levels of hostility are relatively low. If one postpones intervention until hostility is relatively high, peacebuilding becomes evermore challenging. In such cases, the peacebuilding space is diminished from all three directions. International capacity is relatively less, as matching available means to desired ends is strained. Local capacity is likely to be lower due to sustained violence, violence causes loss of life and damage to infrastructure. Hostility threatens a safe and secure environment. Such a *dilemma of intervention timing* was not explicitly explored in this research. Nevertheless, this dilemma remains an important area of research and related to contemporary practice.

Obviously, these findings may have ramifications on all levels of military activity including the strategic, operational and tactical levels. However, pertaining to military and political level interaction these findings raise specific considerations, which should be addressed.

The logic of a conflict challenges all involved at the outset of any planning. A correct appreciation of the logic is fundamental for choosing the correct posture for a peace support operation. Is the posture more towards peace enforcement or more towards peacekeeping? The logic of a conflict remains a factor during implementation of an operation. To achieve desired effects one has to understand what consequences inducing consent or relying on compliance

will have. The obvious guidance that this research advocates is that to support transition peace enforcement should counter offensive incentives. In parallel, peacekeeping should be utilised to avoid defensive incentives developing into security dilemmas. Alongside this, one must be mindful that bursts of tactical actions will to have effects throughout an operating environment – including its military-strategic and political-strategic levels. This also pertains to the idea of consent. One may argue that regardless of a peace support operation's posture, consent is always an integral feature of a sustainable end-state.

Cognizance of transition calls for an evaluation of several questions. What is the extent of effort towards a safe and secure environment, which increases the peacebuilding space by decreasing hostility? To what extent should military capabilities and expertise be utilised in security sector reform, which contributes to local capacity – and yet again increases peacebuilding space? What kind of capabilities should be developed for and deployed in peace support operations? This pertains to increasing international capacity dimension of the peacebuilding space. How these efforts are phased, sequenced and synchronized with other efforts a peace operation? Understanding how and why transition occurs within the peacebuilding space is fundamental. Without the described understanding - inducing consent is 'the luck of the draw', and relying on compliance is 'wishful thinking with eyes wide shut'.

In many of the risk conditions, the spoilers threaten transition. Thus the political level actors, that are custodians of a peace process, must distinguish the existing spoilers. Thereafter military and political actors must agree on a feasible spoiler management strategy. Once approach towards spoilers is agreed upon; then the military must generate the required capabilities, plan concept of operations and execute accordingly. In sum, all the above is very much the practice of strategy: matching ends to means.

To conclude, it is pertinent to reflect on the nine fundamental strategic questions. Peace support operations *are about* supporting achievement of sustainable peace. Appreciating that consent is variable, multilayered and malleable - operations should *affect* the operating environment and actors to increase consent. Understanding the logic of conflict is a prerequisite for an applicable *strategy* supporting transition towards peace. Peace support operations should *limit* their scope to focusing on achieving transition on consent – not on achieving victory over enemies. Spoiler behaviour will remain as the focal factor *thwarting* peace processes. In futures of limited supply and infinite demands, the dilemma of timing interventions will be crucial on decisions over *action against inaction*. Both participation and

non-participation will continue to have direct and indirect effects on *home fronts*. Practitioners of peace support operations are fortunate in at least one respect - it is possible to derive prudent and honest lessons from *history*. Continued involvement in peace support operations is a requisite that we do not *overlook* arising challenges.

## 5.2 Recommendations for Finnish Military Crisis Management

The deductions themselves serve also as general recommendations. However, pertaining to Finland's national decision making on military crisis management, this research brings to the fore three interrelated considerations: (1) participation in peace support operations; (2) type of participation; and (3) requisite capabilities in relation to intervention timing.

It is evident that decisions to participate in peace support operations with Finland's military capabilities are political decisions. However, in this decision making one has to consider what point of view is used when defining interests and commitment to participate. Some of the relevant and possible points of view are: (1) an international organization's; (2) Finland's commitments and aspirations in and toward international organisations; (3) Finland's overall foreign and security policy; (4) development of defence capability; (5) states in conflict area; and (6) population in conflict area. To comprehend the above, some possible contradictions should be highlighted. Firstly, from a development of defence capability viewpoint, it may be beneficial to participate in challenging peace enforcement operations, which are realistic settings for capability evaluation. However, from a conflict area states' viewpoint an early intervention, with peacekeeping oriented monitoring and evaluation, might be crucial in avoiding conflict in the first place - or relapse into conflict. Finland's commitments and aspirations in and towards international organisations may cause her to commit itself into peace support operations. As a result, limited resources are committed for a long time and not available in areas where other international organisations might need them. Besides these points of view, the actual *agreed peace process or the prospect of such a process* should be stressed when participation is considered. This is because to reach such a process, the logic of a conflict should be understood. From such a process stems the idea of transition as well as definition of possible spoilers. If this peace process point of view is neglected, one may end up participating in a strategic muddle.

With a link to the above consideration, another consideration in national decision-making is, *on which dimension of the peacebuilding triangle should we focus on with military*

*capabilities?* Do we attempt to build one sector of local capacity, by focusing on security sector reform? Alternatively, should we focus on international capacity development, by participating actively in doctrine and concept development as well as capability development and training? On the other hand, should we focus on decreasing the hostility dimension, by participating in operations attempting to provide a safe and secure environment? Positioning oneself amidst these considerations may appear as blur. *However, what is not a blur is that one should prepare to participate in both peacekeeping and peace enforcement measures, and not underestimate or exaggerate the benefits of them.* Furthermore, it is pertinent that responses to these questions originate from an honest selection on point of view: selection has impact on interests and commitment. Although military capabilities and expertise may contribute to all the dimensions of a peacebuilding triangle, the military has comparative advantage in decreasing hostility levels by focusing on providing a safe and secure environment. This is achieved by both peace enforcement and peacekeeping measures.

Within the Delphi-panel there is a stem of contradiction. One view is clear; there are no quick solutions to what was called ‘sub-conventional’ conflict (i.e. low intensity conflict). The other view called for further study on the feasibility of using force in a decisive, precise and one time only manner. Although it may seem to be in contradiction, this elaboration brings to the final point for national consideration. It is related to capabilities development. It may be argued, that some operations have provided meaningful support to wider peace support operations by operating decisively and with a ‘one time only’ approach<sup>301</sup>. Nevertheless, one must be mindful that no quick solutions are plausible for many of the risk conditions, and that time consuming challenges related to identifying spoilers and intervention timing exist. Therefore, *one should reconsider the feasibility of rapid deployment capability.* One may argue that in many cases, the sufficient situational awareness is available - it is the lack of will, not the speed of deployment, which is a primary precondition<sup>302</sup>. At least for the military mind, there is clear distinction between decisive, precise and one time only action as compared to rapid deployment capability.

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<sup>301</sup> E.g. operation Palliser.

<sup>302</sup> See Baylis et al. (2010), p. 316 and pertaining references for elaboration.



### 5.3 Evaluation of validity and reliability

Peacebuilding space and spoiler theory were selected as the theoretical approaches to support reliability. The theory of a peacebuilding space is widely cited and accepted, not least due to a robust research design by Doyle and Sambanis. Both peacebuilding space and their ecologies of conflict were integral in formulating research hypotheses. Stedman's theory on spoilers is also widely cited, but the theory has not been developed further. Spoiler theory was fundamental in defining hypotheses. Although theories were useful, it proved that it is not sufficient to evaluate only the spoiler typology of a risk condition. The level of hostility is an evident focal determinant. *One may argue that level of hostility defines the posture of a peace operation, whilst spoiler typology points to where coercive efforts should be directed.* Selection of theories pertaining specifically to military crisis management and peace operations was beneficial. Relying purely on a framework provided by any of the international relations theories may not have produced a similar amount of normative considerations. Based on the above, one may argue that this thesis research design is founded on accepted theories and consequently relevant hypotheses.

As this is a future oriented research, the Delphi-method was applicable in collecting expert views on decision to commit to peace support operations, plausible approaches within those operations, and factors that affect decisions and approaches. However, it is pertinent to note that panellists provide statements relying past and current experiences. It appears challenging to visualize *simultaneously* new trends and point out how they may affect peace support operations. The first round of Delphi-questions acquainted the panellists with the overall scenarios and pertaining risk conditions. The findings of the first round are reliable as five out of seven respondents provided answers – and the findings are not contradictory to prior understanding. All respondents had a possibility of providing comments or alterations during iteration of the findings and deductions. The second round of Delphi-questions was conducted as interviews with an aim of testing the hypotheses. This was successful as the all seven panellists provided a wealth of focused and pertinent observations. All seven responded on the undisputed three risk conditions, whilst five provided answers to eight risk conditions and four respondents on all risk conditions. All respondents provided responses also on a macrolevel, which pertain to all risk conditions. This was logical as the undisputed risk conditions provided the majority of the argumentation. The iterative rounds included in the Delphi-process increased reliability, especially for the first round of findings. Although prepared to address the most pertinent observations, the iteration of the second round of

findings could have produced more considerations. Nevertheless, the discussion pertaining to research findings and contemporary literature enhanced validity and reliability.

The citation analysis identifying relevant authors, subsequent literature study and establishing a comprehensive expert panel contributed to the validity and reliability of reference material. The Delphi-panel was sufficiently wide and diverse to produce plausible different points of view. Categorization of collected material followed the framework of research questions and hypothesis. Analysis of material was conducted by collating and comparing responses provided by members of the panel. Analysis aimed at identifying a collective view, unique findings, contradictions and weak arguments. Hypotheses and probability were evaluated based on support received from the panel. Literature references and the iterative rounds of questions to the Delphi-panel supported interpretation.

Using the NATO scenarios as a foundation for identifying scenarios and risk conditions was an important decision on research approach. To ensure validity of this decision other references were verified<sup>303</sup>, and it was ascertained that the NATO scenarios and risk conditions would be sufficient for this thesis. This was because no major contradiction in comparison to other future scenario related work was identified. Furthermore, as NATO is a security-orientated organisation, their approaches and findings were applicable for military crisis management research. It is likely that in the realm of peace support operations NATO does not miss relevant risk conditions. Notwithstanding these considerations, NATO's interest to advocate its *raison d'être* may emphasize the applicability of military capabilities over other means and ways.

Although not exhaustive, this thesis provides both valid and reliable preconditions and implications pertaining to future peace support operations. The overall findings provide support for contemporary trends on future concept, capabilities and policies development. The generic and specific findings support further training, education and capability development. One may argue that this research; which is based on accepted contemporary theory, hypotheses derived thereof and utilising an expert panel, contributes to the realm of peace support operations.

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<sup>303</sup> UN and affiliated research ventures, UK MOD publications and State of the Future documents.

## 5.4 Propositions for Future Research

Three areas of relevant future research may be highlighted. The first proposition relates to research conducted within the military itself. The military must sensitize itself at all levels from tactical to strategic, on how and why does transition occur in peace operations. Political science, development studies and so forth provide ample information on the matter. However, the military's research interest should be on; *how does the military contribute to a politically driven comprehensive peace process? How does the military support transition in various circumstances?* The research interest is pertinent, because eventually it reflects on planning, directing military efforts, targeting process, etc. Furthermore, it is especially relevant within Finland.

The second proposition pertains more to theory and practical application. Spoiler theory appears logical and it is cited widely quite some time after it emerged. However, it has not been further developed and expanded to reflect the evolving realm of crisis management. One may argue that a further developed spoiler theory could continue to provide relevant guidance for future crisis management. Continued research is suggested on *applicability and development of spoiler theory in contemporary conflicts*. Yet again findings should have ramifications on military efforts in peace support operations.

Implementing the third proposition appears most challenging. Notwithstanding this, it is the most pertinent of these three propositions. It relates to policies on peace operations (i.e. crisis management) in the international system and especially within international organisations. The research interest is derived from the 'timing dilemma' that this research yet again highlights<sup>304</sup>. The dilemma is that interventions, peace support operations, are likely to be authorized only when violence is high; but then peacebuilding space is limited in all of its three dimensions. The dilemma is further exacerbated by a factor that belligerents may not have reached a 'hurting stalemate' or decisive victory over one or the other. They may not have sufficient incentives for a peace process. Political science research in general, and strategic studies in particular, should attempt to support policy development and practice by providing guidance on: *when is the optimal time to intervene?*

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<sup>304</sup> Another scholar has pointed to the same dilemma that remains uncovered. Fortna, VP: *Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace*, International Organization, vol 57, issue 2, p. 366, Spring 2003. Furthermore, this thread of new research could build on the conclusions presented by Peceny, Mark and Pickering, Jeffrey in Mason, TD et al. (2006), pp. 144-145.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX 1**

Spectrum of Military Effort in Peace Operations and Conflict (1 page)

### **APPENDIX 2:**

Summary of key search results from Web of Science (ISI) (6 pages)

### **APPENDIX 3:**

First round of delphi-questions (11 pages)

### **APPENDIX 4:**

Responses and feedback on 1st round of delphi-questions (12 pages)

### **APPENDIX 5:**

Second round of delphi-questions for diploma thesis (18 pages)


### **APPENDIX 6:**

Responses to 2<sup>nd</sup> round of delphi-questions (44 pages)

### **APPENDIX 7:**

Iterative round of delphi-questions for diploma thesis (7 pages)

### Spectrum of Military Effort in Peace Operations and Conflict



Picture 1: Spectrum of military effort in peace operations.<sup>305</sup>

Theory/Era	Model			War
Traditional Peacekeeping (Cold War)	Peaceful Diplomacy		UNC Chapter VI Peacekeeping	UNC Chapter VII Action
Wider Peacekeeping (post Cold War)	Peaceful Diplomacy	UNC Chapter VI Peace-keeping	UNC Chapter VII's 'grey area' Peace Enforcement	UNC Chapter VII Action
Peace Support Operations (Post Balkans)	Peaceful Diplomacy	UNC Chapter VI Peacekeeping Peacemaking	Peace Enforcement	UNC Chapter VII Action
	Peace Building			
	Conflict Prevention			
	Humanitarian Operations			

Picture 2: The evolving spectrum of tension and peace support operations.<sup>306</sup>

<sup>305</sup> Van Dulleman, Willem: *UN – Key Factor in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, presentation at Finnish Defence Force International Centre seminar, 24.10.2008. At the time colonel van Dulleman was Chief Current Military Operations Service, Office of Military Affairs, DPKO. Header rephrased by author.

<sup>306</sup> *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, UKMOD (2004), p. 29 (2-6).

Summary of key search results from Web of Science (ISI) – keyword: *peacekeeping*.

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total 1995- 2011	% of all citations 1995-2011	Average Citations per Year	evaluation
		48	85	101	155	0	752		47,00	
1.	Author(s): Doyle, MW; Sambanis, N Title: International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis Source: AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 94 (4): 779-801 DEC 2000 ISSN: 0003-0554	14	18	16	20	0	133	17,69 %	13,30	relevant
2.	Author(s): Fortna, VP Title: Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war Source: INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, 48 (2): 269-292 JUN 2004 ISSN: 0020-8833	2	9	12	9	0	39	5,19 %	5,57	relevant
3.	Author(s): Burk, J Title: Public support for peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the casualties hypothesis Source: POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 114 (1): 53-78 SPR 1999 ISSN: 0032-3195	4	2	4	3	0	32		2,67	
4.	Author(s): Fortna, VP Title: Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace Source: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 57 (2): 337-+ SPR 2003 ISSN: 0020-8183	2	4	4	7	0	25	3,32 %	3,12	relevant
5.	Author(s): Voeten, E Title: The political origins of the UN security council's ability to legitimize the use of force Source: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 59 (3): 527-557 SUM 2005 ISSN: 0020-8183	3	4	6	6	0	21		3,50	not directly relevant: covers UNSC
6.	Author(s): Singer, PW Title: AIDS and international security Source: SURVIVAL, 44 (1): 145-+ SPR 2002 ISSN: 0039-6338	1	3	1	6	0	18		2,00	
7.	Author(s): Khanna, J; Sandler, T; Shimizu, H Title: Sharing the financial burden for UN and NATO peacekeeping, 1976-1996 Source: JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 42 (2): 176-195 APR 1998 ISSN: 0022-0027	1	0	0	2	0	16		1,23	
8.	Author(s): Bobrow, DB; Boyer, MA Title: Maintaining system stability - Contributions to peacekeeping operations Source: JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 41 (6): 723-748 DEC 1997 ISSN: 0022-0027	0	0	1	2	0	16		1,14	
9.	Author(s): Segal, DR; Tiggel, RB Title: Attitudes of citizen-soldiers toward military missions in the post-Cold War world Source: ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, 23 (3): 373-& SPR 1997 ISSN: 0095-327X	0	1	0	0	0	14		1,00	
10.	Author(s): Battistelli, F Title: Peacekeeping and the postmodern soldier Source: ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, 23 (3): 467-& SPR 1997 ISSN: 0095-327X	0	0	1	5	0	14		1,00	



Summary of key search results from Web of Science (ISI) – keyword: *peace enforcement*.

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total 1995-2011	% of all citations 1995-2011	Average Citations per Year	evaluation
		26	40	40	52	2	293		17,24	
1.	Author(s): Doyle, MW; Sambanis, N Title: International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis Source: AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 94 (4): 779-801 DEC 2000 ISSN: 0003-0554	14	18	16	20	0	133	45,39 %	12,09	relevant
2.	Author(s): Werner, S Title: The precarious nature of peace: Resolving the issues, enforcing the settlement, and renegotiating the terms Source: AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 43 (3): 912-934 JUL 1999 ISSN: 0092-5853	2	6	4	10	0	51	17,41 %	3,92	relevant
3.	Author(s): Werner, S; Yuen, A Title: Making and keeping peace Source: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 59 (2): 261-292 SPR 2005 ISSN: 0020-8183	1	7	6	5	1	22	7,51 %	3,14	relevant
4.	Author(s): Jakobsen, PV Title: National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the cold war? Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 33 (2): 205-215 MAY 1996 ISSN: 0022-3433	2	2	1	2	0	15	5,12 %	0,94	relevant
5.	Author(s): Chopra, J Title: The space of peace-maintenance Source: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, 15 (3-4): 335-357 MAR-APR 1996 ISSN: 0962-6298	0	0	1	0	0	11	3,75 %	0,69	relevant
6.	Author(s): Dandeker, C; Gow, J Title: The future of peace support operations: Strategic peacekeeping and success Source: ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, 23 (3): 327-& SPR 1997 ISSN: 0095-327X	2	1	0	0	0	9	3,07 %	0,60	relevant
7.	Author(s): Timmermans, A Title: Standing apart and sitting together: Enforcing coalition agreements in multiparty systems Source: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, 45 (2): 263-283 MAR 2006 ISSN: 0304-4130	0	1	2	5	0	8		1,33	
8.	Author(s): Bell, C; Keenan, J Title: Human rights nongovernmental organizations and the problems of transition Source: HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 26 (2): 330-374 MAY 2004 ISSN: 0275-0392	3	0	0	2	0	8		1,00	
9.	Author(s): Bearce, DH; Omori, S Title: How do commercial institutions promote peace? Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 42 (6): 659-678 NOV 2005 ISSN: 0022-3433	1	2	1	1	1	7		1,00	
10.	Author(s): Gross, ML Title: Fighting by other means in the mideast: A critical analysis of Israeli's assassination policy Source: POLITICAL STUDIES, 51 (2): 350-368 JUN 2003 ISSN: 0032-3217	1	1	0	0	0	6		0,67	

Summary of key search results from Web of Science (ISI) – keyword: *peace operations*.

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total 1995-2011	% of all citations 1995-2011	Average Citations per Year	evaluation
		36	59	68	106	0	496		34,62	
1.	Author(s): Doyle, MW; Sambanis, N Title: International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis Source: AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 94 (4): 779-801 DEC 2000 ISSN: 0003-0554	14	18	16	20	0	133	26,81 %	4,69	relevant
2.	AU: Luttwak, EN TI: Give war a chance SO: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 78 (4), 36-44, JUL-AUG 1999	3	8	3	6	0	41	8,27 %	3,50	relevant
3.	A: le Billon P TI: Angola's political economy on war: The role of oil and diamonds, 1975-2000 SO: AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 100 (398), 55-80 JAN 2001	1	7	3	4	0	35		2,33	
4.	Author(s): NEACK, L Title: UN PEACE-KEEPING - IN THE INTEREST OF COMMUNITY OR SELF Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 32 (2): 181-196 MAY 1995 ISSN: 0022-3433	0	1	2	5	0	18	3,63 %	1,31	relevant
5.	AU: Greenwood, C TI: International law and the 'war against terrorism' SO: INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 78 (2): 301- APR 2002	1	0	0	0	0	16		2,83	
6.	AU: Bobrow, DB TI: Maintaining system stability - Contributions to peacekeeping operations SO: JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 41 (6): 723-748 DEC 1997	0	0	1	2	0	16		2,83	
7.	AU: Dahlman, C; Tuathail, GO TI: The legacy of ethnic cleansing SO: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, 24 (5): 569-599 JUN 2005	2	2	4	4	0	15		1,89	
8.	AU: VanBelle, DA TI: Press freedom and the democratic peace SO: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 34 (4): 405-414 NOV 1997	2	0	3	2	0	15		1,36	
9.	Author(s): Jakobsen, PV Title: National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the cold war? Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 33 (2): 205-215 MAY 1996 ISSN: 0022-3433	2	2	1	2	0	15	2,71 %	1,15	relevant
10.	AU: de Mesquita, EB; Dickson, ES TI: The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, counterterrorism and mobilization SO: AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 51 (2): 364-381 APR 2007	0	0	4	9	0	13		1,00	

Summary of key search results from Web of Science (ISI) – keyword: *peace support operations*.

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total 1995-2011	% of all citations 1995-2011	Average Citations per Year	evaluation
		12	15	23	41	1	160		9,41	
1.	Author(s): NEACK, L Title: UN PEACE-KEEPING - IN THE INTEREST OF COMMUNITY OR SELF Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 32 (2): 181-196 MAY 1995 ISSN: 0022-3433	0	1	2	5	0	18	11,25 %	1,06	relevant
2.	Author(s): Bobrow, DB; Boyer, MA Title: Maintaining system stability - Contributions to peacekeeping operations Source: JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 41 (6): 723-748 DEC 1997 ISSN: 0022-0027	0	0	1	2	0	16		1,07	
3.	Author(s): Dahlman, C; Tuathail, GO Title: The legacy of ethnic cleansing: The international community and the returns process in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina Source: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, 24 (5): 569-599 JUN 2005 ISSN: 0962-6298	2	2	4	4	0	15		2,14	relevant
4.	Author(s): Jakobsen, PV Title: National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the cold war? Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 33 (2): 205-215 MAY 1996 ISSN: 0022-3433	2	2	1	2	0	15	9,38 %	0,94	relevant
5.	Author(s): de Mesquita, EB; Dickson, ES Title: The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, counterterrorism, and mobilization Source: AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 51 (2): 364-381 APR 2007 ISSN: 0092-5853	0	0	4	9	0	13		2,60	
6.	Author(s): Chopra, J Title: The space of peace-maintenance Source: POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, 15 (3-4): 335-357 MAR-APR 1996 ISSN: 0962-6298	0	0	1	0	0	11	6,88 %	0,69	relevant
7.	Author(s): Dandeker, C; Gow, J Title: The future of peace support operations: Strategic peacekeeping and success Source: ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, 23 (3): 327-& SPR 1997 ISSN: 0095-327X	2	1	0	0	0	9	5,63 %	0,60	relevant
8.	Author(s): Bellamy, AJ; Williams, PD Title: Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace operations Source: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 29 (4): 157-195 SPR 2005 ISSN: 0162-2889	1	2	2	3	0	8	5,00 %	1,14	relevant
9.	Author(s): Sion, L Title: "Too sweet and innocent for war"? - Dutch peacekeepers and the use of violence Source: ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, 32 (3): 454-474 APR 2006 ISSN: 0095-327X	2	1	0	4	0	7		1,17	
10.	Author(s): Higate, P; Henry, M Title: Engendering (in)security in peace support operations Source: SECURITY DIALOGUE, 35 (4): 481-498 DEC 2004 ISSN: 0967-0106	2	1	0	4	0	7		1,00	

Summary of key search results from Web of Science (ISI) – keyword: *humanitarian intervention*.

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total 1995-2011	% of all citations 1995-2011	Average Citations per Year	evaluation
		47	71	80	98	0	554		34.62	
1.	Author(s): Jentleson, BW; Britton, RL Title: Still pretty prudent - Post-cold war American public opinion on the use of military force Source: JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 42 (4): 395-417 AUG 1998 ISSN: 0022-0027	8	7	7	10	0	61	11,01 %	4,69	
2.	Author(s): Alden, C Title: China in Africa Source: SURVIVAL, 47 (3): 147-+ FAL 2005 ISSN: 0039-6338	3	6	7	2	0	21		3,50	
3.	Author(s): Thomas, N; Tow, WT Title: The utility of human security: Sovereignty and humanitarian intervention Source: SECURITY DIALOGUE, 33 (2): 177-192 JUN 2002 ISSN: 0967-0106	1	3	3	2	0	21	3,79 %	2,33	relevant
4.	Author(s): LIVINGSTON, S; EACHUS, T Title: HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND US FOREIGN-POLICY - SOMALIA AND THE CNN EFFECT RECONSIDERED Source: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, 12 (4): 413-429 OCT-DEC 1995 ISSN: 1058-4609	0	0	3	2	0	21		1,31	
5.	Author(s): Williams, PD; Bellamy, AJ Title: The responsibility to protect and the crisis in Darfur Source: SECURITY DIALOGUE, 36 (1): 27-47 MAR 2005 ISSN: 0967-0106	4	6	4	3	0	17	3,07 %	2,83	relevant
6.	Author(s): Gilboa, E Title: The CNN effect: The search for a communication theory of international relations Source: POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, 22 (1): 27-44 JAN-MAR 2005 ISSN: 1058-4609	4	2	4	6	0	17		2,83	
7.	Author(s): Evans, G; Sahnoun, M Title: The responsibility to protect Source: FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 81 (6): 99-+ NOV-DEC 2002 ISSN: 0015-7120	1	2	2	2	0	17	3,07 %	1,89	relevant
8.	Author(s): Robinson, P Title: The policy-media interaction model: Measuring media power during humanitarian crisis Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 37 (5): 613-633 SEP 2000 ISSN: 0022-3433	1	3	2	1	0	15		1,36	
9.	Author(s): Regan, PM Title: Choosing to intervene: Outside interventions in internal conflicts Source: JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 60 (3): 754-779 AUG 1998 ISSN: 0022-3816	0	1	2	4	0	15	2,71 %	1,15	relevant
10.	Author(s): Jakobsen, PV Title: National interest, humanitarianism or CNN: What triggers UN peace enforcement after the cold war? Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 33 (2): 205-215 MAY 1996 ISSN: 0022-3433	2	2	1	2	0	15	2,71 %	1,00	relevant

Summary of key search results from Web of Science (ISI) – keyword: *military intervention*.

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total 1995-2011	% of all citations 1995-2011	Average Citations per Year	evaluation
		93	155	185	257	10	1209		71,12	
1.	Author(s): Collier, P; Hoeffler, A; Soderbom, M Title: On the duration of civil war Source: JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, 41 (3): 253-273 MAY 2004 ISSN: 0022-3433	10	12	14	13	0	69	5,71 %	8,62	relevant
2.	Author(s): Jentleson, BW; Britton, RL Title: Still pretty prudent - Post-cold war American public opinion on the use of military force Source: JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 42 (4): 395-417 AUG 1998 ISSN: 0022-0027	8	7	7	10	0	61		4,36	
3.	Author(s): Regan, PM Title: Conditions of successful third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts Source: JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 40 (2): 336-359 JUN 1996 ISSN: 0022-0027	1	3	6	4	0	43	3,56 %	2,69	relevant, outdated
4.	Author(s): Maoz, Z Title: Realist and cultural critiques of the democratic peace: A theoretical and empirical re-assessment Source: INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS, 24 (1): 3-89 1998 ISSN: 0305-0629	1	2	2	2	0	35		2,50	
5.	Author(s): Leeds, BA Title: Do alliances deter aggression? The influence of military alliances on the initiation of militarized interstate disputes Source: AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 47 (3): 427-439 JUL 2003 ISSN: 0092-5853	5	5	3	4	0	32		3,56	
6.	Author(s): Hermann, MG; Kegley, CW Title: Ballots, a barrier against the use of bullets and bombs - Democratization and military intervention Source: JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 40 (3): 436-459 SEP 1996 ISSN: 0022-0027	4	2	1	1	1	32	2,65 %	2,00	relevant
7.	Author(s): Herrmann, RK; Tetlock, PE; Visser, PS Title: Mass public decisions to go to war: A cognitive-interactionist framework Source: AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 93 (3): 553-573 SEP 1999 ISSN: 0003-0554	7	5	3	4	0	29		2,23	
8.	Author(s): Hibbs, DA Title: Bread and peace voting in US presidential elections Source: PUBLIC CHOICE, 104 (1-2): 149-180 2000 ISSN: 0048-5829	1	6	6	4	0	26		2,17	
9.	Author(s): Berinsky, AJ Assuming the costs of war: Events, elites, and american public support for military conflict Source: JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 69 (4): 975-997 NOV 2007 ISSN: 0022-3816	0	2	10	12	0	24		4,80	
10.	Author(s): Morrow, JD Title: Alliances: Why write them down? Source: ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 3: 63-83 2000 ISSN: 1094-2939	0	2	3	7	0	23		2,09	

## **First round of Delphi-questions**

### **INTRODUCTION AND INSTRUCTIONS**

This 1st round of delphi-questions will **focus on the operating environment of a future military crisis management operation**. In order to do so, the questionnaire is structured as follows:

- 1<sup>st</sup> section covers the relevant drivers that may have an impact on the futures
- 2<sup>nd</sup> section covers the possible futures which are founded on the drivers
- 3<sup>rd</sup> section covers the future conflicts that may arise within each future
- 4<sup>th</sup> section covers the potential sources of conflict
- 5<sup>th</sup> section the risk conditions that may merit for a military crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation; peacekeeping or peace enforcement)

The first four sections “set the scene” for all and serve as a background for the 5<sup>th</sup> section. The **5<sup>th</sup> section includes essential research hypothesis** that are tested with this Delphi-panel. Thus, **the 5<sup>th</sup> section is the most important** part of the questionnaire.

There are 10 questions and 5-6 pages of reference text supporting the questions. I would estimate that responding to this questionnaire requires about 1½ hours. Please respond directly on this MS word document; save the document named with your surname and email it to [mikko.laakkonen@mil.fi](mailto:mikko.laakkonen@mil.fi) by 21<sup>st</sup> of December 2010. My next thesis work session is after this date, and the availability of your responses is vital for proceeding.

### **FOLLOW UP AND NEXT STEPS**

After receiving your responses, I will collate them and revert to you in case there is a need for clarifications. The panel will have the possibility of debating anonymously on your answers before the 2<sup>nd</sup> round of Delphi-questions. During spring 2011, the 2<sup>nd</sup> round will focus on the conceptual issue of consent and compliance in crisis management operations.

Kind regards, Mikko Laakkonen

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## **SECTION 1 – DRIVERS**

### **(READ) Key reference supporting the questions**

Alongside strategic trends one must identify *drivers* that may have an impact on possible futures. Friction, integration and asymmetry are ***structural drivers***, which have been influential throughout history, and are assessed to remain so for centuries. *Friction* over the distribution of power is the degree of ease with which decisions are made at the international level, functions in essence as a relative power meter, ranging from cooperation to confrontation. Economic *integration* including globalisation is the degree to which national and regional economies trade, and their level of functional integration. States will continue to rely on globalisation for their prosperity. As globalisation requires cooperation, it will have a stabilising effect. However it also creates tensions and, in some cases, may be a driver of instability and conflict. *Asymmetry* of states and political entities is the relative discrepancy between states in terms of wealth and power, and influences international relations in terms of both development and security. Examining the interrelation of the structural drivers highlights ***six deterministic drivers***. They are: (1) *changing state capacity*, (2) *resources and their allocation*, (3) *climate change*, (4) *use of technology*, (5) *demographics*, and (6) *competing ideologies*. It is assessed that these *deterministic drivers* will have the greatest impact on security in the coming decades.<sup>307</sup> *These drivers provide the foundation for the possible futures, thus it is pertinent to define them in more detail.*

*Changing state capacity* reflects the distribution and management of power at the state level. States that cannot adapt to the changing global context will risk collapse, and many such failures will be accompanied by substantial outbreaks of violence. The poor governance, economic deprivation and inequality that characterises failed and failing states is likely to spread to neighbouring states. *Resources and their allocation* encompass availability, affordability, access and competition for essential resources, including energy, water, food and other essential commodities. During the future decade it is expected that there is a considerable increase in demand for energy. Many countries will remain critically dependent upon energy imports and securing them will be vital. Any long-term significant change in the ‘average weather’, *climate change*, may have an impact on international relations and create instability, especially in those states that are already vulnerable to other pressures. *Use of technology* denotes the evolution and availability of technology up to 2030. The physical and virtual networks that support globalisation will have to be protected.

*Demographics* reflect domestic population trends related to birth, death, age, income, ethnicity, and the other characteristics of a state's population. It includes migration, urbanisation, and other external factors. The world's population is rising and this will lead to increased demands for resources. Some states will regard the security of their food and water supplies as issues of national survival and will act accordingly. Within EU countries, a changing demographic balance towards a more multi-ethnic society means that some conflicts may create risks, including extremism, within EU communities. *Competing ideologies* and worldviews deal with alienation and confrontation based on different values, religions, identities and historic geopolitical perspectives. Ideologies and world views will remain significant factors and people will continue to fight for their beliefs. Neither ideologies nor world views will be geographically bounded.<sup>308</sup> The trends and drivers described above are the building blocks for the futures that follow. Plausible futures stem from the interaction and interdependency of these drivers.

### (RESPOND) Questions

1. *Do you agree that these are the relevant drivers affecting the future decade?*

..... *(Your text begins here, do not worry about page numbering or text fonts)*

2. *Do you have any objections or additions on the structural drivers?*

.....

3. *Which deterministic driver is a so called 'primus in pares' the most important one?*

- *Attempt to base your assessment on the driver's combined likelihood and impact as well as its interdependency on the other drivers.*

.....

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<sup>307</sup> NATO Multiple Futures Project (2009), pp. 13-16 and UK MoD Future Character of Conflict, pp. 4-5.

<sup>308</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 15-16. and Future Character of Conflict, pp. 2-14.



## SECTION 2 - FUTURES

### (READ) Key reference supporting the questions

The relevant drivers in **Future One “Dark Side of Exclusivity”** are climate change, resource allocation, economic integration, and competing ideologies and worldviews. The Dark Side of Exclusivity describes how globalisation, climate change, and the misallocation of resources significantly *affect the capacity of states to maintain sovereignty*. Weak and failed states generate instability in areas of interest, and present the states of the developed world with strategic choices regarding how to react. This future *concentrates on the friction between the developed or “market” states and the developing states*. The future is complicated by nationalism, the misallocation of resources, poverty, frustration, demographic pressure, and deteriorating environmental conditions.<sup>309</sup>

The relevant drivers for **Future Two “Deceptive Stability”** are asymmetry, demographics, resource allocation, and competing ideologies and worldviews. Deceptive Stability highlights the requirement to manage the demographic shift resulting from aging populations and young migrants. Additionally, resource allocation is both effective and efficient as the resource-rich parts of the world become part of the dominant system. However, a wide range of problems still persist in the less developed regions of the world that are resource-poor. This dichotomy is further exacerbated by the *lack of intervention by liberal democracies* absorbed with domestic priorities. Ensuing tensions and poor economic and cultural integration worsen pre-existing domestic and transnational security issues such as crime and terrorism. The overarching theme of this future is *preoccupation with domestic concerns in the developed states, which leaves them less able to react to instability and geopolitical risk*.<sup>310</sup>

The relevant drivers in **Future Three “Clash of Modernities”** are competing ideologies and worldviews, demographics, and the use of technology. Clash of Modernities sketches a world where *a strong belief in rationalism coupled with technological innovation has enabled advanced-network societies to connect virtually across the globe*. Continued globalisation and technological advances have helped drive urban centres in the developed world to become mega-hubs of wealth and culture. The governance of this developed sector is diffuse, multi-layered, and network-centric where

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<sup>309</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 19-20.

<sup>310</sup> Multiple Futures Project, p. 20.

problems are solved, and created, by virtual networks in real time. The *disconnected, segregated, and disassociated frontier areas suffer the greatest tension*. Further destabilising these regions are organised criminal elements that engage in human and black-market trafficking, intellectual and technological piracy, and illegal arms trading. Authorities within developed states are focussed primarily on keeping these disruptive forces at bay by managing flows of trade, information, resources, and the recruitment of workers that traverse the borders between the *urban cores and outlying areas*.<sup>311</sup>

The relevant drivers of **Future Four “New Power Politics”** are friction in international decision-making; competing ideologies and worldviews; conflict over resource allocation; and a lack of economic integration. New Power Politics describes a *growing absolute wealth, accompanied by the widespread proliferation of WMD/E*. This future is characterized by power politics, but in a truly multi-polar world that is dominated by *competing regional powers*. These powers have established a fragile balance in which globalisation and international rules and norms are challenged by competition for resources and influence. These states may not have a global reach, but regionally they play a significant role in shaping world politics by promoting their strategic interests and competitive advantage. *Competition and demand for resources, particularly in ungoverned spaces, continues unabated* as the most powerful states continuously strive to improve their economies and protect their populations.<sup>312</sup>

#### (RESPOND) Questions

4. *In your view, are all the described futures plausible?*

- *Are they coherent with the structural and deterministic drivers presented?*

.....

5. *In your view, which of the futures is the least likely?*

.....

6. *In your view, which of the futures is the most likely?*

.....

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<sup>311</sup> Multiple Futures Project, p. 21.

<sup>312</sup> Multiple Futures Project, p. 22.

### **SECTION 3 – FUTURE CONFLICTS**

#### **(READ) Key reference supporting the questions**

In the “**Dark Side of Exclusivity**” future the prospect of failed governance and challenges to state authority are key risks. Previously stable governments may be destabilised, and an increase of potentially hostile states is possible. Proliferation of WMD continues. This development undermines national and international law. The friction between developed and developing states is likely to cause uncontrolled migration, illegal immigration and human exploitation. Violations of territorial integrity are possible as well as population unrest. Overall these developments may lead to vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and thus affect free flow of resources. The spread of radical ideologies alongside the prospect of ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts and spill-over are likely.<sup>313</sup> *Failed states, uncontrolled migration, ideological conflict, endangered rule of law and threats to resource allocation portray the conflicts of this future.*

Whilst uncontrolled migration and ethnic, religious or ideological conflicts remain risks; an additional important risk in future two “**Deceptive Stability**” is transnational organized crime. Alongside crime a key risk in this future is related to the demographic shifts.<sup>314</sup> *Uncontrolled migration, ideological conflicts and organised crime are the likely portrait of conflict in this future.*

The conflicts of future three “**Clash of Modernities**” might have a slightly different emphasis. In this future extremism of marginalised groups, conflicts between incompatible belief systems and ideological conflicts are highlighted. Criminal or rogue elements may exploit technology and thus disrupt vital interdependent computer networks<sup>315</sup>. *This future’s conflict landscape includes extremism, ideological conflict and technological network crime.* Competition for ideological supremacy and resources that may lead or include interstate rivalry are the dominant features of conflict in the fourth future “**New Power Politics**”<sup>316</sup>.

#### **(RESPOND) Questions**

7. *In your view, are these conflicts logical deductions from the futures described?*

- *NB.: These risk conditions will be further debated in section 5*

<sup>313</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17.

<sup>314</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17.

<sup>315</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17.

<sup>316</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 17-22, 28-32; NATO 2020, pp. 13-17.

.....

**SECTION 4 – FUTURE CONFLICT SOURCES****(READ) Key reference supporting the questions**

There are some potential sources of threat: individuals, criminal organisations, non-state actors, specific states and nature. *Super-empowered individuals* who have overcome constraints and rules may wield unique political, economic, intellectual, or cultural influence over people and events. Another threat is *organised crime* with the aim of committing serious crimes or offenses in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. Non-sovereign entities (*non-state actors*) expressing extremist values and ideas may exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national, and in some cases international, level. *Rogue states* may act without respect for other states or global norms. *Confrontational powers* resort to force or threaten the use of force disproportionately to what is at stake. Last but not least, *nature* may also pose a threat. The physical world exists and changes on its own accord.<sup>317</sup>

**(RESPOND) Questions**

8. *Do you concur with these sources, and do you have any additional sources one may think of?*

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<sup>317</sup> Multiple Futures Project, pp. 28-29.

## **SECTION 5 – FUTURE CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS**

### **(READ) Key reference supporting the questions**

In the table below (next page) there is a listing of risk conditions that are related to each of the futures. Risk conditions refer to vulnerabilities and characteristics that endanger people, territorial integrity, and - or values and ideas. I have evaluated these risk conditions, and formulated a research hypothesis of the conditions that could merit for a peace support operation. Such an operation would be an international military intervention (either peacekeeping or peace enforcement) conducted under the auspices of a legitimate international organization and abiding to international law. Three risk conditions were particularly challenging to evaluate. Thus I wish that you would pay special attention to: 1) transnational crime, 2) uncontrolled migration and 3) ungoverned spaces.

### **(RESPOND) Questions**

*9. Do you have any additions to the listing of risk conditions?*

.....

*10. (IMPORTANT) Do you agree that the risk conditions listed would merit for a military crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation including peacekeeping or peace enforcement)?*

- *Any comments or supporting argumentation should be added after the table (question 11).*

.....

<b><u>Risk conditions related to future:</u></b>	<b>Research hypothesis:</b> <i>risk condition is a likely trigger for a peace support operation</i>	<b>Agree (YES)</b>	<b>Do not agree (NO)</b>
<b>“Dark Side of Exclusivity”</b>			
1. Failed Governance	PSO		
2. Proliferation of Radical Ideologies			
3. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	PSO		
4. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces	PSO		
5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	PSO not likely. Mediation and diplomacy		
6. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes	PSO not likely. Mediation and diplomacy		
7. Proliferation of WMD/WME	PSO not likely. Mediation and diplomacy		
8. Spread of radical ideologies			
9. Challenges to state authority			
10. Uncontrolled migration	PSO		
11. Shifts in population mix			
<b>“Deceptive Stability”</b>			
12. Inability to anticipate, sense, and shape external security environment			
13. Transnational criminal movements	PSO, policing, military support to state security authorities.		
14. Strategic inattention (by nation-states and international organizations)			

15. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict	PSO		
16. Systemic inability to respond quickly to external effects			
17. Uncontrolled migration	PSO		
<b>“Clash of Modernities”</b>			
18. Complex interdependent computer networks	PSO not likely. Network policing likely.		
19. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties			
20. High dependency on constant flow of vital resources			
21. Extremism of marginalised groups	PSO		
22. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	PSO, mediation, diplomacy		
23. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements	PSO not likely. Network policing likely.		
24. Vulnerability of complex interdependent systems and infrastructures			
25. Conflict between incompatible belief systems			
26. Shifting loyalties (state vs. non-state actors)			
27. Alliances of authoritarian states			
28. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict	PSO		
<b>“New Power Politics”</b>			
29. Shifting spheres of influence			
30. Competition for ideological supremacy			

31. Competition for resources			
32. Proliferation of nuclear and other WME capabilities			
33. Ungoverned spaces			
34. Interstate rivalry	PSO		
35. Inability of the international system to handle large power fluctuations			
36. Shifting state alliances			

**(RESPOND) Comments**

***11. (IMPORTANT) Your comments and argumentation on the above table of risk conditions and research hypothesis:***

.....

***12. (OPTIONAL) Comments, reflections, argumentation on the questionnaire<sup>318</sup>:***

.....

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<sup>318</sup> ***Thank You for your efforts!***



## **Responses and feedback on 1st round of delphi-questions**

The Delphi-questionnaire was sent to seven (7) respondents in November 2010. By May 2011 five (5) respondents had replied<sup>319</sup>. The responses are collated below, and researcher's comments added. In order to enhance visualisation the following colours are used:

- **Original questions** are in black font
- **Respondents' responses** in blue font
- **Researchers comments** in red font

### **SECTION 1 – DRIVERS**

***11. Do you agree that these are the relevant drivers affecting the future decade?***

#### ***Respondent 1:***

*Yes, principally so. Although these drivers are identified from an etatist approach rather than from a comprehensive one*

⇒ ***Researcher's comment (1): One may argue that the structural drivers apply regardless of which entities are being analysed: states, societies, organisations or inter-personal relations. The comprehensive viewpoint is constituted by the deterministic drivers, which cover all the dimensions of a PESTE-analysis. PESTE-analysis includes political (P), economical (E), society (S), technological (T) and ecological (E) dimensions.***

#### ***Respondent 2:***

- *I am unsure why you address the first driver as “changing state capacity” vice simply “State Capacity”. With the available ‘state’ capacity or what a State goes on to create to address issues (here it depends on how you use this word vice ‘capability’ that would fit more with the way NATO uses it), each State would need to be flexible to adapt, as you correctly mention, to the situation with which it is confronted and also to look beyond the*

*current timeframe. As we are all aware the US activated the Dept of Homeland Security soon after the 9/11 attacks and the Bush doctrine of preventive measures against potential threats was firmly instituted (vice pre-emptive measures against imminent threats, as is generally accepted by most all States). However, the US had both capacity and capability to do that; how many other States would be able to flex muscles in similar ways or ‘adapt’. Of note, all well managed States would do so within means, but that is my assumption.*

- *Resources. Indeed, and in many ways here’s where the world bodies such as the UN also come into play. I.e. with all the good work that the Agencies/funds/programmes could do to maintain a semblance of balance in an imperfect world.*
- *Climate Change. Agree but here too it would be for the world at large (international bodies) to ensure that the have-nots or those states that are subjected to natural disasters, the burdens of climate change etc. do not suffer unduly but also to ensure that the super powers or more endowed States come to realise that their ways should not subject others to the burdens of pollution, global warming etc.*
- *Use of technology. Why not a more general term such as innovation. In sum, more than simply technology and the almost automatic association to ‘networks’.*
- *Demographics.*
- *Competing ideologies. Debatable whether they indeed compete. It is more I think a case of different ideologies that would have to be countered with respect for diversity.*

⇒ ***Researcher’s comment (2):** As it is implied that something needs to be countered, then the phenomenas actually do compete – here one should not confuse original phenomenon with desired action.*

⇒ ***Researcher’s comment (3):** Agree that most important to distinguish difference between preventive and pre-emptive. Relate to potential threats and imminent threats accordingly. Michael Doyle covers this matter in his book “Strike First” and presents the yardstick of legality, legitimacy, likelihood and lethality when a nation considers preventive and pre-emptive measures. Secondly, this differentiation has relevance in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Delphi-round, where peace enforcement is differentiated in three categories.*

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<sup>319</sup> In addition to these five, one of the respondents (no. 3) concurs with the findings of the 1<sup>st</sup> round, although this respondent did not respond to the initial questionnaire.

**Respondent 7:**

*Climate change is certainly a credible driver for conflict and insecurity, but it is also trendy. That does not discredit it but, as an example, conflicts over water supplies (resource allocation affected by climate change) have long been offered as a likely driver for conflict, but no water access driven wars are on recent record. I'm sure all the listed drivers are relevant. Some nevertheless tend to receive attention due to novelty as much as threat. Cyber-issues are a case in point. They are very important, but more instruments than drivers.*

**12. Do you have any objections or additions on the structural drivers?****Respondent 1:**

*Friction and integration are real structural drivers. Asymmetry is not a driver but a consequence of the simultaneous effects of the two previous one.*

⇒ **Researcher's comment (4):** *Initially I thought the same, but referring to discussions on the GSO-course related to Finnish Defence Force Development exercise – I came to realise that these three are independent and well identified drivers. To make the case – if asymmetry exists in a system then integration should decrease it. Asymmetry alone does not lead to friction – or vice versa.*

**Respondent 2:**

*No. However, you might wish to consider the role of the bigger and more powerful States; I believe, there is a case to make for, as an example, the role of the USA, and then too the UN and perhaps the European block. In sum, Superpowers and World Governing Bodies (AU, UN, EU, NATO {on its last legs?}, ASEAN, etc.) more than just States.*

⇒ **Researcher's comment (5):** *A point with merit that structural drives should include major states and IOs. Their actions do shape the international system. Though the point is valid - for the benefit of this research, which does not aim to elaborate further on possible futures, this critique on drivers is noted and that itself remains sufficient..*

**Respondent 7:**

No

**13. Which deterministic driver is a so called 'primus in pares' the most important one?**

- *Attempt to base your assessment on the driver's combined likelihood and impact as well as its interdependency on the other drivers.*

**Respondent 1:**

*Demography is the prime driver, because its changes affect all the other drivers. Clear consequences might be drawn from demographical trends - positively or negatively to the state's role, the allocation of resources, the climate change, the use of technologies (the 'use' is an important distinction here) and the competing ideologies.*

**Respondent 2:**

- *My vote goes to State Capacity. The others are very much 'givens'! If State capacity is addressed optimally then in the future all should be well or (many) attempts will be undertaken to keep it well. Leaders determine what the right things are (to do), it's up to the lower echelons to do things right.*
  - *The State(s) influences all the other drivers, perhaps not always directly, but through its handling of affairs definitely does.*

## **SECTION 2 - FUTURES**

**14. In your view, are all the described futures plausible?**

- *Are they coherent with the structural and deterministic drivers presented?*

**Respondent 1:**

*Yes, they are, although Future Three is somewhat fiction to me. But they all respond to one or more possible combination of the trends of the drivers.*

**Respondent 2:**

*They are plausible but some of the underpinning descriptions are debatable. Here are some of the questions that I raise in regard the reasoning.*

- (1) Whose “areas of interest”: all “developed” States? (2) The implied perception is “developed states” are on the right track; I’d suggest that this is not necessarily true given what we saw with the Bush doctrine of 2002 and beyond. (3) What of the role that international bodies could play, they don’t seem to factor in any of the underpinning reasoning. (4) If the world (or rather developed states) takes on a more balanced role in addressing the ‘haves’ and have-nots’ then there does not necessarily need to be friction between the two. Leaders will be determinants, especially in poorer states. Consider the (highest globally) per capita contributions that the Nordic and North-western European nations make to poverty, developing states, do-good projects, etc. Also, I caution on the issue of being “resource-poor” and being “less developed” and the conclusion that there will be a “wide range of problems” to address. Consider Congo, Nigeria, and many other poorly managed ‘states’ and especially the resources at each of these states disposal. Had they been better managed they would have been (all relative) richer, I believe, than many European states. (5) What are the remaining “ungoverned spaces” and how do you consider a key aspect of protecting populations in a global melting pot?

⇒ **Researcher’s comment (6):** Agree that underpinning descriptions are debatable. This is not surprising since, the future scenarios are products of a collective security organisation (NATO) of primarily developed world nation states. The collective and compromised viewpoint of the organisation is clearly visible.

#### **Respondent 7:**

I have some difficulty with the “Dark side”, as I don’t see friction between developing countries and the global market as a given. Latin America offers a variety of examples. Of course, conflict and diminished capacity for everything are exacerbated in failed states and outside the global political economy.

Deceptive stability can have as much to do with bad governance as with allocation of resources, as the case of Tunisia illustrates. At the same time it was indeed an excellent example of Europe’s preoccupation with stability.

⇒ **Researcher’s comment (7):** Excellent point and most relevant when one looks at what is happening in North Africa and the Middle East.

The significance of ideology and borderlands as a future is at the moment diminished. New Power Politics is a primary concern in South and Central Asia.

**15. In your view, which of the futures is the least likely?**

**Respondent 1:**

*Future Three (i.e Clash of Modernities (ed.)), because it implies the possibility of satisfying a virtually endless demand of energy and resources*

**Respondent 2:**

*Dark side of exclusivity.*

**Respondent 7:**

*None are likely alone*

**16. In your view, which of the futures is the most likely?**

**Respondent 1:**

*Future Four (i.e New Power Politics (ed.)), because it follows logically the integration pattern of the mankind and does not nurture illusions about the change of the human nature related to power.*

**Respondent 2:**

*Deceptive stability*

**Respondent 7:**

*All are possible as partial factors*

### **SECTION 3 – FUTURE CONFLICTS**

**17. In your view, are these conflicts logical deductions from the futures described?**

- **NB.:** *These risk conditions will be further debated in section 5*

**Respondent 1:**

*Apparently, yes.*

***Respondent 2:***

*As presented there is logic in the conflict scenarios. On future-one, I am not sure on “threats to resource allocation”. Who or which state is allocating resources and what are the associated threats? Also, with power politics, innovation will be key, most certainly in the next decade.*

***Respondent 7:***

*The logic is fine, although I find organized crime a little overrated and effective offensive cyber-weapons more likely to be developed by states than by terrorists or other rogue groups.*

**SECTION 4 – FUTURE CONFLICT SOURCES**

***18. Do you concur with these sources, and do you have any additional sources one may think of?***

***Respondent 1:***

*Yes, in addition: the potential of an incursion by an extraterrestrial life-form (pandemic or cognisant). But it may also be classified as part of the nature (in very wider sense). Also, in addition: functionally overpowered oligarchic international organisations (like the FIFA, nowadays).*

***Respondent 2:***

*Perhaps outrageously, the breakdown of accepted international organisations and/or non-acceptance of their rulings. Recall the demise of the League of Nations.*

*And when you refer to ‘confrontational powers’ I trust you are actually referring to powerful states.*

***Respondent 7:***

*All are relevant, but again in a traditionalist vein I would not underestimate states as a source of conflict. They don’t have to be failed or rogue*

## **SECTION 5 – FUTURE CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS**

**19. Do you have any additions to the listing of risk conditions?**

**Respondent 1:** NIL ; **Respondent 2** NIL ; **Respondent 7:** NIL

**20. (IMPORTANT) Do you agree that the risk conditions listed would merit for a military crisis management operation (ie. peace support operation including peacekeeping or peace enforcement)?**

**Researcher's comment (8.1):** Most importantly the delphi-panel suggests that the following 12 risk conditions would merit for a peace support operation including peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities. These nine risk conditions arose from the 33 risk conditions in four different futures. The risk conditions listed below are arranged in descending order according to support received:

1. Interstate rivalry
2. Failed Governance
3. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict
4. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces
5. Uncontrolled migration
6. Transnational criminal movements
7. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories
8. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes
9. Extremism of marginalised groups
10. Proliferation of WMD/WME
11. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes
12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements

The table below shows the number of respondents in favour or against the idea that a risk condition would merit for a PSO.



Risk condition that merits for a PSO	Respondents:		
	Aye	Nay	(?)*
13. Interstate rivalry	5		
14. Failed Governance	5		
15. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	5		
16. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces	4	1	
17. Uncontrolled migration	4	1	
18. Transnational criminal movements	3	2	
19. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	3	2	
20. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	3	2	
21. Extremism of marginalised groups	3	1	1
22. Proliferation of WMD/WME	3	1	1
23. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes	3	1	1
24. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements	1	3	1
<u>Uncertain</u> : "Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties" - I faced difficulties interpreting responses to this risk condition. Please, all respondents state clearly if you are in favour of a PSO or against it in this risk condition.			

Table 1: Risk conditions that merit for a PSO showing number of respondents in favour or against.

\* (?) = undecided responses

*These risk conditions pertain to specific futures, which have an impact on the overall strategic setting where within the PSO functions - thus it is pertinent to make this differentiation. The table below depicts these relationships.*

Future 1: "Dark Side of Exclusivity"	Future 2: "Deceptive Stability"	Future 3: "Clash of Modernities"	Future 4: "New Power Politics"
8. Failed governance 9. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict 10. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces 11. Uncontrolled migration. 12. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories 13. Proliferation of WMD/WME 14. Consequences from	4. Transnational criminal movements 5. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict 6. Uncontrolled migration.	5. Extremism of marginalised groups 6. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes 7. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements 8. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict	1. Interstate rivalry

environmental catastrophes/changes			
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Table 2: Risk conditions that merit for a PSO related to a specific future scenario.

**Researcher's comment (8.2):** *Out of the 33 risk conditions, the ones that would NOT merit for a peace support operation were:*

1. Proliferation of Radical Ideologies
2. Spread of radical ideologies
3. Challenges to state authority
4. Shifts in population mix
5. Inability to anticipate, sense, and shape external security environment
6. Strategic inattention (by nation-states and international organizations)
7. Systemic inability to respond quickly to external effects
8. Complex interdependent computer networks
9. High dependency on constant flow of vital resources
10. Vulnerability of complex interdependent systems and infrastructures
11. Conflict between incompatible belief systems
12. Shifting loyalties (state vs. non-state actors)
13. Alliances of authoritarian states
14. Shifting spheres of influence
15. Competition for ideological supremacy
16. Competition for resources
17. Proliferation of nuclear and other WME capabilities
18. Ungoverned spaces
19. Inability of the international system to handle large power fluctuations
20. Shifting state alliances

**13. (IMPORTANT)** *Your comments and argumentation on the above table of risk conditions and research hypothesis:*

**Respondent 2 :**

- *Of note, PSOs in today's political climate could also be used to bring about Stabilisation and capacity building in the States in question. And in some of the delineated risks, there is*

*always the potential for a very different type of intervention, such as Humanitarian assistance, Disaster relief, etc. The UN has proved its worth in those fields.*

⇒ **Researcher's comment (9):** *Agreed, this is the case – and good that it is. However I need to focus on the applicability on the use of force (military means) and evaluate it with the concept of consent (political), which remains the toughest conceptual challenge of peace operations.*

- *Moreover, with the evolution of world affairs and development, PSO in its very present nature could change by the next decade. In sum, by referring to PSO as we know it today, we could be on the wrong track? For example, an expanded role is very likely. Conceptually, PSOs have moved on from classic peacekeeping to more “robust” peacekeeping. But will the world’s bodies be able to generate the means to conduct PSOs as we would want.*

⇒ **Researcher's comment (10):** *The last question captures the “big picture” in relation to intervention optimism vs intervention pessimism.*

#### **Respondent 4 :**

- *Mediation and diplomatic efforts should not be presented in the selective manner (as presented in the table). This is due to the fact that economic intergration, cooperation and trade; sanctions; development aid; would all be relevant to consider in all cases – and their applicability should be evaluated on a case by case basis.*

⇒ **Researcher's comment (11):** *Agreed; multidimensional efforts are all always pertinent.*

- *Spill over of ethnic etc. conflict is a very general description, but I have attempted to understand it in a context, where it could cause more widescale violent spill over effects across state boundaries*
- *I would rather use the term of utilisation of military and civilian crisis management capabilities – rather than peace support operations (PSO).*

#### **Respondent 5:**

*Respondent views that these risk conditions would constitute for peace support operation: (1) interstate rivalry, (2) failed governance, (3) potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict, (4) territorial and extra-territorial border disputes, (5) extremism of marginalised*

*groups, (6) proliferation of WMD/WME and (7) consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes.*

*Furthermore, some risk conditions would require specific preconditions to be met, for them to merit a peace support operation (PSO). Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces should be extremely serious, for it to merit for PSO. The precondition extreme seriousness applies to transnational criminal movements. Uncontrolled migration is also problematic as a PSO scenario. However it would merit for frontier guard and border control type measures. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories, would require coalition or interests to be threatened, for it to merit for military interventions. Respondent does not see that technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements would merit for a PSO. However, a single nation may take action, but this cannot be regarded as a PSO.*

***Respondent 7:***

*Referring to question: I would change WOULD merit to COULD merit. it is always political.*

***Respondent 7:***

*I'm not aware of mediation after natural disasters, except of course in the case of post-tsunami Aceh, where the mediation was about preceding political violence.*

***14. (OPTIONAL) Comments, reflections, argumentation on the questionnaire:***

*NIL*

## **Second round of delfi-questions for diploma thesis: “Military crisis management in the next decade (2020-2030)”**

### **AIM OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND INSTRUCTIONS**

**The aim of the 2<sup>nd</sup> round of delfi questions is to identify the relevant spoiler types and appropriate spoiler management strategies in the risk conditions identified in the 1<sup>st</sup> round of delfi questions.** The specific focus is on preconditions that would merit for coercive spoiler management measures. Therefore in the table below the preconditions that would merit for coercive measures are highlighted in red.

The table is a summary of hypotheses that have been made against the frameworks of: (1) **peacebuilding space** (i.e includes international capacity, local capacity and level of hostility), (2) the **ecology of authority** (i.e. factions are few or many, reconciled or hostile, coherent or incoherent) and (3) **spoiler typology** attempting to identify the most significant (i.e. dominant) spoiler type. The conditions that are assumed to merit for coercive measures are: **total or greedy spoilers, high level of hostility, hostile factions**. These are highlighted in the table. The table is followed by questions that include the description of deductions made from the risk condition and hypothesis based on that deduction. **The respondent is requested to evaluate the validity and relevance of the hypothesis presented, and also provide comments on the matter.**

The questionnaire aims to provide views to the following questions: What are the preconditions and implications of attempting to induce consent vis-à-vis to relying on compliance? Under what circumstances is it advisable to attempt inducing consent? Under what circumstances it is of decisive importance to seek and nurture the compliance of the parties?

### **BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SPOILER THEORY**

The 2<sup>nd</sup> round of delfi-questions builds on spoiler theory, thus it is pertinent to provide a brief description of the theory - which was initially presented by Stephen Stedman in 1997.

**Spoilers** do not exist in wars, but are created within peace processes. Spoilers exist only when there is a process to undermine. Such a peace process begins when at least two warring parties have committed themselves to a peace agreement. A peace process creates spoilers because it is rare in conflicts for all leaders and factions to see peace as beneficial. Even if parties come to value peace, they rarely do so simultaneously, and they often disagree over the terms of an acceptable peace. A compromise in the form of a negotiated peace usually has losers: some who do not achieve their war aims. A compromise by definition requires the parties to accept that some of their demands are not met.<sup>320</sup>

Stedman claims that **spoilers vary by type by being limited, total or greedy**. These types differ primarily on the aims of the spoiler, and secondarily on the commitment to achieving those aims. Limited spoilers have limited goals (e.g. a share of power, basic security for followers etc.). Limited goals do not imply limited commitment – goals can be non-negotiable. At the other end of the spectrum are total spoilers. They pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority whilst holding immutable preferences: i.e. their goals are not subject to change. Pragmatism required for compromised settlements is rare. Total spoilers often advocate radical ideologies, for them total power is the means for radical transformation of society. Between the limited and total spoiler lies the greedy spoiler, that holds goals that expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk. When faced with low costs and risks the greedy spoiler may expand its limited goals. And vice versa, when faced with high costs and risks the total goals may contract.<sup>321</sup>

International actors that have overseen the implementation of peace agreements, custodians of peace processes, **have pursued three general conceptual strategies in managing spoilers**. The first of them is **inducement**, which is giving the spoiler what it wants. It entails taking positive measures to address the grievances of factions who obstruct the peace process. The other is **socialization**, which means changing the

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<sup>320</sup> Stedman, Stephen John: *Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes*, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 5-7. Stephen J. Stedman (PhD) has been a professor of political science and senior fellow at Stanford University since 2002, and provided the first systematic analysis of the spoiler problem in 1997; see Doyle et al. (2006), p. 58. Stedman remains valid hitherto, as the original distinction between total, greedy and limited spoilers has not been further elaborated in research literature; see Berdal, Mats: *Building Peace After War*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, Oxon, 2009, pp. 101,200.

<sup>321</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 7-12.

behaviour of the spoiler; so that it adheres to a set of established norms. The third is **coercion**, or punishing the spoiler behaviour or reducing the capacity of the spoiler to destroy the peace process.<sup>322</sup>

According to Stedman **total spoilers** cannot be appeased through inducements, nor can they be socialized. Coercive diplomacy may also be dangerously counterproductive; if custodians fail to carry through threats, a spoiler's position may be strengthened. **However, appropriate strategies for managing total spoilers are: the use of force or the departing train strategy.** Stedman claims that few custodians are willing to use force, thus they should strengthen the parties of peace so they could defend themselves. The departing train strategy combines a judgment that the peace process will go irrevocably forward, regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not. The departing train strategy would legitimize the parties of peace and deligitimize the spoiler.

**As the greedy spoiler is not a total spoiler, there are at least prospects of bringing it into a peace process. Socialization is the appropriate long-term strategy towards a greedy spoiler. In the short term, this spoiler presents a serious dilemma.** As inducements alone will only whet the appetite of the greedy spoiler; the legitimacy and illegitimacy of its demands must be clearly distinguished. In addition, depending on the risk-taking and cost insensitivity of the spoiler, the **use of coercive measures may be required to impose costs and create limits to the spoiler's demands.** However a relying solely on a coercive strategy ignores that even greedy spoilers have legitimate security goals that can only be accommodated by inducements.<sup>323</sup>

**Inducement is an appropriate strategy for managing limited spoilers,** but it depends on the bargaining range established by the other parties who have already committed to peace. If the demands of a limited spoiler cannot be accommodated, then the remaining strategies are socialization and coercion. Obviously the threat or the use of force may prompt a counterescalation of violence by - so far - a limited spoiler.<sup>324</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> Stedman (1997).

<sup>323</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17.

risk condition	peacebuilding space (i.e. peacebuilding triangle; Doyle and Sambanis, 2001)			ecology of authority (Doyle et al. 2006)	spoiler typology (Stedman 1997)	
	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility		significant spoiler	other spoilers
future with related risk conditions				factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	-total -greedy -limited	
<b>“Dark Side of Exclusivity” (DsE)</b>						
Failed Governance	HIGH; within states developed	LOW	LOW	INCOHERENT	GREEDY; failed states and their leadership	LIMITED (1); state leadership with legitimate pleas LIMITED (2); local population with legitimate pleas
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	HIGH; within states developed	N/A; both low and high possible	HIGH; potentially and highly significant <sup>325</sup>	COHERENT; ethnicity, religion or ideology unites	TOTAL; in worst case	LIMITED; moderates within factions
Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces	HIGH; within states developed	LOW; as pertaining to overall future	LOW	N/A; can be all combinations	GREEDY	TOTAL; potentially
Uncontrolled migration	HIGH; within states developed	LOW; at departure areas. But HIGH at arrival areas; in worst case LOW also in arrival area.	HIGH; potentially towards developed states	MANY, RECONCILED, INCOHERENT (no leadership)	LIMITED; migrants likely to plead for legitimate protection	N/A
Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	HIGH; within states developed	N/A; both low and high possible	HIGH; potentially between parties of dispute and towards external intervenors	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	LIMITED	GREEDY
Proliferation of WMD/WME	HIGH; within states developed	N/A; both low and high possible	HIGH; potentially towards external intervenors	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	GREEDY	TOTAL; potentially
Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes	HIGH; within states developed	N/A; both low and high possible	LOW	RECONCILED, COHERENT	LIMITED	
<b>“Deceptive Stability” (DS)</b>						
Transnational criminal movements	LOW; within states developed that focus on	LOW; overall criminal elements capacity low	LOW	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	GREEDY	N/A

<sup>324</sup> Stedman (1997), pp. 12 – 17.<sup>325</sup> Doyle et al. (2000), p. 787.



	domestic issues	as compared to developed states				
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict	LOW; within developed states that focus on domestic issues	N/A; both low and high possible	HIGH; potentially and highly significant <sup>326</sup>	COHERENT; ethnicity, religion or ideology unites	TOTAL; in worst case	LIMITED; moderates within factions
Uncontrolled migration	LOW; within developed states that focus on domestic issues	LOW; at departure areas. But HIGH at arrival areas; in worst case LOW also in arrival area.	HIGH; potentially towards developed states	MANY, RECONCILED, INCOHERENT (no leadership)	LIMITED; migrants likely to plead for legitimate protection	GREEDY; higher potential for criminal elements than in DsE.
<b>“Clash of Modernities” (CoM)</b>						
Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties	HIGH; within developed states	HIGH; within developed states	LOW	MANY, RECONCILED, INCOHERENT (no central leadership)	LIMITED; civil liberties advocates likely to plead for legitimate demands	N/A
Extremism of marginalised groups	HIGH; within developed states	LOW	HIGH; towards developed states (or societies)	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	TOTAL	N/A; likely that amount of LIMITED spoilers (moderates) not significant
Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	HIGH; within developed states	LOW; on marginalised (deprived) side and HIGH on developed side; which is the propable setting	HIGH; potentially towards developed states	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	LIMITED	GREEDY; potentially
Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements	HIGH; within developed states	LOW; overall criminal elements capacity low as compared to developed states; but potential for HIGH destructive capacities	LOW;	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	GREEDY	N/A
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict	HIGH; within developed states	N/A; both low and high possible	HIGH	HOSTILE, COHERENT; ethnicity, religion or ideology unites	TOTAL; in worst case	LIMITED; moderates within factions
<b>“New Power Politics” (NPP)</b>						
Interstate rivalry	HIGH	HIGH	LOW, but potential for HIGH	FEW, potentially HOSTILE,	GREEDY; states compete	

<sup>326</sup> Doyle et al. (2000), p. 787.

				COHERENT		
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**(RESPOND) Questions**

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	dominant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Failed Governance	HIGH; within states developed	LOW	LOW	INCOHERENT	GREEDY; failed states and their leadership	LIMITED (1); state leadership with legitimate pleas LIMITED (2); local population with legitimate pleas

**1. QUESTION****RISK CONDITION:**

Failed Governance

**DESCRIPTION:**

In the risk condition of “**Failed Governance**” local capacity by the definition is LOW. Plainly due to the fact of failed governance local hostility level is not necessarily high – thus it is assumed LOW. Obviously hostility can rise over time due to other intertwined risk conditions. By definition the ecology is INCOHERENT. The significant spoiler type is assumed to be GREEDY, which could be the failed state’s leadership regime. Alongside greedy spoilers LIMITED spoilers are likely. They could be both the failed state’s leadership regime and the local population.

**HYPOTHESIS 1:**

It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.

**RESPONDENT’S COMMENTS:**

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	HIGH; within developed states	N/A; both low and high possible	HIGH; potentially and highly significant <sup>327</sup>	COHERENT; ethnicity, religion or ideology unites	TOTAL; in worst case	LIMITED; moderates within factions

## 2. QUESTION

### RISK CONDITION:

Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict

### DESCRIPTION:

In this case the level of local hostility is potentially HIGH and also very significant. The factions are assumed to be COHERENT as ethnicity, religion or ideology unites them. In the worst case the significant spoiler type is TOTAL alongside LIMITED spoilers, which are moderates within the factions.

### HYPOTHESIS 2:

It is likely that in such a risk condition TOTAL spoilers exist, and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures).

### HYPOTHESIS 3:

It is likely that in such a risk condition the levels of local (i.e. within in mission area of operations) hostility are HIGH, thus military capabilities are necessary to protect any political peace process.

### RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:

NB. this risk conditions appears in three futures; elaboration of significant differences, if any.

<sup>327</sup> Doyle et al. (2000), p. 787.

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces	HIGH; within developed states	LOW; as pertaining to overall future	LOW	N/A; can be all combinations	GREEDY	TOTAL; potentially

<b>3. QUESTION</b>		
<b>RISK CONDITION:</b> Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces		
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> In this case the levels of local capacity are LOW, which is due to the overall setting that this specific future implies. Local level of hostility is not a significant feature – thus it is assumed LOW. The ecology of conflict may be any combination. The significant factor is that the significant spoiler type is likely to be <u>GREEDY</u> , with the potential for TOTAL spoilers.		
<b>HYPOTHESIS 4:</b> It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.		
<b>RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:</b>		

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Uncontrolled migration	HIGH; within developed states	LOW; at departure areas. But HIGH at arrival areas; in worst case LOW also in arrival area.	HIGH; potentially towards developed states	MANY, RECONCILED, INCOHERENT (no leadership)	LIMITED; migrants likely to plead for legitimate protection	N/A

#### 4. QUESTION

**RISK CONDITION:** Uncontrolled migration

#### DESCRIPTION:

It is likely that local capacity is LOW at migration's areas of origin, but local capacity may be either HIGH or LOW at receiving areas where migration directs itself. The local level of hostility towards developed states has the potential to be HIGH, which is consistent with the overall setting of the future scenario. The significant spoiler type is LIMITED.<sup>328</sup> It is likely that there are many factions, which are generally reconciled and incoherent, due to the lack of organized leadership

#### HYPOTHESIS 5:

It is likely that in such a risk condition LIMITED spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any humanitarian aid operation.

#### HYPOTHESIS 6:

It is likely that international and national legitimacy and legality considerations RESTRAIN FROM the use of any military force at arrival areas, to prevent migration directing itself to those areas.

#### RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:

<sup>328</sup> Bali, Sita: *Population Movements*, in Williams, Paul D. (ed.): *Security Studies: An Introduction*, Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 468 -475, 480 – 481. According to Bali, migration can be categorized into: (1) involuntary or forced (i.e. refugee movements) and (2) voluntary of free (i.e. economic migration), based on the motivation behind the migration. Economic migration can be further subdivided into: legal permanent, legal temporary and illegal migration. Bali substantiates that there is a potential for hostility. Furthermore the originating reasons for migration may include both legitimate and illegitimate demands, thus the dominant spoiler type is defined as limited. Bali also describes trends where migration generates guerrilla or extremist movements, which arguably constitute for greedy and even total spoilers, pp. 474 – 475.

NB. this risk conditions appears in two futures; elaboration of significant differences, if any.

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	HIGH; within developed states	N/A; both low and high possible	HIGH; potentially between parties of dispute and towards external intervenors	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	LIMITED	GREEDY

## 5. QUESTION

**RISK CONDITION:** Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories

### DESCRIPTION:

It is likely that levels of hostility, between parties of any dispute and towards any external intervenors, are HIGH. The ecology of conflict is likely to involve FEW factions that are COHERENT, as the disputed issues unite the factions. The factions are HOSTILE towards each other and parties that are external to the dispute. The significant spoiler type is LIMITED, which have both legitimate and illegitimate claims to previously *uninhabited* territories. Alongside this GREEDY spoilers are likely to be involved and emerge.

### HYPOTHESIS 7:

It is likely that LIMITED spoilers with both legitimate and illegitimate demands are involved, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political mediation process as well as coerce LIMITED spoilers on their illegitimate demands.

### HYPOTHESIS 8:

There is an evident potential for the emergence of GREEDY spoilers, which justifies for peace enforcement measures.

### RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Proliferation of WMD/WME	HIGH; within developed states	N/A; both low and high possible	HIGH; potentially towards external intervenors	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	GREEDY	TOTAL; potentially

**6. QUESTION****RISK CONDITION:** Proliferation of WMD/WME**DESCRIPTION:**

It is not possible to estimate the levels of local capacity – both high and low are plausible. However, the levels of hostility towards any external intervenor are potentially HIGH, thus the ecology is HOSTILE. Factions are likely to be few and coherent. The significant spoiler type, be it a statelike organisation or non-state actor, is likely to be GREEDY. The aim of such a spoiler is to gain as much power and influence as possible. Alongside this there is the potential for TOTAL spoilers.

**HYPOTHESIS 9:**

It is likely that both GREEDY and TOTAL spoilers pertain to these cases, which justifies for peace enforcement measures (pre-emptive measures) in support of any political peace and mediation process.

**RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:**

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes	HIGH; within developed states	N/A; both low and high possible	LOW	RECONCILED, COHERENT	LIMITED	

**7. QUESTION****RISK CONDITION:** Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes**DESCRIPTION:**

In this case the levels of local capacity may be either high or low. There is no evident reason for the level of hostility to be high, thus it is assumed as LOW. Furthermore, it is assumed that populations that are affected remain reconciled and coherent at least initially. If any spoilers arise, they are likely to be LIMITED, with legitimate and possible illegitimate demands.

**HYPOTHESIS 10:**

It is likely that in such a risk condition, only LIMITED spoilers are initially plausible. This necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any humanitarian aid operation.

**RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:**



risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Transnational criminal movements	LOW; within developed states that focus on domestic issues	LOW; overall criminal elements capacity low as compared to developed states	LOW;	FEW, <b>HOSTILE</b> , COHERENT	<b>GREEDY</b>	N/A

<b>8. QUESTION</b>		
<b>RISK CONDITION:</b> Transnational criminal movements		
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> In this case the ecology of conflict is hostile as criminal elements oppose those safeguarding legality. The significant spoiler type is GREEDY.		
<b>HYPOTHESIS 11:</b> It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.		
<b>RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:</b>		

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties	HIGH; within states developed	HIGH; within developed states	LOW	MANY, RECONCILED, INCOHERENT (no central leadership)	LIMITED; civil liberties advocates likely to plead for legitimate demands	N/A

<b>9. QUESTION</b>		
<b>RISK CONDITION:</b> Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties		
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> In this case it is reasonable to assume that the significant spoiler type is LIMITED, which have both legitimate and possible illegitimate demands.		
<b>HYPOTHESIS 12:</b> It is likely that in such a risk condition LIMITED spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political peace and mediation processes.		
<b>RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:</b>		

NB. this risk conditions was not agreed on the delfi-panel in the 1<sup>st</sup> round of questions.

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Extremism of marginalised groups	HIGH; within states developed	LOW	HIGH; towards developed states (societies?)	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	TOTAL	N/A; likely that amount of LIMITED spoilers (moderates) not significant

<b>10. QUESTION</b>		
<b>RISK CONDITION:</b> Extremism of marginalised groups		
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> <p>In this case the local capacity level is likely to be low, which is usually related to marginalisation and eventual extremism of different groups. The local level of hostility is likely to be HIGH towards external parties and especially towards developed nation-states. The ecology of the conflict is HOSTILE with few factions. These factions are more coherent than incoherent, as the extremist groups usually feature internal cohesion. The significant spoiler type is TOTAL. Alongside total spoilers, LIMITED spoilers may appear. Limited spoilers would be the moderates of these factions, but extremism implies that the amount of moderates is not significant.</p>		
<b>HYPOTHESIS 13:</b> <p>It is likely that in such a risk condition TOTAL spoilers exist, and this justifies for and this justifies for coercive spoiler management strategies including the use of military force (i.e. peace enforcement measures).</p>		
<b>RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:</b>		

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	HIGH; within developed states	LOW; on marginalised (deprived) side and HIGH on developed side; which is the propable setting	HIGH; potentially towards developed states	FEW, HOSTILE, COHERENT	LIMITED	GREEDY; potentially

<b>11. QUESTION</b>		
<b>RISK CONDITION:</b> Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes		
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> <p>In this case the local capacities may be varied: both HIGH against HIGH and HIGH against LOW are possible. The local level of hostility towards external parties and developed states is potentially HIGH; thus the ecology of the conflict is HOSTILE. However, the significant spoiler type is LIMITED, with both legitimate and illegitimate claims. GREEDY spoilers may appear and emerge alongside limited spoilers.</p>		
<b>HYPOTHESIS 14:</b> <p>It is likely that in such a risk condition LIMITED spoilers are significant, which necessitates the use of military capabilities to protect any political peace and mediation processes.</p>		
<b>HYPOTHESIS 15:</b> <p>It is likely that GREEDY spoilers appear <u>alongside</u> limited spoilers, which would necessitate peace enforcement measures.</p>		
<b>RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:</b>		

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements	HIGH; within developed states	LOW; overall criminal elements capacity low as compared to developed states; but potential for HIGH destructive capacities	LOW;	FEW, <b>HOSTILE</b> , COHERENT	<b>GREEDY</b>	N/A

**12. QUESTION****RISK CONDITION:** Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements**DESCRIPTION:**In this case the ecology of conflict is **HOSTILE** as criminal elements oppose those safeguarding legality. The significant spoiler type is **GREEDY**.**HYPOTHESIS 16:**It is likely that in such a risk condition **GREEDY** spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.**RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:**

risk condition	international capacity	local capacity	level of hostility	factions -few/many -reconciled/hostile -coherent/incoherent	significant spoiler -total -greedy -limited	other spoilers
Interstate rivalry	HIGH	HIGH	LOW, but potential for HIGH	FEW, potentially HOSTILE, COHERENT	GREEDY, states compete	

<b>13. QUESTION</b>		
<b>RISK CONDITION:</b> Interstate rivalry		
<b>DESCRIPTION:</b> In this case local capacities are assumed to be HIGH (relative to opposing force) as they are used to challenge external states. Initially the level of local hostility is low, but as rivalry develops it has the potential to be HIGH. Therefore the overall ecology involved few parties that are likely to be coherent in a HOSTILE setting. As states compete the significant spoiler type is GREEDY		
<b>HYPOTHESIS 17:</b> It is likely that in such a risk condition GREEDY spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures.		
<b>RESPONDENT'S COMMENTS:</b>		

## **RESPONSES TO 2<sup>ND</sup> ROUND OF DELPHI-QUESTIONS**

### **INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 1**

#### **1. Failed Governance:**

##### **Preconditions**

- (1) International acceptance: here Libya serves as an example, and all the problems related to the case in gaining acceptance for an international intervention.
- (2) Local acceptance also important, although it may be that representatives of that acceptance are not given (i.e. available). E.g. gaining consensual agreement from the forces opposing Gaddafi was difficult to obtain.
- (3) Local acceptance also important from a wider point of view: e.g. the acceptance of the Arab League was important.
- (4) The third aspect is difficult to quantify. The presence of a clear interest and therefore of clear will to intervene (e.g. EU's interventions). EU stepping up is based on regional or national interests. The decision to take action is an amalgam. For instance these considerations work against Germany in the current Libya case. There is a clear economic interest not to intervene and internal political considerations (e.g. impact of elections).
- (5) Fourthly there should be a set of guiding principles, which do not exist at the moment. There are numerous conflicts related to failed states, e.g. Zimbabwe, where intervention is not happening, due to the fact of lack of sufficient interest. If no interest the no will; e.g. in the international community should do interventions in Congo every year<sup>329</sup>.
- (6) Regarding greedy spoilers: one has to realise that alongside greedy local spoilers greedy international spoilers may also appear. E.g. OCHA, ECO etc. act on their interests – they would like to “frame” the situation to fit their case, that is to fit the appreciation of the situation to fit their “modus operandi”.

##### **Implications**

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<sup>329</sup> Researcher's comment: It is always case by case and planners should not fight this, but provide the appreciation of the existing preconditions, plausible ways and means, as well as the implications of intervening and not intervening. An

- (1) Implications are related to preconditions – because the standpoints are not rigid. There is a dynamic in a crisis influencing the preconditions – this means that an “evolution” of the preconditions begins, and this involves the nation states and international organisations. E.g. the actions of Russia, China and NATO towards Libya after the UNSCR 1973 reflect this dynamic. Furthermore this has consequences for e.g. the EU – UN – OCHA relations; OCHA has been instructed by the UN by its member states not to request for EU military assistance due to challenges related to impartiality.

**Hypothesis 1 cannot be denied (i.e. accepted); respondents note: “Greedy spoiler is not framing the conflict, but being framed by it”.**

## **2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict**

### **Preconditions**

Alongside the generic preconditions mentioned in the first question the following preconditions arise:

- (1) It is important to highlight ideological reconciliation. This is an “*illogical*” type of conflict as versus a “*logical*” type of conflict, of which conflicts with root cause in economy being an example. Furthermore international terrorism not following logical type of conflict. However even in an illogical type of conflict effect based approach to operations (EBAO) remains a valid way of thinking.
- (2) The second precondition is the need for robust comprehensive capabilities not necessarily military capabilities. E.g. Bosnia facing the highest danger potential since the Dayton agreement; but it is more a political challenge with the military having no role at the moment.

### **Implications**

- (1) Yes, intervening would have implications. The problem is that certain conflicts have roots that go back to almost prehistoric times; thus it is expected that these conflicts have a long “after history”. E.g. the Thirty Years war as an inter-European war portrays this. One may say that the Christian and Islamic worlds are in constant “skirmish”. The UN operations that have gone on for a long time follow the borderlines of cultural belief systems<sup>330</sup>.

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military-strategic options paper should look into the implications of intervening versus not intervening. Considerations should focus on the “*timing of intervention*” - not too early not too late.

<sup>330</sup> Researcher’s comment: to accept this statement, historical and quantifiable empirical data should be analysed.



- (2) As argued in the first round of delfi, the primus inter pares driver is demography, which is behind many conflicts. Once demographic challenges are solved then the conflict is also solved.

**Hypothesis 2 accepted.**

**Hypothesis 3 accepted.**

### **3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces**

#### **Preconditions**

- (1) There is a clear relation to economic interests. This is a logical type of conflict, where the players are more predictable and their interests are easier to find out – and thus a much clearer concept of operating is possible.
- (2) However this does not have relevance to the anti-piracy operations of the Horn of Africa, where the only weakness is the legal constraints – the coercive measures are not strong enough. The vulnerability of strategic chokepoints is a more grand interstate level conflict scenario. E.g. the situation on the Persian Gulf (Strait of Hormuz) – thus it is no coincidence that Iran does not dare to threaten that strait, as it would be an immediate case for war by the USA side.
- (3) The priorities of preconditions change here. The political will to intervene is paramount, whilst the local acceptance is not considered.

#### **Implications**

- (1) The conflict must be compartmentalized to a specific area in order for it not to have an effect in a wider sphere.
- (2) Conducting a crisis management operation with military capabilities is a balancing act – there may be phases that require crisis management operations, which may have preventive role.<sup>331</sup>

**Hypothesis 4 partly accepted. Reservations: crisis management used only in different phases of a conflict, if truly a strategic chokepoint is threatened then it is no longer managed by CMO.**

### **4. Interstate rivalry**

#### **Preconditions**

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<sup>331</sup> Researcher's comment: Note that crisis management operation can be utilised as *preventive* (i.e. conflict prevention). If really strategic chokepoints are threatened then it is a reason for war.

- (1) The number one precondition is local acceptance, one cannot wage war without the consent of the parties to an interstate rivalry.
- (2) International acceptance is not necessarily required as “full” acceptance, but the intervention must abide to international law.<sup>332</sup>

### **Implications**

- (1) The challenge is that impartiality should remain. E.g. in Libya, how can the EU be impartial if its member states have bombed under NATO framework? Thus members telling OCHA not to ask for EU assistance

**Hypothesis 17 NOT ACCEPTED. Reservations: must have the consent of the rivalries – thus not a peace enforcement mode of operating.<sup>333</sup>**

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<sup>332</sup> Researcher's comment: Both points show that consent, local and international, are preconditions.

<sup>333</sup> Researcher's general comment not related to interview: The tools for planning are available. The skill required is to ask the right questions at the right time. Planning begins with the proper appreciation of the strategic scenario (e.g. 9 questions, drivers for a scenario), then the scenario of the conflict (e.g. intertwined risk conditions).

## INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 2

### 1. Failed Governance

Respondent fully accepts the hypothesis presented including the description (ref. questionnaire).

#### Preconditions

The preconditions that should be met from a military perspective are: definition of desired end-state for logic sequence of planning with an exit strategy.<sup>334</sup> From a political perspective the preconditions can be more diffused. In today's world even the vague set of conditions and pulls to different directions should finally translate to mandate documents.

#### Implications

Regarding implications; using peace enforcement in failed governance situations has both advantages and disadvantages. Advantages are that it brings order to states and assists states in stabilizing security situations. The disadvantages are that peace enforcement may cause serious local factionalisation – e.g. as may happen in the Ivory Coast, where displacing the former leader may be successful, but the leader's followers may not back down as easily.

**Hypothesis accepted. Reservations: follow on effects must be considered.**<sup>335</sup>

### 2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious or ideological conflict

What happens is the total spoiler is the governing power bloc? What to do then? Must combat the spoiler, but politics dictate. Political approaches must have clarity and be solid. These need to translate into clear cut concepts for the military. However this kind of comprehensive approach is NOT there. For example the LRA is a complete spoiler. Fighting against the Taliban is considered war on terrorism, but this does not apply to Africa

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<sup>334</sup> Nota bene: For the respondent these are the classic tenets of planning that are generic to all risk conditions.

<sup>335</sup> Researcher's comment: PRECONDITION: end-state for military, political diffusion must translate to clear mandate. IMPLICATION: peace enforcement needed for safe and secure environment. IMPLICATION: peace enforcement may be used to target specific spoilers. DEDUCTION: must appreciate, understand and mitigate against consequences of peace enforcement actions.

and e.g. LRA. Furthermore the war on terrorism does not apply to developed states as it applies to developing states.

### **Preconditions**

Preconditions that should exist are as follows. There must be a ‘way to success’ and a ‘way out’. The political “backbone” is the overarching matter here: there must consensus on the legitimacy of any intervention – which requires that intervenors rally for support.

### **Implications**

There are a variety of implications that interventions may cause. Depending on the case intervention may cause complete breakup of socio-economic structure – and thus cause a ‘vacuum’. Planners at all levels need to look at all implications – they need to be drawn out. A concern is what impact does intervention have on stability – does it disrupt or support stability?

**Hypothesis 2 and 3 accepted. Reservations: follow on effects must be considered.**<sup>336</sup>

## **3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces**

### **Preconditions**

For preconditions, again classic tenets of planning apply. However the ‘timeline’ is more of a question – cannot be open ended. For example operations of the coast of Somalia – should not be open ended – maybe should start from the land. This risk condition applies to smaller scale areas as well (e.g oil-rich area of Abyei region in Sudan, where the situation remains unresolved). Regarding the timeline in general, although international capacity may be high – how long can one sustain operations.

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<sup>336</sup> Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: way to success and way out, legitimacy; IMPLICATION: impacts on social structure to be determined.

## Implications

Regarding implications: there should be way out – must offer some closure for those threatening chokepoints. Must get actors to sit down and negotiate – offer a course out towards an end state.

Another note, there is also cultural perspective: “respect for life”. For instance UN country teams get “wrapped around axels” with loss of life. In some countries life loss of over 100 people may result in swiftly “marching on”. For UNCT a loss of 1 of own escalates the situation “100 fold”. Maybe limited casualties should be accepted to reach overarching goal.

**Hypothesis 4 accepted.**<sup>337</sup>

## 4. Uncontrolled migration

Peace enforcement not likely. Here one sees the “western school of thought” – the other view is that people are likely to move. In today’s world there are migratory tribes that are armed to the teeth (e.g. the Misseriya tribe in and around the Abyei region – when they move south it is “free for all”). Military capabilities could be used as a deterrent. There are also different points of view on protection: how to protect; when to protect; “pocket of people” versus entire nation’s interests; borders are meaningless to some of these tribes. Using Libya as an example, the involvement of military capabilities is not due to migration, although the conflict causes migration. Involvement is due to actual crisis overall. In generic terms the needs of the periphery must be factored in, whilst appreciating that migration will be there in the future.

## Preconditions

The classic generic tenets remain, however the protection of civilians principle arises. (E.g. in Darfur AMIS and then UNAMID has been there for years – but no peace agreement, and people moving all over. The PKO there is a deterrent and committed to protection of civilians. Interesting that even without a peace agreement troops are there. However political preconditions are different<sup>338</sup>. For example there is willingness to conduct PSO in Sudan but not in Zimbabwe.

<sup>337</sup> Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: timeline is emphasised.

<sup>338</sup> Respondent made reference to this earlier on: political preconditions are more diffuse (see 1st question).

## Implications

There is always a potential for skirmishes – and the question is how to step in, and remain impartial? As an example in UNAMID the Rwandan battalion has stepped in with rigour, and had to pay for it. In an incident Rwandan soldiers were ambushed and shot by men dressed in civilian clothing whilst helping out in water delivery.

## Future

Current trends continue to sustain migration. Migration will be there – either diffuse or forced. As migration is bound to continue the UN is taking serious dedicated measures towards the issue.

**Hypothesis 5: reservations on this.**

**Hypothesis 6 accepted.**<sup>339</sup>

## 5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories

This is more likely to occur within states and more likely to occur intrastate. Not so likely in uninhabited areas<sup>340</sup>. The risk condition needs to be assessed is it “uninhabited and resource-rich” or “uninhabited or resource-rich”. This risk condition involves not only the states involved but also external stakeholders.

## Preconditions

As a precondition, one has to assess what is the influence of e.g. USA, China, Russia or India in such a risk condition? Although there is no imbalance yet – there is imbalance developing. China and India need the resources (e.g. oil etc.). There is high potential that PSO in this scenario would be mandated – however, the mandate could be either weak or strong. Generic preconditions still apply.

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<sup>339</sup> Researcher's comment: CONSIDERATIONS: Migration is a part of lifestyle – question is when is uncontrolled or has undesired effects? Meaning of state borders in the first place? Responsibility to protect principle AMIS & UNAMID make the case – troops there even no agreement DEDUCTION: No PSO with migration as the sole incentive. Intervening even in this scenario poses life threatening risks for intervening force.

<sup>340</sup> Researcher's comment: the risk condition's definition “uninhabited” may be there because of political considerations and potential ramifications – as it is a NATO public document it could avoid pointing out inter- or intrastate disputes in order not to escalate such disputes.

## Implications

Regarding implications, one must prepare for contingencies to avoid flare up, and seek agreement on resolution over disputes. Pertaining to the **future**, these disputers are likely not to be so severe that they necessarily lead to fighting – thus the settlements are likely to be reached in cabinet politics. Today's technology, estimates on availability and consumption of resources provide better 'forecasts' on potential problems, and provide possibility to mitigate potential disputes early on. As a 'joker', what would the impact of wholly new types of energy resources be if found in previously unexpected areas?

**Hypothesis 7 accepted. Reservations: see below quote.**

**Hypothesis 8 accepted. Reservations: see below quote.**<sup>341</sup>

*"These are the two on which we did have some discussion. Given they have been grouped together, I agree. If you were to have to sit through a panel session on these, the discussion and challenges could get interesting and challenging. There's always a case to make that in some instances, even total spoilers could be the dominant force."*

## 6. Proliferation of WMD/WME

Situation makes respondent completely uncertain. This is such a dangerous thing. It negates on world bodies (i.e. UN), but superpowers may step in (e.g. case Iraq). The scenario has links to rogue organisations. The military **preconditions** are less generic here – there is more 'free hand' here. It is tantamount, that misuse is not only local concern, but leads to larger areas – thus this as escalatory potential. The political **preconditions** come back to classics. However the organisations must be able to work 10 times faster than now – in a crisis situation. Current mode of operating for organisations is too protracted. **Implications** are numerous and could be grave. These include at least: spillover, accidents, and contingencies. Overall nothing should be left for chance here.

**Hypothesis 9 accepted.**

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<sup>341</sup> Researcher's comment: PRECONDITION: Should not allow external stakeholders influence. IMPLICATION: impact of total spoiler behaviour needs to be noted. DEDUCTION: Must understand that mandate alone is not enough. Planners must appreciate: are we seeking a weak or a strong mandate, and what is realistically, politically, expected? If resolving issues will primarily occur through "cabinets" - would there be a need for monitoring, observing and verifying type missions?

## 7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes

This is an interesting scenario. E.g. earthquake close to Japan has severe follow on effects – spillover. Accept hypothesis – military capabilities might be needed to prevent looting, protect against gangs etc. Regarding **preconditions**; nothing besides the generic preconditions – this is more an “open tap” situation, i.e. disaster situation. However, regarding compliance – countries are not necessarily fully compliant. For example Pakistan displayed some reluctance – countries do have a constitutional right to decline from external help. **Implications**. Must understand the end-state – especially how to hand over responsibility to civilian elements. And how to hand over the responsibility in a 3<sup>rd</sup> world country. E.g. effects of tornados in USA are completely different from the impact they would have in a developing state. **Future**. Developed nations should focus their efforts, but at the same time the forces are being downsized, resulting in less facilitating military elements

**Hypothesis 10 accepted.**

## 8. Transnational criminal movements

This is a difficult question and respondent is not necessarily in agreement with description or hypothesis. For instance the drug barons in the West Indies and proliferation of their activities are being countered by many naval forces of the world. Respondent sees that this risk condition does not constitute for a full blown peace enforcement operation, but rather peace enforcement in support of a law and order policing operation. A lot can be achieved by bilateral and multilateral actions. The hope is that transnational crime does not increase, but the indicators are not good. Developed nations have less capability for faraway operations whilst demand for them remains great. There are less capabilities (i.e. material and personnel) available. Willingness to participate is there if criminality has high impact, and thus is a major issue for external states. Overall the issue relates to culture and society build up.



**Preconditions**

The approach towards this risk condition should be low key and benign. A lot can be done by regional, bilateral or multilateral cooperation,

**Implications**

Considerations must cover penal code and right to arrest matters, e.g. on national as well as international waters. One must have an understanding about: “who are you countering?” After all, this is a criminality problem, where legal considerations become a priority.

**Hypothesis 11 not accepted with above argumentation.**

**9. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties**

Agree with description that limited spoilers exist, but does not fully accept hypothesis, though it might be necessary. Interventions are done only on a very selective basis. For instance no discussion of intervening in China or Russia has occurred in the past decades, although internal tensions have existed. In Libya’s case Gaddafi’s rule has been tolerated for decades.

**Hypothesis 12 not fully accepted, see reservations.**

**10. Extremism of marginalised groups**

Agree with hypothesis, this is highly likely.

**Preconditions**

Classic tenets of planning apply. Intervening force must have the consent of the host state. Host states will invite, but will want to retain control. In Sudan the rebels have attacked the government, as they were becoming marginalised: this has led to large loss of life. Consideration is also needed on whom’s point of view justifies for peace enforcement. Overall it is essential that parties are brought to a negotiation table.

## **Implications**

Implications depend on levels of severity and extremism, as well as the presence of a cease-fire agreement, if extremism had led to armed conflict. One implication is physical segregation, which is against “gut” feeling. But one may establish zones of separation, as has been explored in the Darfur Peace Process. Such cantonments or demarcation lines must be an agreed effort, with external monitoring and verification of adherence. (e.g. UNAMID conducting monitoring and verification in Darfur).

**Hypothesis 13 accepted. This is highly likely.**<sup>342</sup>

### **11. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes**

Respondent accepts hypothesis 14 with certain assumptions. Hypothesis 15 is more acceptable, such a condition would merit for a “full blown” peace enforcement operation. The dispute over Kashmir area is a classic example. In the dispute between North and South Korea, the northern counterpart could be considered as a classic greedy spoiler. Regarding **preconditions**; There is always room for negotiation, but one must reach agreement on a huge array of issues. The case of North Korea would require preventive measures as there is a potential for serious counter-reactions. On future **perspectives**; This is more likely to happen intrastate. There is a possibility that territorial integrity is tested in Africa and the Middle East by manipulative power bases.

**Hypothesis 14 accepted with reservations.**

**Hypothesis 15 accepted.**

### **12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements**

Agree entirely with hypothesis. There is also significant potential for increase in this area.

Regarding **preconditions**, the effects here may be very collateral. For example criminal activities on the internet, may not be physically tangible, but are still very significant. The same precondition exists as in countering transnational crime. It requires that a combination of police forces, security agencies and military services act in cooperation.

**Hypothesis 16 accepted.**

### **13. Interstate rivalry**

#### **Preconditions**

International consensus on intervention is important. However, situations do not necessarily play out as interventions – although international consensus is there the local (regional) consensus may not be given. This is especially the case in border across border situations (e.g. ISAF, Iraq have witnessed this difficulty). How about Iran? There must be broad consensus – but there will never be total consensus. In generic terms organisations such as the NAM, AU or Arab League will test consensus.

#### **Regarding the potential for future**

There is a greater potential for large-scale spillover in the 2020s – Iraq may be a democracy, but Iran will not. Rivalries have the perspective of chemical weapons and other WME. If local or regional conflicts involve WMD/WME then the concern is international. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan that caused nuclear facility disaster demonstrates this - effects of WMD/WME will spread beyond conflict area.

#### **Hypothesis 17: undecided.**

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<sup>342</sup> Researcher's comment: Note there are differences between panelists – some in favour others reserved.

## INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 3

### 1. Failed Governance

Starting point is: what is governance? Firstly, it is political inclusivity, accomodation and reconciliation. Secondly, it is the ability to provide security and stability. Thirdly, it is economy and development. On the first point: power gets invested in certain people, leaving others out – this is the basic grievance. Failed governance is also caused by the lack of political will to provide inclusiveness, reconciliation and to accommodate. Security and stability have linkage with the political point – it is the failure of addressing security and stability issues, which is a cross-cutting issue. If government is unable to provide security, popalation will start arming themselves.<sup>343</sup> Pertaining to economy and development, the key point is that people are lacking basic needs. There are two core questions: what is failed governance and who is a spoiler? Spoilers are defined through the point of view.

**No clear answer on hypothesis 1. Reservation: defining spoilers is a point of view.**<sup>344</sup>

### 2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict

Agree in large: there are always hawks, moderates and doves. We are experiencing a dangerous turn in the world. Al-Qaida can be considered as a total spoiler as it opposes the modern way of living. However the current mode of operating against Al-Qaida is turning the “fencesitters” into Al-Qaida’s camp. E.g. US drone strikes in Pakistan – Pakistanis do not support Taliban, but drone strikes are moving fencesitters towards Taliban and Al-Qaida. Key question is: how to marginalise a total spoiler?

Approaches towards this risk condition must be solid – and must appreciate that there are no quick fix solutions. In conventional conflict quick fix is there – capture the land or kill the enemy. But in subconventional conflict

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<sup>343</sup> Researcher’s comment: security dilemma.

<sup>344</sup> Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITIONS: Must be cognizant of what governance is and what failed governance is! Must define PE accurately in this context? Defining spoilers is a point of view. Here one must appreciate that spoilers are defined from the peace process’ point of view (i.e. parties of a peace process and their external interlocutors). If this is the case, then a military prerequisite is that specific guidance is needed on directing actions against spoilers – i.e. they must be universally within the peace process be agreed as spoilers. IMPLICATION: If safe and secure environment (SASE); then no incentive for population to arm itself – thus provide SASE. Economy and development cannot be provided by military means – can merely protect such endeavours. DEDUCTION: If good governance is about political inclusivity, accomodation and reconciliation – then this does not support PE measures, but at the most supports PK measures to protect any such process. For security and stability there is a need for PE and PK measures.

there is no quick fix. When has conventional approach succeeded in subconventional conflict (e.g Iraq, Afganistan, now Libya?). Agree with spoiler distinctions in large, there are always hawks, moderates and doves.

**Hypothesis 2 is accepted with reservations.**

**Reservations: spoilers are always defined through point of view.**

**Hypothesis 3 no clear answer.**<sup>345</sup>

### 3. Interstate rivalry

Very contextual – rivalries are there even in Europe. In Asia they relate e.g. to the rising powers China and India. Many countries of the world are beyond the “conflict mindset”, which is not the case in Africa. Factors that have an impact on rivalry are: (1) political inclusiveness (the lack of) – as rivalries would not escalate in democracies and (2) development. Development includes the level of democracy, which is significant as autocracies would go to conflict. Also in the developing world the stakes are relatively lower - a conflict would cause casualties, but not to the scale as in a conflict between developed nations. The stakes for developed states are relatively higher.

**No clear answer on hypothesis 17. The role of military force was not elaborated.**<sup>346</sup>

### 4. Responses to hypotheses on other risk conditions

**Hypothesis 5, 6 and 7 are accepted.**

**Hypothesis 8 is partly accepted.** Point of view in defining spoiler is stressed.

**Hypothesis 11 is accepted.** All factors are intertwined, but criminality must be dealt with very firmly.

**Hypothesis 14 is accepted.**

**Hypothesis 15 is partly accepted.** This is very contextual; affected become part of the conflict and may evolve to becoming spoilers.

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<sup>345</sup> Researcher's comments: IMPLICATION: Must consider the consequences of PE on e.g. moderates. Will forceful actions alienate them from any peace process – or will they be more inclined to support?

PRECONDITION: No quick fix for subconventional conflict – must always consider seeing through the whole process. Subconventional conflicts cannot be resolved by conventional military means.

DEDUCTION: How to marginalise a total spoiler? This is a key question. What is the role of military in marginalising a total spoiler? Provide SASE – show that total spoilers efforts are ineffective. Use information operations to raise support for own cause and marginalise opposing force (total spoilers). Make sure that own actions are coordinated so that “fencesitters” do not fall prey for total spoiler recruitment and support. If no quick fix – then time is not a crucial substance but in contrast patience is crucial

<sup>346</sup> Researcher's comments: PRECONDITION: Not likely to appear in the developed world, moreover a question of appearing in the developing world. IMPLICATION?: Military forces of the developed world will have sufficient capabilities to intervene – but will they be allowed to and will there be enough incentives to authorize such interventions? And what do

**Other comments****Referring to the 1<sup>st</sup> round of Delphi questions**

Respondent says “agree with deductions”. However, must appreciate regional dynamics aspect also.

Failed governance causes migration. Important to understand that migration is internal within the region and continent (e.g. Africa), which is not the migration from Africa to e.g Europe.

In Africa the conflict drivers are: inter-ethnic tensions, competition and rivalry over resources and failed governance. Failed governance is a condition where there is no democracy – the people in power do not represent the will of the population. Power is centralised. These are the conflict drivers in Africa. In Asia and elsewhere the drivers are likely to be different. Thus no standard template can be derived for conflict resolution.

On risk conditions and their applicability: proliferation of WMD not applicable in Africa - can occur in low lying areas of Asia.

**On spoiler theory**

Respondent says “agree in large”, but does not agree on concept of total spoiler in conflict resolution setting. It is more a question of aspirations, grievances and tools applied. Total spoilers come to being only by the way people “look”.

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they actually attempt to accomplish if they are authorized to intervene? DEDUCTION: Must seek conflict prevention mechanisms (e.g. J2 functions, JMAC, SITCEN, information sharing, early warning, mediation and negotiation etc.)

## INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 4

### 1. Failed Governance

#### Preconditions

The generic preconditions are: (1) mission (i.e. for the operation), (2) interests (i.e. the interests of different nation states and international organisations in the political, economical etc. dimensions), and (3) resources (i.e. will there be sufficient resources for the scope of the mission), which makes things relative. Regarding preconditions, in this risk condition the mission becomes a specific issue and problem. Defining the mission sufficiently becomes very challenging.

#### Implications

The implications are as follows. When there is failed governance – the problem that arises is ‘local ownership’ of the process. In the scenario of failed governance finding local ownership will be difficult. One can build a “façade” but true local ownership is still challenging to develop. In a situation of failed governance it implies failure in governance across the board, which implies that one cannot focus on one area alone.

#### Hypothesis

Pertaining to the hypothesis, Respondent rejects the hypothesis as a generic assumption. Could be that in individual and specific ‘failed governance’ situation this is the case. Can often be a greedy spoiler, but this can occur alongside other spoilers.<sup>347</sup>

**Hypothesis 1: not accepted as a generic assumption, see comments above.**<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>347</sup> Researcher’s comment: Hypothesis allows for other spoilers – assumption relates to the significant spoiler.

<sup>348</sup> Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: mission, interest, resources. IMPLICATION: local ownership.

## 2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious or ideological conflict

The scenario setting may be a “matrix”. That means that there can be “crossing” (i.e. intertwined) elements (i.e. Sunni versus Sunni disputes with ethnicity related dimensions which lead to dispute of region versus region). Respondent accepts high level of hostility, but underscores that it usually is a matrix portraying the complexity of the scenario.

### Preconditions

The same three (3) generic preconditions exist. Pertaining to spoilers it would be utmost important to identify the total spoiler or spoilers. It is a balancing act between interests and mission – and it raises the question is plausible to define the mission specifically enough? In ethnical and religious conflicts the interests actually blur and defining the mission may be challenging, as the case was in Rwanda. Pertaining to the protection of civilians: these types of conflict exist all over the world. What is the interest to intervene amidst tensions? If indications of genocide are evident, then international attention and interest arise. However, tensions as such are a constant state.

### Implications

The specific challenge is the prospect of becoming a party to the conflict. This is because this is not the “classical” setting. For instance densely populated areas (i.e. cities and towns) are particularly challenging.<sup>349</sup>

**Hypothesis 2 and 3: undecided.**<sup>350</sup>

## 3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces

The respondent agrees with the hypothesis that greedy spoilers would exist and that justifies for peace enforcement measures.

### Preconditions

<sup>349</sup> Researcher's comment: Agree, terrain (villages or towns or cities) has significance. Make reference to “illogical” conflict

<sup>350</sup> Researcher's comment: Deduction from respondent's response (identify total spoiler): The hypothesis gains evidence that is that total spoilers may exist in this scenario. Is the challenge of defining here related to the “matrix” setting? DEDUCTION: “tensions are constant” affirms FRICTION as a structural driver



Regarding preconditions, the key question is: which actor has a strategic interest in the issue? Alongside local actors, this can also be a state that is located faraway.

### **Implications**

On implications, one cannot simply deploy, execute the tasks and leave. The solution must be a lasting and durable one.

**Hypothesis 4 accepted.**<sup>351</sup>

## **4. Uncontrolled migration**

The respondent agrees with the existence of limited spoilers in this scenario.

### **Preconditions**

- (1) Pertaining to preconditions, the interest viewpoint is emphasised in this case. The political pressure of European nations to participate is a precondition, as well as humanitarian and logistic pressures.
- (2) Regarding military capabilities, one cannot dismiss the possibility that military capabilities are used. In a failed state scenario military capabilities may be used, but not targeting the population.

**Hypothesis 5 accepted.**

**Hypothesis 6 accepted – not targeting the population.**

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<sup>351</sup> Researcher's comment: DEDUCTION: A strategic chokepoint will have wider considerations: i.e. beyond the immediate area of operations. These considerations must be factored in when devising a strategy for a PSO that must have a durable end state.

## **5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories**

Examples of disputes that pertain to uninhabited areas are few. The spoiler can be any of the three: limited, greedy or total.

### **Preconditions**

- (1) Pertaining to preconditions, if the spoiler type is greedy, then it emphasises the importance of identifying the local counterpart.
- (2) Furthermore, a solid answer on the question of local ownership is a precondition.
- (3) Identifying interests is also a precondition especially if the significant spoiler type is greedy.

**Hypothesis 7 and 8:** The respondent supports the view that both limited and greedy spoilers exist.

## **6. Proliferation of WMD/WME**

The respondent sees that matching a crisis management strategy to this scenario is extremely difficult, thus this scenario was not explored further.

## **7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes**

The hypothesis is accepted. If conflict components appear in this scenario, then that would obviously change the situation. It may be that there is a conflict that had not merited a crisis management operation, but then an environmental catastrophe occurs which merits a crisis management operation.

### **Hypothesis 10 accepted**

## **8. Transnational criminal movements**

Peace enforcement is plausible in this scenario but only with specific restrictions. Criminal movements with elements of terrorism, drug trade or human trafficking could merit for peace enforcement type measures. These movements are likely to be connected to failed governance type scenarios. Enforcement should be precise 'surgical' measures.

**Preconditions**

- (1) In this case, a crisis management operation will not be conducted without an UNSC resolution. To pass a resolution the risk condition needs to have a clear linkage to security and stability.

**Implication**

- (1) Implications are related to international legitimacy. For instance in the case of piracy, there must be a definition between the problems of crime and the problems related to unhindered sea lines of connection.
- (2) This type of crisis management is likely to be policing operations with the aim of supporting the population.

**Future**

- (1) These types of scenarios as well as international police cooperation are likely to increase.

**Hypothesis 11 accepted with reservations.****9. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties**

Where is the point that actually sparks the international community to take action? This would encompass a series of actions including sanctions, arms embargo and movement restrictions (e.g. no fly zones). If intervention is conducted it happens on a case by case basis.

**Preconditions**

- (1) One must be able to define the mission.
- (2) There must be sufficient resources.
- (3) Furthermore there must be an interest to intervene.

**Implications**

- (1) There are examples where this type of intervention has occurred, and the implication has been the change of the ruling regime.
- (2) This implies that the local ownership has to have been planned beforehand.

## **Future**

It is possible that these types of scenarios and interventions occur, especially as the media draws attention to them.

**Hypothesis 12 accepted with above remarks.**

## **10. Extremism of marginalised groups**

This risk condition is always present in a crisis management scenario. It is related to the setting where there are multiple actors present.

## **Preconditions**

- (1) The support of the host nation is a precondition.
- (2) Intervention must have international legitimacy.
- (3) Extremism is only a sub-factor of wider challenges.

## **Implications**

- (1) One must consider how different components of the population are treated.
- (2) A group may cease to exist or endanger the security situation, but another one may appear.
- (3) This is related to the 'breeding ground' of these movements. Pertaining to repercussions, it is possible that such movements attempt to take revenge on intervenors at their home fronts.

## **Future**

This is also difficult to evaluate. There is no generic answer as compared to the Cold War, when there was a wholly different setting. It is likely that the overall scenario is more fragmented.

**Hypothesis 13: respondent has reservations on this, as this is difficult to evaluate. There is an emphasis on the requirement of a political process.**

## **11. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes**

### **Preconditions**

- (1) The hypothesis no. 14 is a precondition itself.
- (2) Pertaining to peace enforcement: mission needs to be balanced with available resources.

### **Implications**

- (1) A peace agreement itself is an implication. An agreement is the objective towards which all efforts are aimed at.

**Hypothesis 14 accepted; this is a usual situation.**

**Hypothesis 15 requires more judgement where mission needs to be balanced with available resources.**

## **12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements**

Crimes that occur in cyberspace are related to this risk condition. Military crisis management has limited roles in these scenarios. Military means are likely to be limited to intelligence gathering and logistical support. It is not possible to counter this risk condition with military

### **Future**

These types of exploitations are likely to increase and challenge societies, which calls for pre-emptive and preventive approaches to counter these challenges.

**Hypothesis 16 not accepted**

### **13. Interstate rivalry**

Interstate rivalry is more a classical reason regional power struggle related scenario. However as an example the economical penetration of China to Africa is different from a regional interstate rivalry.

#### **Preconditions**

In the case of China's increasing influence in Africa there is little room for preconditions that would allow for intervening. However the three (3) generic preconditions are plausible in "classic" interstate rivalry. A fundamental precondition is the existence of some kind of peace agreement or at a minimum an armistice (ceasefire). Without a credible negotiation contact, agreement or armistice acceptance; then intervening in peace enforcement mode is not plausible.

#### **Implications.**

The operation must support and build a sustainable peaceful solution.

#### **Future**

It is possible that such scenarios would merit for peace support operations in the future. The humanitarian element is strong in the future – it is a prerequisite.

**Hypothesis 17 accepted, reservations hypothesis acceptable is relates to a regional conflict specifically between neighbour states.**

In general the respondent has reservations about PSO as a concept. For instance the EU acts in support of humanitarian aid in Libya. In Chad the issues are the IDPs and provision of humanitarian aid. In Congo the issue is stability.

## INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 5

### Respondent's comments on the first Delphi round findings:

Respondent sees that these risk conditions would constitute for peace support operation: (1) *interstate rivalry*, (2) *failed governance*, (3) *potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict*, (4) *territorial and extra-territorial border disputes*, (5) *extremism of marginalised groups*, (6) *proliferation of WMD/WME* and (7) *consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes*.

Furthermore, some risk conditions would require specific preconditions to be met, for them to merit a peace support operation (PSO). *Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces* should be extremely serious, for it to merit for PSO. The precondition extreme seriousness applies to *transnational criminal movements*. *Uncontrolled migration* is also problematic as a PSO scenario. However it would merit for frontier guard and border control type measures. *Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories*, would require coalition or interests to be threatened, for it to merit for military interventions. Respondent does not see that technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements, would merit for a PSO. However, a single nation may take action, but this cannot be regarded as a PSO.

### 1. Failed Governance:

The greedy spoiler type is likely to be significant. However the situation is likely to be complex, and there would be substantial need for local demand, that no one group or spoiler is raised above others. But overall the circumstances dictate, and as the level of violence is low; it would not convince the international community that a crisis-management operation is necessary.

“Would this mean that it is more of a peacekeeping character?” Yes: for example the case of South Sudan, which may turn out to be a newly independent failed state, the crisis-management operation is more of monitoring and verification type activities. The UNDPKO has a “low key” approach where the mission is present and visible at a community and village level. The actions are in support of the governance and not coercive.

## Preconditions

- (1) Although it is not necessary to involve absolutely every single party to a conflict in a peace process; some kind of political process must be in place, even if it involves greedy spoilers.
- (2) The fundamental preconditions that apply are: (1) a mandate (e.g. resolution) from the UN Security Council; (2) sufficient support through comprehensive considerations from the international community; and (3) the practical resources.
- (3) There should also be an initial understanding on who contributes to the practical resources (e.g. troop contributing nations) before a UN Security Council resolution is passed.

## Implications

- (1) An important implication arises from the passage of time since the beginning of an operation. Unless substantial progress is apparent, a review of the mandate will surely take place especially if the situation turns more hostile. An operating environment can quickly change.

## Future perspectives

It is difficult to comment on perspectives. If one looks at past or recent failed governance situations: they are all individual cases, and thus it is hard to identify any trends. However the threshold for the international community to intervene is lower on a conceptual level, but not necessarily in practice. It is likely that these interventions are not going to decrease, but rather increase. The operations are not solely military operations; rather they must be comprehensive operations which include the political, civilian crisis management, policing and military elements. An operation must have quick impact projects to demonstrate quick progress alongside long-term development programs. In these failed governance situations the effects may spread world wide and are thus severe. Progress may take time, but hopefully the international community has learnt that developing failed governance towards self-sustainability is important.

**Hypothesis 1 accepted as plausible. Reservations: see above.<sup>352</sup>**

## 2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict:

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<sup>352</sup> Researcher's comments: DEDUCTION: Level of hostility is an important precondition in considering any intervention and the mode of operating. To note; this is actually in contradiction with what Doyle and Sambanis PB triangle suggests, but level of hostility has impact on the international community's commitment. But this tricky: if high hostility then public opinion might call for intervention but practical resources matters do not allow for it – it is a "catch 22". DEDUCTION: Time has an important impact once a mission is launched.



This is slightly difficult as there is not direct causality between the existence of a total spoiler and high level of hostility. If there is a total spoiler then surely peace enforcement is used (e.g. Libya). But unless level of hostility is not high there will not be a chapter 7 mission.

### **Preconditions**

- (1) The responsibility to protect approach is a vital precondition.
- (2) Urgency may require the UNSCR to pass resolutions quickly.
- (3) The UNSCR must be resolute especially if the threat is high.
- (4) A strong peace negotiation process is a prerequisite, otherwise will be extremely difficult.

### **Implications**

- (1) Without a strong peace negotiation process the military component will evolve into being a party to the conflict.
- (2) Without a peace process there will not be a positive outcome exit strategy.

### **Future perspectives**

The demand for an inclusive international process will remain as a precondition in these cases also in the future. There are no solely military solutions to these risks even in the future. The described risk condition requires long-lasting and serious-minded commitment from the international community.

**Hypotheses 2 and 3 accepted with reservations presented above.**

### **3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces**

The scenario itself is acceptable. However it is difficult to identify military actions conducted by the international community for this scenario. This is because conflict arises from economical interests. This does not disclude individual states or coalitions that may take military action. Piracy may be the exception, where the EU or NATO would intervene, but intervention would require more prerequisites.

#### **Preconditions**

- (1) It is a concrete precondition that the vulnerability is also experienced as a problem at the local – regional level. A mission cannot appear from “nowhere”.

#### **Implications**

- (1) The timeframe; for how long can it go on for?

**Hypothesis 4: the scenario is accepted, but collective military action is not likely. However, individual states or coalitions may take action to protect their economical interests.**

### **4. Uncontrolled migration**

Respondent does not see uncontrolled migration as a scenario that would merit for military means in a crisis management operation, but rather frontier guard (i.e. border control) type instruments.

#### **Preconditions**

- (1) The security situation should be extremely severe for it to necessitate military means.
- (2) Military means may be needed to secure delivery of aid (e.g. EU operation in Chad). The humanitarian aid agencies are extremely careful about their integrity.

## **Implications**

- (1) Wide support from the citizens of participating nations is likely.
- (2) Not a particularly risky operation, thus getting a mandate should not be difficult to obtain.

## **Future perspectives**

Management of this risk condition will be needed in the future and wider means to manage will be called for.

## **5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories**

Regarding **hypothesis and dscription**, if the dispute has high impact on states, then military means may be employed even in (pre-emptive/preventive) actions. Firstly, the challenge is finding a balance between the international negotiations (demands) and international law. If the dispute is highly violent then the threshold for international intervention is high, and very much dependent on how critical the resources are. In this scenario the distinctions between the spoilers are not pertinent to the actions taken.

## **Preconditions**

- (1) The scale of the conflict must be large enough.
- (2) The effects should not be limited to the local area only, but should have effects beyond the immediate are on a regional or even global level.
- (3) Alternatively the disputes should have long lasting effects on international trade.

**Hypothesis 7 and 8 accepted with above consderations.**

## **6. Proliferation of WMD/WME**

The scenario seems very plausible. The evaluation comprises of the risks (scope and type) as well as the overall setting. Hard to imagine anything beyond a setting, where one actor is in illegitimate possession of WMD/WME. Anything with more actors or more complicated is hard to portray.

## **Preconditions**

- (1) Actions taken must be precise and short duration. The exception is the safeguarding of WMD/WME facilities, which may be a long term undertaking.
- (2) Preconditions are dependent on the spoiler type (e.g. state actor or non-state actor). If the spoiler is a small non-state actor, then it is likely that actions international community would be taken quickly. This would not be the case if the spoiler is a state actor. Actions against North Korea or Iran are very far away. This is due to the grave escalation prospects.

### **Implications**

- (1) If there is a substantial amount of WMD/WME involved, or the use of military force is very likely, then the planning must be conducted so that success is assured. Success must be very sure, because the political risks are so great. Although the physical effects of a failure may be limited to local – regional level, the political effects will have a much larger impact.<sup>353</sup>

### **Future perspectives**

A positive feature is that regardless of the outcome, this type of risk condition is not likely to require long term commitment for the military capabilities.

## **7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes**

Hypothesis is accepted, but does not see the linkage between this risk condition and the applicability of spoiler theory. The risk condition is not man-made.

### **Preconditions**

- (1) This risk condition is not linked to the security situation. For example NATO's relief operation after the earthquake in Pakistan had no security implications.

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<sup>353</sup> "Jos merkittävä määrä WMD, jos sotilaallinen voimankäyttö on todennäköistä po. suunniteltu niin että varmasti onnistuu. Onnistumisen pitää olla erittäin varmaa, koska poliittinen riski on niin suuri. Vaikka epäonnistumisen fyysiset vaikutukset olisivat paikallisia, niin poliittiset vaikutukset olisivat laajalle leviäviä."

**Implications**

- (1) Cynically thinking, the resources would be engaged some time. Evaluation would take into account what else is going on, as well as internal and foreign policy considerations.

**Future perspectives**

Coordination by the international community is vital. The coordination issues relate to the will to be seen nationally, interoperability and command structures.

**Hypothesis 10 is accepted.****8. Transnational criminal movements**

Slightly problematic – how do these movements fit into the grand threat scenarios? There are the type of actors that are not compromised with. There will be no negotiations with criminal movements – but rather efforts to prevent and limit criminal actions alongside other policing measures.

**Preconditions**

- (1) If in support of police forces, the key preconditions arise from the capability evaluation of the police component. If their capabilities are not sufficient, then military capabilities may be used in support.
- (2) Does not necessarily require an international commitment. Can be utilised within a single state or be bilateral cooperation between neighbours. Military capabilities used as a last resort.

**Implications**

- (1) Must be clearly defined also with respect to the timeframe, otherwise may drift into a violent spiral.

## **Future perspectives**

Respondent does not see an increase in the trend employing military capabilities. However; international police cooperation is likely to continue increasing.

**Hypothesis 11 not accepted. See remarks on 1<sup>st</sup> round of delphi-questions.**

## **9. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties**

**Hypothesis 12 not accepted.** Hard to visualize – only through many hypotheses. The linkage to the spoiler type is especially difficult. If the case is about a total spoiler, may be then it would easier to visualize.

## **10. Extremism of marginalised groups**

Hypothesis accepted - the hypothesis is plausible. The point of view has an impact as well as the level of violence, which should be high for intervention to be conducted.

## **Preconditions**

- (1) The quality of the extremist group has an impact. If the situation builds up international support for intervening, then intervention may happen quickly. Otherwise intervention does not occur quickly.
- (2) Also the military might of the country in question has an impact.
- (3) The prospect of a quick relative change is always to be considered.
- (4) If the rise of an extremist group is about to oust otherwise difficult actors, then this may mean that the international community only follows the developments.

## **Implications**

- (1) The political evaluation and considerations must take into account the possible ramifications against the states participating in the intervention.
- (2) If external intervention is conducted, but there is support for the spoiler from external parties or states, then the process is likely to become more difficult.
- (3) Must be prepared for a long-term approach.

**Future perspectives**

Is not an advocate of the idea that the Islamists' pose a threat. Therefore does not foresee that military capabilities would be involved in these situations.

**Hypothesis 13 accepted - the hypothesis is plausible.**

**11. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes****Preconditions**

- (1) Even if parties to dispute have not requested external parties to intervene, they should allow it and not actively resist it.
- (2) A mandate is necessary, not necessarily a UNSC resolution, but legitimacy for the intervention is a precondition. Mandate should have a peace enforcement dimension (e.g. UN Charter chapter VII type mission).

**Implications**

- (1) The first priority is an effective political process, which requires unity on the issue from the international community. The use of military capabilities is a supporting measure.

**Future perspectives**

The end state is best achieved if the problem is managed before any military action has taken place.

**Hypothesis 14 accepted. The hypothesis is plausible and portrays a classic approach.**

**Hypothesis 15 accepted with reservations. The hypothesis is plausible and portrays a classic approach.**

## **12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements**

There was no need to cover this risk condition, as respondent does not view it as a case for PSO.

## **13. Interstate rivalry**

This is a classic case and the hypothesis appears logical. One question that comes to the fore is the amount of parties to a rivalry. Initially one would think there are only two, but in this case there can be numerous. However, some of these parties may not be as important as others. Some considerations: does the military action actually relate to the spoiler in this scenario, or is it simple to conduct peace enforcement in this case?

### **Preconditions**

- (1) Some regional “African” conflicts would require mediation processes led by regional organisations (e.g. ECOWAS, AU).
- (2) If the dispute is small scale and limited, then it does not necessarily require a UN Security Council mandate. However, some type of international structure should be in support of the process.

### **Implications**

- (1) After a decision to commit to a PSO, the speed at which forces deploy is a concern for all.
- (2) There must be a linkage to a realistic negotiation process and plausible exit strategies
- (3) Currently the will to commit to PSOs is relatively low. There is a desire to limit commitments to short term only. This is evident in the current discussions happening within the EU. The big scale operations have gone on for long periods, and implementing exit strategies is difficult. The political will is waning alongside the strict financial limitations.

### **Future perspectives**

Unfortunately this hypothesis is valid, although trends portray that these cases would be on the decrease. Especially these cases are likely to appear intertwined with different regional and ethnic dimensions. The applicability of peace enforcement is related to the level, intensity and scope of violence. If violence can be “capsulated” or if it has wider ramifications, that has an impact.

**Hypothesis 17 accepted.**



## INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 6

### 1. Failed Governance

Somalia is an example of a failed state. However, the ‘criminal’ elements of a failed state may form part of the future organized governance structure. As an example is that some elements of Somalia’s president Farole’s government have links to piracy – similar challenges are related to president Karzai’s government. A peace process would not prevail if these elements were excluded on the grounds of suspicion of illegitimate activities. In Afghanistan the international actors aid and support Karzai’s government, but do not fully accept it. Referring to Somalia and USA’s perspective on Islamists: Islamists are viewed as terrorists because they have substantiated links to Al-Qaida. Respondent’s perspective is that Al-Qaida influences only in a limited manner the overall Islamists’ network – thus control is very regional.<sup>354</sup>

Respondent does not agree with distinction of total spoilers. As an example is Hamas. Hamas does not accept Israel as a state, but based on discussion with other negotiators and diplomats Respondent believes that Hamas would accept a ceasefire that lasts for decades (i.e. 100 – 150 years). In this case Hamas would not need to back down on its fundamental demand of not accepting Israel – but would accept the ceasefire.<sup>355</sup>

In general, respondent sees that by categorically excluding Islamists from negotiations the Western states are committing a grave mistake. This exclusion is founded on Western states own perception only. As an example is Khalil Ibrahim of the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement, Darfur – Sudan). Khalil Ibrahim is political Islamist. In Abudja 2005-2006, Respondent was astonished that the EU, USA and AU representatives undermined the negotiation position of Khalil Ibrahim, and also undermined the fighting power of his followers. Neither the World Bank nor EU high representative were willing to meet Khalil Ibrahim. However this faction proved to be one of the most influential factions in the coming years. According to Respondent the similar situation is present in Afghanistan with the Taliban, in Somalia, in Sudan with the JEM and in Gaza with the Hamas. In general this means that the intervening international actors have taken sides with one or more of the actors – and this actually implies that the intervening international actors are actually a part of any such crisis. Thus they are unable to get all the relevant actors into a negotiation process.<sup>356</sup>

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<sup>354</sup> Researcher’s comment: May need to involve total spoilers in peace process, which is consistent with Stedman’s theory.

<sup>355</sup> Researcher’s comment: DEDUCTION: Useful to explore various time perspectives in current conflict settings. Maybe an uneasy ceasefire is better than ongoing violent conflict?

<sup>356</sup> Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: a prerequisite for remaining impartial will necessitate the involvement of all relevant parties and factions.

Using the recent history of Sudan and Darfur as an example, respondent made the point that the military does not favour military solutions; the civilian counterparts were calling for military solutions. The military counterparts strongly favour a peace process.<sup>357</sup>

The responsibility to protect civilians will have an emphasis in the future. If there is a prospect of a great number of civilian casualties or large refugee movements, then intervention is more likely.

The extent of the planned effort must be manageable. (i.e. ends to means)

On the prospect of becoming a part of a crisis; in order to avoid this, the action should have “one time only” character and the action should have a “decisive impact” on the developments. As examples are: (1) the NATO bombing actions in Kosovo and (2) the liberation of Kuwait in accordance to the UN Charter, which calls for the protection of any member state that becomes the object of military action.<sup>358</sup>

**Hypothesis partly accepted. Reservations: decisive actions could be necessary in support of political peace process whilst all relevant actors should be involved.**

Respondent sees the possibility of using “one time only” and “decisive impact” actions in support of a peace process. Overall a mandate authorizes an operation, whilst specific actions must remain within the mandate’s provided authority. Respondent has reservations on the identification of spoilers as total spoilers – there will be a need to negotiate and involve all relevant actors.<sup>359</sup>

## **2. Interstate rivalry**

Respondent used the invasion and liberation of Kuwait as an example. Kuwait was a sovereign state, and its government in exile requested for assistance. The intervention was authorised by the UN Security Council

<sup>357</sup> Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: A feasible political process remains crucial in any crisis management undertaking, with the military capabilities supporting that effort.

<sup>358</sup> Researcher’s comment: Avoiding becoming a part of crisis and sustaining impartiality calls for that case by case decisions and actions to have decisive impact on the course of events. Overall, this (i.e. decisive) supports utility of peace enforcement.

<sup>359</sup> Researcher’s comment: EMPHASIS: Peace process. PRECONDITION: The responsibility to protect civilians will have an emphasis in the future. If there is a prospect of a great number of civilian casualties or large refugee movements, then intervention is more likely. DEDUCTIONS: (1) To initiate a process, have to accept that it will not be “perfect” textbook solution. One will have to accommodate parties and factions, which from developed states’ point of view are not fully legitimate. (2) Influence of terrorist networks very regional. (NB. same point as respondent 7 provided!) (3) Will have to negotiate with ‘terrorists’! Will have to negotiate with those whose perception of the world one does not agree with. (4) What is the impact of time? Must appreciate that the influence of any factions is likely to evolve and develop over time (ref: case Hamas).

Resolution. However despite this example, in the future there is limited possibility for intervention in interstate rivalries. Some kind of ‘focused operations’ may be possible; but operations involving large scale military capabilities are not likely to be plausible.

### 3. OTHER COMMENTS

#### **Broadly on the UN and NATO relationship and differences**

On negotiation cultures: In Afganistan the situation seems to be that is the ‘final moment’ to initiate negotiations with the Taliban – else it may up in a situation as was in South Vietnam, where the last elements supporting external forces had to be rescued. The challenge is that: negotiations with the Taliban seem to cross the boundary of acceptable patriotism in the USA – and are therefore not accepted. Meanwhile there is a fear that President Karzai’s regime’s loyalty for the intervening coalition is eroding.<sup>360</sup>

Regarding preconditions in the future: there must be a mandate for actions taken. These mandates must be evermore clear. The UN Security Council is the authorizing body and provides the mandates. NATO provides the military capabilities, and continues to collaborate with other regional organisations (e.g. AU, Arab League) for support and coordination of efforts.<sup>361</sup>

Pertaining to Afganistan and on the ISAF – UN relationship; the civilian development efforts are the key to success, and with early ventures a lot of ‘good will’ would have been gained – this did not materialize as the UN Security Council was divided on the matter early on. Whilst conducting military crisis management one has to consider what effects are caused by the distruction of infrastructure and removal of competent people from their posts. Here respondent used the water management systems rebuild in Iraq as an example. Continuing on examples occurred in Iraq; the late SRSG to Iraq, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, was accordingly outraged by the bypassing of the UN in Iraq.<sup>362</sup>

#### **Regarding the international system**

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<sup>360</sup> Researcher’s comment: Timing of negotiations and appreciation of changed circumstances are highlighted.

<sup>361</sup> Researcher’s comment: PRECONDITION: A UN Security Council mandate is a prerequisite for actions COMMENT: importance of a UNSCR seems to remain in the future, despite alternative views – UNSC remains as custodian of international law.

<sup>362</sup> Researcher’s comment: IMPLICATION: A military component should not start leading the overall crisis management operation, but should provide a safe and secure environment for others to operate in.

Regarding the international system; Respondent emphasises that the UN sets the rules of play, and ‘news on the death of the UN are strongly exaggerated’. Respondent sees that the UN concept will remain in the next decade. UN provides the mandate for actions, it is the forum of interaction and discussion, whilst all new emerging powers remain involved in the UN system. Respondent does not see the structural reform of the UN succeeding (e.g the permanent 5 will not change). Any reform should be sector and UN sub-organisation specific and the approach from down to top.

## INTERVIEW RESPONSES – RESPONDENT 7

### 1. Failed Governance

The level of hostility is challenging in this case: it may appear as low, but even small interventions may spark high levels of hostility – thus the *potential for hostility* is also a factor. Also challenging is distinguishing different spoilers – but agree that greedy spoilers. Overall it may seem that interventions are tempting and more plausible than they actually are.

**Hypothesis 1 is accepted. Reservations: potential for escalation.**<sup>363</sup>

### 2. Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict

This scenario has resemblance of Libya (situation as of spring 2011), which is not a peace support operation scenario, but a scenario of war fighting. An intervention is always a political decision – and all political and diplomatic means should be exhausted before military action. However this scenario merits for a PSO, as was the case in Afghanistan where initially the problems with the taliban were known, but the potential for spillover rose to the forefront of concerns. Overall this approach where interventions would be conducted is a (hyväntahtoinen), and not likely to appear in the real world. The challenge is that: crisis management, peace operations or peace support operations have not been explicitly defined.

**Hypothesis 2 accepted. Reservations: war fighting scenario.**

**Hypothesis 3 accepted. Reservations: hostility is likely to be high.**<sup>364</sup>

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<sup>363</sup> Researcher's comments: Idea that greedy spoilers exists is accepted. IMPLICATION: interventions may change the level of hostility; if this is the appreciation, then seeking compliance is important; if escalation not likely, then intervention impact may be assessed from current setting. PRECONDITION: the level of hostility that is visible is not a single factor, as alongside that the potential for escalation of hostility needs to be considered. IMPLICATION: the potential for escalation has an impact on force generation and military mode of operations.

<sup>364</sup> Researcher's comments: PRECONDITIONS: Must distinguish between PSO and warfighting. Make reference and differentiate pre-emption / preventive (ref. Doyle). Intervention is always a political decision, on which potential spillover effects has an influence. What is the impact of the overall future scenario? RECOMMENDATIONS (reference to UN and NATO strategies): phasing of effort, clear aims and end states, comprehensive and collective efforts, etc.

### **3. Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces**

If one accepts the theoretical approach, then this is a good foundation for launching a peace support operation. The precondition is that there is no conflict of interest with a powerful regional or local actor. The precondition is that the local or regional authority has the same (similar/parallel) interest as any intervening force. Intervention is not plausible in a chaotic (sekasortoinen) situation. The current situation of Somalian piracy reflects this as well as the situation in Egypt (spring 2011), where it was an overall interest to maintain the Suez canal operable.

**Hypothesis 4 accepted. Reservations: also limited spoilers would exist.**<sup>365</sup>

### **4. Uncontrolled migration**

Not a good or plausible scenario for military crisis management: more a question of humanitarian aid efforts and policing. The protection of aid efforts with military means is accepted. The hostility towards states at areas of arrival is not a precondition but an implication of the effects of migration (deteriorating living conditions)

**Hypothesis 5 accepted.**

**Hypothesis 6 accepted.**<sup>366</sup>

### **5. Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories**

Setting is problematic, as a limited number of areas where such disputes may arise. The Arctic area does not provided such scenario as disputes have been and are likely to be settled through political means. Alongside this the demands of China at South China Sea have been countered by political and diplomatic means: i.e. states emphasizing their strong ties with the US. In contrast areas that are resource-rich but habited may cause conflicts; as is the case in the Great Lakes area in Africa. These potential conflicts would be the school examples of robust intervention, where the responsibility to protect would be the main incentive.

**Hypothesis 7 accepted. Reservations: if happens in habited areas.**

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<sup>365</sup> Researcher's comment: PRECONDITION: A PSO may be launched if no unacceptable conflict of interest with a strong local or regional actor. PRECONDITION: Interventions not likely into chaotic and unclear situations.

**Hypothesis 8 accepted. Reservations: more likely in habited areas.**<sup>367</sup>

## **6. Proliferation of WMD/WME**

This issue involves also other WMD than only nuclear weapons. Several preconditions must exist in order to intervene. Firstly, the country that is about to gain WMD/WME capability must be new and an emerging one – not a country that has already established that capability (e.g. Pakistan). Gaining legitimacy for such an intervention should be possible (e.g. 2<sup>nd</sup> Iraq war). Another precondition is that a political process must be executed before any military action. It is plausible that against relatively weak actors preventive interventions are conducted.

**Hypothesis 9 accepted. Reservations: must be against a relatively weak actor with an emerging WMD capability.**<sup>368</sup>

## **7. Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes**

Clear without a doubt.

**Hypothesis 10 accepted**

## **8. Transnational criminal movements**

Examples can be seen in Mexico, Central America and even Russia. The precondition is that the local capacity to resist intervention is low, but other factors need also be considered. For example the Mexican government resists international intervention to support its campaigns against the drug cartels – Mexico is one of the states that emphasise sovereignty. Emphasis of state sovereignty varies from country to country and from region to region, but in certain areas the participants of an intervention force are a very crucial factor. As Afganistan shows; fighting criminality (drug crime) and attempting nation building simultaneously is extremely

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<sup>366</sup> Researcher's comment: PRECONDITION: Gravitates towards humanitarian aid, and thus not suitable for evaluating peace enforcement measures. Protection of humanitarian aid efforts (i.e. peacekeeping measures) accepted. IMPLICATION: Level of hostility is an implication not a "given".

<sup>367</sup> Researcher's comment: Conflicts not considered likely in uninhabited areas, but in habited areas there is potential for conflicts. Intervention in such cases would be justified and legitimacy gained by the "responsibility to protect" framework. IMPLICATION: Likely to be settled through political means. However in certain areas the responsibility to protect incentive will be sufficient to intervene.

challenging. However, USA conducts joint campaigns with Columbia targeting drug crime there (Plan Colombia). The challenge is that drug crime instigates many other forms of activity (e.g. law enforcement and corruption). In Columbia there is functioning government albeit its legitimacy may have been questioned. The Plan Colombia has slightly increased its legitimacy, and the government is more or less approaching democratic standards. However fighting crime (e.g. drug crime) in one country has the effect of moving crime to another deprived area. Therefore this is a serious threat for e.g. Mexico, small Central American states, Caribbean states and West African states.

**Hypothesis 11 accepted. Reservations: authorizers and participants of an intervening force must consider follow on effects.**<sup>369</sup>

## 9. Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties

The threshold for intervening with incentive of “responsibility to protect” is high, and is likely to even higher in the future as authoritarian regimes gain more influence within the international system. The threat must be a direct threat to the physical security of a population. Current situation North Africa in general and Libya in particular serve as a case studies. Only when the physical security of citizens was clearly threatened was there enough incentives for the UNSC to pass a resolution and nation states to act accordingly.

**Hypothesis 12 not accepted.**<sup>370</sup>

## 10. Extremism of marginalised groups

It is important to note that the impact of extremism of marginalised groups is often local or at most regional. Furthermore it is religion oriented. Thus they cannot be considered as total. However groups like Al-Qaida can be considered as total. In contrast Hizbollah and Hamas can be considered as greedy spoilers, as they work as

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<sup>368</sup> Researcher's comment: DEDUCTION: as respondent refers only to emerging capabilities – thus the actions would be preventive (i.e. against potential threats), but this would raise the concerns about the legality and legitimacy of such actions as the threat is not imminent?

<sup>369</sup> Researcher's comment: PRECONDITIONS: respect of state sovereignty may be unsurpassable. A functioning government in the area provides a far better starting point for combating transnational crime, than attempting to do both crime prevention and nation building simultaneously. IMPLICATIONS: The correct (i.e. acceptable) participants of an intervention force is crucial. One must consider follow on effects of successful operations towards other states; will success somewhere merely move the problem elsewhere. RECOMMENDATION: politically acceptable and impartial intervening forces

<sup>370</sup> Researcher's comment: In many instances power politics of great powers overrides concerns about responsibility to protect. PRECONDITION: A threat must be a direct threat to the physical security of a population.



proxies for Iran and Syria at times, but limited spoilers in their aims regarding their own area. Hizbollah has been flexible – which supports the greedy spoiler theory; whilst Hamas has functioned tactically – which also supports the greedy spoiler theory, but it has been total towards Israel. The question this raises is: From whose point of view is a group considered a total spoiler? Al-Qaida arrived to the scene as a new phenomenon, not respecting boundaries. For example and in contrast a Palestinian suicide bomber may attack in Israel, but is not likely to attack in Spain.

**Hypothesis 13 accepted. Supporting case is Afganistan.**

## **11. Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes**

More often the case is protection of an achieved peace process, not a case of intervening and using peace enforcement means. Border disputes have occurred and will occur in the future. It will not be possible to identify legitimate or illegitimate demands. It is likely that external military capabilities are only used once parties are committed to a peace process in order to safeguard such a process.

**Hypothesis 14 accepted when referring to responsibility to protect civilians. Reservations: legitimate and illegitimate demands difficult to identify.**

**Hypothesis 15 accepted with reservations - see above.<sup>371</sup>**

## **12. Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements**

Peace enforcement against cybercrime would be most suitable and even subject to plausible development measures.

**Hypothesis 16 accepted**

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<sup>371</sup> Researcher's comments: Peacekeeping has its place (protect peace process) traditional peacekeeping; not likely that interventions to impose peace. PRECONDITION: protecting peace not imposing it. IMPLICATION: peacekeeping measures called for.

### **13. Interstate rivalry**

Preconditions are that intervention in most cases will require a UNSC resolution; a common understanding that intervention would be successful in stopping the rivalry by the fact that rival parties are relatively weak or the level of rivalry is low. The intervening force must also be able to overwhelm one or both parties simultaneously.

**Hypothesis 17 accepted. Reservations: see above preconditions.**

### **14. OTHER COMMENTS**

Contemporary military crisis management operations (i.e. peace support operations) have been developed on the basis of lessons learned in the wars of former Yugoslavia. Maybe the lessons learnt from Afganistan are only starting to be incorporated? Libya was a surprise – the undeciveness of the US is typical, as it follows the pattern that occurred in Bosnia. The UNSC voting by Germany on Libya might even be an accident, but surely is a mystery.

**Iterative round of delphi-questions for diploma thesis:**  
**“Military crisis management in the next decade (2020-2030)”**

## INTRODUCTION AND INSTRUCTIONS

The 3<sup>rd</sup> round of delphi-questions is an integral part of the delphi-research method. **The aim of the 3<sup>rd</sup> round of delphi-questions is to consolidate the findings of the 2<sup>nd</sup> round.**

The responses to the 2<sup>nd</sup> round are in the following draft. The draft is exhaustive, but to make the task more manageable I have highlighted the text parts that merit specific attention:

- a unique finding provided by a panelist = purple highlight (5 parts within the text)
- a contradiction amongst the delphi-panel = yellow highlight (11 parts within the text)
- a finding that is not robust or researcher's elaboration = turquoise (9 parts within the text)

The contradictions are the primary focus at this stage. I request that you provide your comments to the highlighted parts in at least the following format:

- strongly agree
- agree
- disagree
- strongly disagree

If possible, please provide short argumentation especially in the cases where you disagree.

I appreciate your earliest possible responses. Responses received by 26<sup>th</sup> of July 2011 will be incorporated.

With many thanks and kind regards,

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## Testing the Hypotheses: 2<sup>nd</sup> Round of Delphi-questions

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### 5.4.1 Failed Governance

*Preconditions. Cognizance of what is good governance versus what is failed governance is a fundamental precondition for anyone planning, participating or conducting a peace support operation.*<sup>372</sup> --

A fundamental precondition is that defining spoilers is founded on the selected point of view. One must appreciate that *spoilers are defined from the peace process' point of view* (i.e. parties of a peace process and their external interlocutors). --

### 5.4.2 Potential Spill-over of Ethnic, Religious or Ideological conflict

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One may argue that this is an “illogical” type of conflict as versus a “logical” type of conflict. As an example, a logical type of conflict may have its root cause in economy. It is argued that illogical type of conflict has root causes in ethnicity, religion or ideology. Based on this point of view it is important to highlight ideological reconciliation.

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### 5.4.3 Vulnerability of Strategic Chokepoints and Infrastructures in Ungoverned Spaces<sup>373</sup>

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-- *The vulnerability of strategic chokepoints is a more grand interstate level conflict scenario.* --

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<sup>372</sup> This point is supported by the argumentation available in United Kingdom Ministry of Defence: *Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2040*, Strategic Trends Programme, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), 4<sup>th</sup> edition, 2010, pp. 10-14,17.

The delfi-panel provided conflicting views related to acceptance. It is argued that *the political will to intervene is paramount, whilst the local acceptance is not considered*. This suggests that the priorities of preconditions change in this scenario. The conflicting view is that *vulnerability should also be experienced as a problem at the local and regional level*. A mission cannot appear from nowhere. It is also argued, that there should not be a conflict of interest with a powerful local or regional actor. Local or regional actors should have similar or parallel interest as any intervening force. Furthermore, it is argued that intervention is not plausible in a chaotic situation.

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The panel has different views on what is truly strategic, as was elaborated earlier. In relation to this the panel provides a view that international community as a whole would not be likely to intervene. Rather an intervention would be conducted by individual states or coalitions with a strategic interest in the matter.

#### 5.4.4 Uncontrolled Migration

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#### 5.4.5 Potential Disputes over Previously Uninhabited and Resource-rich Territories

*Preconditions.* These disputes are more likely to occur intrastate. They are not likely in uninhabited areas<sup>374</sup>. --- . *The hypotheses are accepted with reservations, but the acceptance is not robust*<sup>375</sup>. Firstly, it is pointed out that actually all three types of spoilers (i.e. limited, greedy or total) may appear as the significant spoiler. Secondly, it is highlighted that this scenario is likely to happen in habited areas rather than in uninhabited areas.

#### 5.4.6 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction or Weapons of Mass Effect<sup>376</sup>

<sup>373</sup> The definition of *ungoverned space* was elaborated during the interviews. The respondents provided their responses within a background where ungoverned was extended to geographical space in general.

<sup>374</sup> Researcher's comment: *The risk condition's definition "uninhabited" may be there because of political considerations and potential political ramifications. As it is a NATO public document it could purposefully avoid pointing out inter- or intrastate disputes; in order not to escalate such disputes.*

<sup>375</sup> Two panelists accept and two panelists accept partly, whilst three panelists did not provide responses.

<sup>376</sup> Henceforth WMD/WME.

*Preconditions.* --. Overall *nothing should be left for chance* in the planning for countering this risk condition. However, it is argued that the military preconditions are less generic - there is *more "free hand"* in this case. --

As a counter-argument it is stated that matching a crisis management strategy to this scenario is extremely difficult, and therefore it should not be explored further<sup>377</sup>. --. *The hypothesis gains acceptance amongst the panel, although the finding is not robust*<sup>378</sup>. The reservations are encompassed in the preconditions.

#### 5.4.7 Consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes

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#### 5.4.8 Transnational criminal movements

-- *However fighting crime in one country has the effect of moving crime to another deprived area.* policing measures. Therefore criminal elements cannot be defined as greedy spoilers, and *the hypothesis is not accepted in this form.*

#### 5.4.9 Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil liberties

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#### 5.4.10 Extremism of marginalised groups

*Preconditions.* Extremism of marginalised groups is a risk condition is *always present* in a crisis management scenario. In these scenarios there are *multiple* actors present, of which some are likely to be marginalised and become extremist. However, the impact of extremist marginalised groups is often *local or at the most regional.*

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One implication is physical segregation, which is against instinct of panelist. But one may establish zones of separation, as has been explored in the Darfur Peace Process. --

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<sup>377</sup> This refers to responses by respondent no. 4.

#### 5.4.11 Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes

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#### 5.4.12 Technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements

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*Hypothesis.* Hypothesis no. 16 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. This hypothesis received lucid support alongside views which do not accept it. The opposing views built the argumentation on the foundation that military ways and means or peace support operations do not have a role in countering this risk condition. Quite intentionally the hypothesis does not describe the ways and means how such peace enforcement could be conducted. It is plausible that the military means could be intelligence gathering and logistical support, but importantly the military could also kinetically target criminal or rogue elements that actually exploit technology with malicious intentions.

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#### 5.4.13 Interstate rivalry

--. It is stated that the intervening force should be able to overwhelm one or both parties simultaneously. This relates to the number of parties involved. Initially one would think there are only two, but in this case there can be numerous parties that affect the situation. However, some of these parties may not be as important as others.

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*Hypothesis.* Hypothesis no. 17 is: It is likely that in such a risk condition greedy spoilers exist, and this justifies for peace enforcement measures. The hypothesis received support; although its acceptance is subject to preconditions. One reservation is that this hypothesis applies to an interstate conflict with regional character,

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<sup>378</sup> Three panelist accept the hypothesis, whilst three do not provide adequate response and one does not see the risk condition relevant for crisis management operations.

and especially to a conflict between neighbour states. Alongside two undecided respondents, one respondent does not accept the hypothesis. This opposing view is founded on the basis that as one must have the consent of the rivalries, thus a peace enforcement mode is not possible.

One may argue that this opposing view does not fully appreciate the definition of impartiality,. The definition pertains to the consent of the *main parties* of a conflict. If there are other parties involved or proxy forces that have become uncontrollable; peace enforcement may be a necessity in resolving an interstate rivalry. If either of the main parties behaves as a greedy spoiler, defining peace enforcement becomes difficult. One may argue that even in such cases peace enforcement may be relevant, for at least limited periods of time, provided that the actions conducted are consistent with the mandate. This elaboration supports the earlier notion that spoilers are defined from the peace processes point of view.

## Future Perspectives

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. *However, the threshold for the international community to intervene is lower on a conceptual level, but not necessarily in practice.* --

--. Some of these considerations pertain to the responsibility to protect. For example, challenging considerations are: how to protect, when to protect and what are the interests of a limited number of people versus an entire nation's interests. In generic terms, the needs of the periphery must be factored in plans and actions, whilst appreciating that migration will exist in the future.

*Disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories are likely to occur.* However, these disputes are likely not to be so severe that they necessarily lead to armed conflict. It is probable that agreements are reached through political negotiations and mediation. Technology --

*Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes are more likely to happen intrastate.* --

On a more generic note pertaining to the use of military power; one should explore the possibility of using "one time only" and "decisive impact" actions in support of a peace process. --



## Rely on Consent or Enforce Compliance

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Posture of peace support operation	Associated risk condition	Primary reason for PSO's posture	Assessment of propability
peace enforcement	failed governance	greedy spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	total spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in ungoverned spaces	greedy spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	extremism of marginalised groups	total spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	greedy spoiler	highly certain
peace enforcement	interstate rivalry	greedy spoiler	propable
peace enforcement	technological exploitation by criminal or rogue elements	greedy spoiler	propable
peace enforcement	potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	greedy spoiler	possible
peace enforcement	proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or effect	greedy and total spoilers	possible
peace enforcement	transnational criminal movements	support police operations	possible
peacekeeping	potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict	high hostility	highly certain
peacekeeping	uncontrolled migration	protection of aid efforts	highly certain
peacekeeping	consequences from environmental catastrophes or changes	protection of aid efforts	highly certain
peacekeeping	territorial and extra-territorial border disputes	limited spoiler	highly certain
peacekeeping	potential disputes over previously uninhabited and resource-rich territories	limited spoiler	possible

Table: Illustration of key research findings